Philosophy of Life

The Overman - Carrier of a New Morality: Immoralism

All the shortcomings and vices of decadence are inherent in the modern European individual, Nietzsche asserts. Thus, through the voice of his protagonist Zarathustra, he proclaims: "Behold, I teach you the Overman! The Overman is the meaning of the earth." "Man is a rope, stretched between beast and Overman... In man, what matters is that he is a bridge, not an end: in man, one can love only what he is in transition and demise."

Who then is the Overman? Did he exist before? What are his characteristic traits? How is he connected to his people, his nation? Nietzsche consistently posits that the Overman must serve as a goal and meaning for every individual. In man, only that which serves to approach and affirm the Overman holds value. Yet, when it comes to the Overman himself, Nietzsche resorts to vivid imagery, beautiful comparisons, and aphorisms, rather than concepts and definitions. The Overman is "a lightning bolt," "madness," "a blonde beast," "a creator," and so forth. However, fundamentally, Nietzsche articulates the essence of the Overman primarily through his critique of the modern individual—the man of decadence. In most of his works, not only in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," he dedicates primary attention to this aspect. Through a critique of the vices of contemporary society and its value system, Nietzsche illustrates what the Overman should not embody, what values he should not possess. Still, from these two approaches to characterizing the Overman, one can identify his distinctive traits.

First and foremost, the Overman is a being endowed with a highly developed will to power, for the will to power is not merely a characteristic trait of life; it is, in fact, "life itself is but a particular manifestation of the will to power..." Thus, Nietzsche's concept of "will to power" cannot be interpreted as a mere aspiration to ascend the ladders of political or any other sphere of human activity, although Nietzsche occasionally offers reflections that might suggest such an interpretation. He often remarks that anyone, even the smallest individual, strives for dominance over those even lesser than themselves. Yet, this merely illustrates that "the will to power" is inherent to all humans and not exclusive to them. Regarding the Overman, however, his "will to power" is inextricably linked to his role as a "creator," an "inventor of new values." This is another characteristic trait of the Overman.

Nietzsche is convinced that all human culture results from the endeavors of the Overman, manifesting his creative forces, his aspiration to transcend the existing boundaries. Only from this perspective can we rightly comprehend the third characteristic of the Overman.

The Overman stands beyond good and evil. This realm of good and evil constitutes the prevailing moral system, the system of Christian values, where, in Nietzsche's view, everything is turned upside down: compassion, weakness, and submission are hailed as virtues, while cruelty, strength, and independence are condemned as vices, where the poor, the incapable, the humble, the suffering, the sick, and the ugly are deemed noble, while the powerful, the mighty, the cruel, and the self-assured are disparaged. Nietzsche even argues that the etymology of the words "noble" and "base" in German and other languages reveals that the notion of "noble" derives from "aristocratic," while "base" originates from "common," "earthly," or "lowly." Therefore, Nietzsche contends that the morality of the Overman must fundamentally differ, being directly opposed, as the Overman must be guided by other values. To act, to create, to affirm new values, Nietzsche believes one must be cruel, malevolent, and stand above the masses. The good, the compassionate are incapable of creativity, of asserting the new. However, the Overman is not an amoralist; he is an immoralist, though dictionaries often equate these concepts.

Nietzsche recognizes that, although morality is a prolonged oppression for individuals, it is necessary for society; without it, communal life among people is impossible. Hence, religion is also necessary. For strong, independent individuals destined for dominance, religion serves as a means of discipline and education, another tool for supremacy, overcoming resistance; for ordinary individuals, for the majority, religion provides a sense of sufficiency, comfort, and hope. Nietzsche views religion as the foundation of morality, the basis of the value system. Yet, the norms of the Overman's morality pertain solely to his relationships with his equals and do not apply to his relations with ordinary individuals. In dealings with the latter, the Overman is not guided by moral norms. "... Whoever has known those 'good' (referring to the noble, the aristocratic) only as enemies, has known them solely as malevolent foes, and those same individuals, who among their peers strictly adhere to the rules dictated by morality, respect, habit, gratitude, and mutual control, express in their relations with one another a remarkable ingenuity regarding tact, restraint, sensitivity, loyalty, pride, and friendship; yet outside their milieu, where the alien begins, they behave much like unleashed predatory beasts. ... At the core of all these noble races lies the predatory beast, the splendid blonde beast, lustfully roaming in search of prey and victory...". Thus, the Overman possesses a dual morality: he adheres to one set of moral norms in relationships with his equals and entirely different, opposing norms in relations with those of a different circle, with ordinary people, the common folk.

