Philosophy of Life

Critique of Preceding Philosophy and Understanding the Subject of Philosophy

The philosophy of life is one of the fundamental currents of non-classical philosophy. It initiates a strand of thought that concentrates on the issue of human existence and the question of individuality. Certainly, humanity has always been, at least since the time of Socrates, at the center of philosophical inquiry. However, classical philosophy never positioned man as the focal point of the world. Even in Socrates, the human being is merely a part of the cosmos, a microcosm.

The philosophy of life emerges in the latter half of the 19th century, with key figures such as Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), and Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) at its origins. Yet, when we speak of the philosophy of life, we primarily refer to Nietzsche, whose name is associated both with a fervent appreciation of this philosophy and with vehement criticism. Nietzsche's ideas also bear the stigma of taboo that was imposed during the Soviet era, as his thoughts were branded as the philosophical foundation of German National Socialism and fascism, rendering discussions about them, at best, inappropriate.

Critique of Preceding Philosophy and Understanding the Subject of Philosophy

From his earliest works, Friedrich Nietzsche expresses a growing distrust of existing philosophy, a sentiment that intensifies over time. This does not imply that the philosophy of life is disconnected from earlier philosophical thought. Nietzsche's oeuvre reflects a profound understanding of the history of philosophy, particularly influenced by ancient philosophy and the ideas of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche sees ancient philosophy as the rightful source of all European thought and frequently engages with it. Concerning Schopenhauer, Nietzsche himself asserts that when he read "The World as Will and Representation," he felt it was entirely written for him. Schopenhauer's concept of the "will to live," which replaces the objective world, captivates Nietzsche. Nevertheless, Nietzsche ultimately repudiates the entirety of previous philosophy, including Schopenhauer.

What, then, disquiets Nietzsche about existing philosophy?

Firstly, he contends that the primary aim of philosophy has been the pursuit of truth. Even Aristotle distinguished philosophy from other sciences, elevating it above them by asserting that philosophy concerns itself with truth for its own sake, while other sciences operate on principles of utility.

Secondly, he asserts that reason is the source of truth and the means to attain it. Senses, he argues, are sources of deception, distorting the true world and its essence. Only reason grants us comprehension of the genuine world.

Thirdly, as a consequence of the second point, the world reveals itself to us in two forms: as the world given to us through the senses, a "moral-optical deception" that presents itself as reality, and as the true world, the realm of authentic being, whose representation is provided by reason through philosophy and science.

Fourthly, ancient philosophy acknowledges the duality of human nature, comprising reason and body, the Apollonian and Dionysian elements, as personified by the Olympian gods Apollo and Dionysus—representing the rational and the sensual, instinctive facets of humanity. Yet it favors the Apollonian aspect, denying the corporeal element. The philosopher's wisdom lies in being liberated from sensory deceptions concerning the true world and human desires. "To be a philosopher, to be a mummy, to enact the monotheism of grave diggers!—And, above all, banish the body, this pitiable idea fixe of the senses! Possessed of every conceivable logical error, it is discredited, even impossible, though it is bold enough to pretend to be something genuine!"

Primarily, Nietzsche opposes the notion that the category of being should be central to philosophy, which results in a division of the world into true and false. "The foundations on which 'this' world is deemed illusory only serve to substantiate its reality; another kind of reality remains utterly unprovable... It is pointless to yearn for an 'other' world apart from this one..." True being is an empty fiction. The world, in fact, is not a stagnant entity but a continuous becoming, a process that can never be halted. Nietzsche replaces the category of being with that of life. But what is life?

Here, it is worth noting a few words about Nietzsche's language. He is a remarkable stylist, recognized even in his youth by the philological community, attaining a position as a professor of philology at Basel University at the age of 24 without defending a doctoral dissertation. He considers himself, without undue modesty, the foremost stylist among Germans, comparable to Heine in the succinctness and clarity of his language. Nietzsche communicates in aphorisms, metaphors, and a somewhat cryptic language. His narratives lack a calm, sequential progression of thought, problem formulation, or a systematic web of arguments and evidence. His ideas are vivid, fragmentary, and imaginative, exhibiting a more artistic than scientific quality. Thus, one will not find strict definitions in his work; his exposition is fragmented, leaping from one subject to another, requiring interpretation, and is often challenging to grasp. It is no coincidence that Nietzsche's principal work, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," is referred to as the Nietzschean "Bible," a designation he himself acknowledged. Many scholars justly link Nietzsche's distinctive style to the migraines that plagued him throughout his creative life, as he himself stated. However, this style is also connected to his irrationalist inclination, which will be discussed further. Consequently, it is difficult to find rigorous definitions in Nietzsche's work, which are typically characteristic of both philosophy and science, as well as a coherent presentation of problems. This applies to the concept of "life" and others as well.

