Postmodernism

The Essence of Postmodernism

Postmodernism in philosophy is inextricably linked to a new understanding of the nature of knowledge and its truthfulness, leading to a fresh perspective on existence itself. As noted in the previous chapter, the focus of philosophy in the twentieth century centers on knowledge and language, from which all other philosophical inquiries arise. This approach is vividly illustrated in the work of Jean-François Lyotard (1924—1998) titled "The Postmodern Condition." "Our working hypothesis," writes Lyotard, "is that as society transitions into what is termed the post-industrial era, and culture enters the age of postmodernity, the status of knowledge undergoes a transformation." This shift in the status of knowledge manifests primarily in the fact that knowledge ceases to be merely an element of cognitive development and personal formation; instead, it takes on a value-laden form, emerging as the principal productive force, achieving the status of information. Henceforth, society requires knowledge in the form of information, and its evaluation pivots not on its truthfulness, but rather on its legitimization. Knowledge becomes one of the key factors of state power, which plays a crucial role in its legitimization, for "in the age of informatics, the question of knowledge is, more than ever, a question of governance."

Lyotard conceives of knowledge as a specific linguistic game, where the rules are established by the players through consensus. The game holds meaning and significance only if the rules are acknowledged by its participants. In modern societies, the legitimating function concerning knowledge and the rules of the game was fulfilled by grand narratives: Hegel's idea of universal rationality and progress, Marx's notion of class struggle and alienation, Parsons' conception of the systemic nature of society, and even Nietzsche's idea of the will to power—although, on the other hand, Nietzsche’s philosophy can also be seen as pre-postmodern. However, in the twentieth century, these grand narratives fade from prominence and can no longer serve as legitimating factors. The new legitimating factor becomes power, represented by the ruling class that makes decisions, which "is not composed of a traditional political class, but rather a heterogeneous layer formed of corporate leaders, high-level bureaucrats, heads of major professional organizations, trade unions, political parties, and religious denominations." The legitimacy of the ruling class's decisions is then realized through effectiveness and productivity. Productivity serves not only as a measure of efficacy but also as a reliable verification and a satisfactory conclusion. Conversely, the legitimating function regarding knowledge is now performed by scholars, who are no longer intellectuals and bearers of societal ideals, but rather specialists and experts who establish the rules of the game and formulate paradigms and discourses.

The postmodern theory of knowledge fundamentally rejects the idea of productivity as a means of legitimizing knowledge. As Lyotard asserts, productivity is inherently tied to the concept of a stable system that adheres to the laws of thermodynamics. Yet modern science, particularly quantum theory and microphysics, has undermined our notions of stability, determinism, and predictability. In this light, "postmodern science constructs a theory of its own evolution as an interrupted, catastrophic, irrepressible, paradoxical development. It alters the content of the word 'knowledge' and articulates how this transformation may occur. It transforms the unknown into the unknowable, and it instills a model of legitimization that bears no relation to the model of maximum productivity, but rather understands development as a paralogism." In Lyotard’s context, a paralogism signifies the absence of a definitive discourse, a lack of established rules of engagement in the functioning of science as a condition of its legitimization, and a negation of the legitimating significance of effectiveness and productivity. Within science, there can and do exist simultaneously not one but multiple rules of the game. "Science, if it is selective, serves as an antithesis to the model of a stable system in its pragmatics. Any statement must be upheld only if it contains a distinction from what was previously known and is subject to argumentation and proof. It is a model of an 'open system,' where the relevance of a statement lies in its ability to 'give birth to ideas,' that is, to other statements and alternative rules of the game. In a generalized sense, the issue of legitimization transforms into a matter of the relationship between the antithesis represented by scientific pragmatics and society."

According to Lyotard, society should operate not on the principle of systemic coherence and consensus, but rather on the principle of justice. In this context, justice is not tied to consensus. So what, then, constitutes justice according to Lyotard? It must be regarded as the diversity of rules of the game and the freedom to modify these rules. "This direction (postmodernism) corresponds to the evolution of social interactions, where temporary contracts indeed supplant permanent establishments in professional, affective, sexual, cultural, familial, international realms, and in political affairs."

Even further in discrediting knowledge is another French philosopher, the postmodernist Jacques Derrida (1930). Derrida establishes his theory of deconstruction, in which he "deconstructs the authority of the monumental text." He reveals the multiplicity of meanings inherent in any text, arising from the polysemy of individual words. "Language is neither absolute, nor precise, nor logical. In each word, every phrase, and even in the structure of sentences lie the potentialities for ambiguities that distort meaning. Language eludes clarity and precision." Thus, it becomes apparent that postmodernism proclaims different tasks and sets new goals for philosophy. Classical philosophy aimed to reduce knowledge to a singularity, seeking foundational principles and being as such. Even non-classical philosophers, such as Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, and the neopositivists, were unable to evade this goal, albeit presenting it in the forms of the will to power, the unconscious, "Dasein" (being-existence), or linguistic fact. In contrast, postmodernism—and particularly Derrida—proclaims the right of the reader to provide their own interpretation of the text. The traditional concept of truth and the univocal nature of being is declared untenable. This univocity is now denied not only in reality but also in language. Being can take various forms and requires no justification. It may manifest as intergalactic battles or the realm of Harry Potter, in the virtual domain of the Internet or the political landscape of post-Soviet states. It can appear in any guise—be it in nature, society, thought, or language. Philosophy's pursuit of unity and univocity becomes impossible. However, in this context, the philosophy of postmodernism itself may also become unviable, a point that Derrida does not contest. His interpretation of language stands as one of many possible interpretations. But how, then, does one reconcile this with Lyotard's justice, which he declares an inviolable value? In the philosophy of postmodernism, there are no answers to this question.