Nietzsche posits that there exist two types of people: the aristocrats, the nobility, the noble, and the commoners, the rabble, the plebeians. This distinction does not manifest in social hierarchy (plebeians may occupy high positions in society), but rather at the physiological level, at the level of vital force, at the level of the will to power, at the level of instinct. Given that the Overman embodies the life forces, he must assert his will in defiance of the common folk, without limiting himself in means in relation to them, rejecting mercy and compassion, pity and love. He must be cruel and ruthless, decisive and unyielding in dealings with the rabble. However, the common folk always outnumber the extraordinary, and they harbor a perpetual hatred for the remarkable, thus making it difficult for the Overman to thrive within society. Nietzsche dismisses social Darwinism with its assertion that only the strongest survive. In society, those who thrive are those who keep pace with the majority, sharing in their values.

It is pertinent to address the question: is the Übermensch a being of the future, or has it existed before? Nietzsche, in Zarathustra and other works, primarily speaks of the Übermensch as a future state of humanity. Some commentators even suggest that Nietzsche views the Übermensch as a forthcoming stage in the development of human society. Such an interpretation, however, is entirely unfounded. The Übermensch is not a mere stage of societal evolution, akin to communism in Marx's framework. The Übermensch has existed before: it embodies the “Roman, Arab, German, and Japanese nobility, the heroes of Homer, the Scandinavian Vikings”—Caesar and Napoleon, the figures of the Renaissance, Goethe and Wagner, and Nietzsche himself, ultimately. “In isolated instances across various regions of the globe and among different cultures,” Nietzsche writes, “there manifests what is essentially a higher type, which represents the species of the Übermensch in relation to all humanity. Such fortunate occurrences have always existed and may continue to arise. Under favorable circumstances, entire generations, tribes, and nations may embody these successes.”

The Übermensch is more a creation of nature than of culture. It results from a gradual and prolonged accumulation of essential qualities. The populace serves as the soil, the foundation, an indirect route to the emergence of a handful of great individuals. The appearance of such remarkable figures is contingent and conditioned by time, particularly when it comes to great nations. This phenomenon, as a rule, pertains to the past, to the dawn of civilization, when the natural triumphed over the cultural, when strength, dignity, and the will to power were unashamedly displayed. Therefore, the claims of German fascism to Nietzsche's philosophical legacy, representing the German nation as a nation of Übermenschen, were baseless. Indeed, if one were to “bring forth not the prophet but the clinician,” as the French philosopher Albert Camus observes, one could extract nothing from Nietzsche's work but an ordinary, lowly cruelty that he detested with all his soul. “Before Nietzsche and National Socialism, there was no instance where thought, wholly sanctified by nobility, was presented to the world in a parade of falsehoods and dreadful heaps of corpses in concentration camps.”

Nietzsche's philosophy should not be perceived as a practical plan for the reconstruction of the world, the establishment of a society of Übermenschen, for another reason. In Zarathustra, Nietzsche articulates another fundamental idea of his philosophy—the idea of eternal recurrence. He not only repudiates notions of progress and the inevitability of societal development, but he asserts that in the world, everything returns to its place. From Nietzsche's perspective, both natural and social evolution do not signify a movement toward the better; change does not embody a progressive orientation. No reasonable projections for the future can be derived from Nietzsche's philosophy.

So, where should we discern Nietzsche's merit? Why can we justly regard three Germans—Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud—as having defined the vision of humanity within the philosophy and culture of the twentieth century and beyond?

Nietzsche himself perceives his mission as one of reevaluating all values. He analyzes the perspectives of philosophers from Antiquity to his time regarding the world, humanity, science, morality, God, and the entire spectrum of human relations, declaring the fallibility of these viewpoints and the inadequacy of the existing philosophical system of values. More accurately, he critiques not their absolute fallibility, but rather their unsuitability for the exceptional individual, for the person endowed with a strong will to power, for the Übermensch. In this context, Nietzsche states: “My philosophy is directed toward hierarchy—not toward individualistic morality. The herd instinct must prevail among the herd, yet not extend beyond its boundaries: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different evaluation of their actions, just as independent or ’predatory’ creatures do.” Such a value system is fundamentally distinct from the existing one championed by Nietzsche's philosophy. If, in Nietzsche's view, the emergence of the Übermensch was once a matter of chance, now, grounded in his philosophy, the Übermensch will consciously cultivate the will to power inherent in nature. In this sense, we can speak of the advent of the Übermensch proclaimed by Zarathustra.

However, Nietzsche's doctrine of the Übermensch should hardly be regarded as a theory for the cultivation of the Übermensch. Nietzsche's philosophy is not instrumental; it is, rather, prophetic, oracular. We might agree with G. Schirbeks and N. Gille that, like Socrates, Nietzsche serves as an “intellectual gadfly, beautiful precisely in that it compels us to defend ourselves against him.” Nietzsche was one of the first to declare, on the eve of an era of standardization, mass culture, and conformity, the right of humanity to exceptionality, individuality, uniqueness, and creativity. It is in this aspect that we ought to evaluate the influence of his teaching on the Übermensch on the development of our conceptions of humanity.