Life is the natural in contrast to the mechanical, artificial; it is a holistic reality grasped intuitively, not identical to either spirit or matter. "Life, as the most familiar form of being, is a specific will to accumulate power..."—life is the will to power. Nietzsche examines life in a broad sense, encompassing not only the organic world but the universe as a whole. He even proposes substituting the concept of "force" in physics with "will to power." This interpretation of life arises from the understanding of the world as eternal becoming, rather than as static, complete, and defined. Yet, simultaneously, this view enables Nietzsche to focus on the human condition, for it is in humanity that life manifests most fully, revealing that "the deepest essence of being is the will to power."

Nietzsche fundamentally disagrees with the classical philosophical approach to the problem of humanity. Beginning with Socrates, an Apollonian perspective prevailed in Greece, viewing the human as a rational being. The Dionysian element—instinct and nature—was deemed inferior, and passions were to be suppressed. This perspective became dominant and was further amplified by Christianity, which deemed nobility, strength, health, uniqueness, and virtue as lesser compared to reason. However, reason is characterized by tranquility and detachment, skepticism, and Socratic dialectics, ultimately triumphing over exceptionalism and courage through cunning argumentative tactics. Nietzsche counters this approach, proclaiming the priority of the Dionysian element over the Apollonian, of instinct and sensation over reason, and of Heraclitus's notion of becoming over Parmenides's and Socrates's absolute being, virtue, and justice.

From this foundation, Nietzsche's approach to the problem of truth follows suit. He contends that true judgments are no more valuable than false ones; a false judgment has a right to exist if it "contributes to life, sustains life." Thus, to treat philosophy as a theory of knowledge aimed at achieving true understanding is, according to Nietzsche, profoundly misguided. Scientific knowledge is not objective; rather, science, even physics, serves merely as a means of interpreting and organizing the world, not explaining it. The world is inherently chaotic. The laws of nature and causal relationships are convenient fictions humans invent to bolster their confidence and assert their existence. Hence, reason is not the omnipotent force that earlier philosophies, especially Enlightenment thought, claimed it to be, nor can it provide us with objective truth. Moreover, thought itself is merely an expression of instinct. "After long observations of philosophers and reading their works between the lines," Nietzsche writes, "I tell myself that most conscious thought should still be attributed to instinctual activity, even in the case of philosophical thinking."

For Nietzsche, reason is far from being the defining trait of humanity, and cognitive function holds subordinate significance in human life. Knowledge is necessary for self-preservation and the strengthening of the will to power. "Utility from the perspective of preservation, rather than any abstract-theoretical need to avoid deception, is the motive for the development of cognitive faculties... they evolve to ensure that their observations suffice for our preservation. In other words, the desire to know correlates with the growth of the will to power in that species..." From this standpoint, Nietzsche reinterprets truth, rejecting the classical notion of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality. To him, truth represents a convenient fiction for humanity. Science is a human construct that enables orientation within the surrounding environment. "Truth is a kind of illusion," he asserts, "without which a certain species of living beings could not survive. The value for life is the ultimate foundation." Nietzsche's understanding of truth aligns closely with its pragmatic conception as useful knowledge. However, within this understanding lies a crucial distinction. Based on his concept of the Übermensch, Nietzsche posits that truth is not universally applicable; instead, it belongs to the Übermensch and the masses. Thus, there are two kinds of truth, corresponding to two systems of values: the truth for the majority, for the common people, and the truth for the chosen, for the Übermensch. Nietzsche maintains that reason, with its quest for analysis, certainty, and definitions, is incapable of grasping the dynamics of life; this task is better suited to intuition than to reason. Notably, Nietzsche's conception of intuition differs from Descartes's intellectual intuition.

In Nietzsche's understanding, intuition is more sensory than rational, as life is not reason but body, essence, and nature, with reason being merely a function of the body. Consequently, the dialectical, fluid, and mutable nature of life is more accessible to the senses than to reason. Nonetheless, Nietzsche does not devote extensive attention to this issue; it interests him primarily as a critique of classical understandings of science and the role of reason in knowledge and human life. Researchers of Nietzsche, such as Dilthey and Spengler, have paid more attention to this problem.

In truth, philosophy has been less a search for truth than an articulation of the philosopher's experiences, akin to memoirs written unconsciously and unnoticed by themselves. The outcome of philosophical thought consistently results in the philosopher proclaiming a system of values. Nietzsche notes that since Socrates, any philosophical system has culminated in an exploration of ethical problems, declaring a particular moral framework. The resolution of the problems of being and truth is significant, as it paves the way for specific interpretations of good and evil, justice and injustice, and all other moral categories. Indeed, Kant had previously asserted this when he claimed that his critique of pure reason was initiated to determine the possibilities and limits of practical reason. Based on this understanding of philosophy's function, Nietzsche sets himself the task of critiquing the entire existing system of values and creating a new one.