German Classical and European Post-Classical Philosophy from the 18th to 20th Centuries

The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a seminal figure in German classical philosophy, is traditionally regarded as its founder. His work is divided into two major periods: the pre-critical (up to 1770) and the critical. During the pre-critical period, Kant pursued scientific inquiries, such as his hypothesis about the formation of the Solar System from a primordial nebula. The critical period is marked by his publication of key philosophical texts: "Critique of Pure Reason" (1781), "Critique of Practical Reason" (1788), and "Critique of Judgment" (1790). In this period, Kant established the foundations of his "critical philosophy," opposing both the dogmatism of metaphysics and the skepticism regarding the unknowable "things-in-themselves" (objective sources of sensations) and the knowable phenomena that form the realm of infinite possible experience.

In his dissertation (1770), Kant concluded that space is a subjective framework, not a relationship between things or a substance in which things exist. Additionally, he argued that intellectual intuition is possible only for God, while human intuition will always be sensuous. In "Critique of Pure Reason," Kant posited that "knowledge must relate to objects, rather than objects relating to our knowledge." Thus, Kant’s transcendental philosophy emerged, with the concept of the transcendental becoming central to his system. He also articulated three fundamental philosophical questions: "What can I know?", "What should I do?", and "What can I hope for?". He emphasized that these questions can be reduced to a single one: "What is man?"

For Kant, space and time are impossible outside of human perception. Everything humans know is comprehended through their way of organizing sensations—space and time—which have no meaning outside human consciousness. Hence, he concluded that we know things not as they are in themselves but as they appear to us in space and time. We can only know phenomena, not things-in-themselves. Kant did not provide a clear answer to "What is man?" but famously remarked, "From such a crooked piece of wood as that from which man is made, nothing straight can ever be built."

Kant believed that the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality cannot be proven theoretically but must be fundamental postulates of "practical reason," essential components of any virtue. Kant's stance on religious faith and the divine is encapsulated in the thesis: "I had to limit knowledge in order to make room for faith." For Kant, faith is when the recognition of the truth of a judgment has sufficient subjective grounding but is considered objectively insufficient. He distinguished between pragmatic faith—based on the practical application of means; doctrinal faith—about the existence of God, where "faith" reflects humility in an objective sense but firm confidence subjectively; and moral faith—which requires adherence to moral laws.

Kant asserted that belief in God is purely based on moral principles. He termed this "ethical theology" and placed it above speculative theology or metaphysics, which he saw as inherently contradictory in proving God’s existence. For Kant, the world of things does not indicate the existence of God on its own. Kant’s ethical theology is grounded not in theoretical consciousness but in practical reason. Thus, where Kant discusses the ideal of pure reason, faith relates to the theoretical nature of reason and can be applied positively in the theoretical use of pure reason.

Central to Kant’s ethics is the categorical imperative, an unconditional, universal rule of conduct for all people. This means that every action must be based on a principle that could be a universal moral law and that each person must be treated as an end in themselves, not merely as a means.

Kant repeatedly emphasized that philosophy cannot be taught, only the act of philosophizing can. Nonetheless, his followers significantly deviated from his teachings and, in some cases, radically altered the meaning of his critical philosophy.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) set out to reform Kant’s transcendental philosophy into a unified philosophical system. He often referred to his philosophical framework as Wissenschaftslehre (science of science) and proposed replacing the "so-called philosophy" with his Wissenschaftslehre.

For Fichte, philosophy is primarily a science, and science must be a system, a whole where everything derives from a single fundamental principle. He identified this principle as the "I". According to Fichte, a system based on the autonomy of thought, the freedom of reason, and independence from external influences could be termed true idealism and criticalism in contrast to dogmatism. Fichte believed that Kant’s philosophy was insufficiently critical because thinking was not autonomous due to various external factors. These considerations led Fichte to diverge from Kant in two areas:

• The recognition of the possibility of intellectual intuition for humans;
• The rejection of Kant's "thing-in-itself" as an independent source of knowledge and cognition.

However, the existence of the I necessarily entails the existence of the non-I. For I and non-I to be understood as opposites, they must have a common basis for comparison and contrast. This led Fichte to separate a particular absolute I from a divided I. He believed that every new position inevitably creates a new contradiction, resolved by forming the next position. Fichte’s distinction between I and non-I correlates with other oppositions such as freedom/necessity, intellect/nature, and male/female. He argued that the reality of both I and non-I convinces us not through knowledge but through feeling, as humans are inclined to believe in reality.

In his later works, Fichte began to examine reason from a historical perspective. He even proposed a principle of five stages in the development of the state, interpreted as epochs in the development of reason:

• The dominance of instincts;
• The dominance of external coercive authority;
• The epoch of liberation from authority and instinct;
• The epoch of rational science (i.e., Fichtean Wissenschaftslehre);
• The epoch of rational art.

Additionally, Fichte defined five forms of human consciousness towards the world: sensory, conscious, moral, religious, and scientific knowledge.

Fichte was a staunch patriot of the German nation, and during the wars with Napoleon, he equated "German" with universal human spirituality, asserting that the disappearance of the German nation would mean the disappearance of humanity itself with no hope for future revival.

The popularity of Fichtean Wissenschaftslehre quickly waned. In the later years of his life, Fichte was overshadowed by his student Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), who developed principles of objective idealist dialectics, viewing nature as a living organism characterized by dynamic unity of opposites. This unity can be perceived through intellectual intuition, a trait of philosophical and artistic talents. Schelling was a multifaceted thinker, and his work can be categorized into several distinctive stages: natural philosophy, transcendental idealism, philosophy of identity, and philosophy of revelation. Throughout his career, Schelling pursued the idea of finding the Absolute, which took various forms: I, absolute spirit, nature, and God. Expanding on Fichte’s ideas, Schelling aimed to portray philosophy as "an uninterrupted history of self-consciousness" traversing different epochs.

In Schelling’s theoretical philosophy, consciousness is defined through the unconscious. He identified three successive epochs demonstrating the development of self-consciousness: from initial sensation to productive contemplation, then to reflection, and finally to the absolute act of will. He argued that only after the I recognizes itself as autonomous does it become will. Following Kant, Schelling sought to preserve human freedom, which he deemed inconceivable without God. He noted that within a person are both the forces of darkness and light. Yet, as the primary being, Schelling identified not reason but will, thus he did not find it necessary to explain the world’s origin rationally.

Schelling believed that theoretical reason is too weak to comprehend God, and while the idea of God may only be realized through moral demands, God can only be understood through moral laws. If we acknowledge that theoretical reason cannot know God, then, regardless of how we name it—assumption, knowledge, or faith—we cannot escape the idea of God. On a personal level, Schelling believed, "In order to be able to believe in an absolute object, I must first remove myself as the subject of this belief." Thus, for Schelling, belief in God must arise a priori, dogmatically, and should remain constant unless it is the subject of our progress.

Conversely, Schelling attempted to view faith as a unique mode of knowledge. He believed there exists a type of knowledge that is both rationalistic and incorporates material faith. Therefore, faith cannot be opposed to mediated knowledge but is closely related to it. Faith always aims at something and is essential in any purposeful activity directed at a specific goal. If faith is a necessary component of any purposeful activity, it is an important element of true philosophy. Thus, Schelling categorized those who oppose faith and knowledge as people who do not know what they want. If such people understand faith not as contemplation, they should not reject knowledge altogether; or if they view faith as direct knowledge or true contemplation, they should not consider themselves proponents of rational faith.