Postmodernism

Modernism: Its Boundaries and Characteristics

The question of modernity and postmodernity, their boundaries and meanings, continues to provoke intense debate even today. This discussion extends beyond postmodernism in philosophy to encompass culture as a whole, as both modernism and postmodernism manifest as cultural phenomena rather than mere movements or trends within philosophy. Today, the majority of philosophers agree that the era of postmodernism emerged at the end of the twentieth century. By the 1980s, postmodernism as a cultural phenomenon was evident worldwide, with the possible exception of the post-Soviet space, where it was overshadowed by the processes of perestroika; however, even there, elements of postmodernism made their presence felt in everyday life and culture, albeit without adequate theoretical reflection or understanding. This situation is now changing, with increasing attention being paid to postmodernism. Here, we intend to explore the characteristic features of postmodernity in philosophy and its associated challenges. Yet, before delving into postmodernism, it is essential to consider modernism and its defining traits, for one can only grasp postmodernism in relation to modernism and how it defines itself.

Modernism: Its Boundaries and Characteristics

There are two main approaches concerning the boundaries of modernity. One associates the beginning of modernity with the French Revolution (the late eighteenth century) and the rise of capitalism in Europe, linked to the practical realization of a social project developed by the French Enlightenment thinkers. The other approach traces the inception of modernity back to the formulation of that very social project, thus placing the beginning of modernism nearly a century and a half earlier, in the mid-seventeenth century, when Francis Bacon and René Descartes laid the groundwork for a new worldview, centering humanity within the cosmos and assigning it responsibility for its fate and the establishment of social justice. Bacon and Descartes proclaimed the principle of "knowledge is power," placing the onus of truth upon humanity. From this moment on, individuals associated their futures with the development of knowledge, culminating in its highest form—science. This notion further developed within the philosophy of the Enlightenment, where fundamental new principles of societal order were articulated: freedom, equality, justice, reason, progress, brotherhood, and so forth. Enlightenment thinkers assumed that the world—nature, society, and humanity itself—operates rationally, governed by objective laws, and that individuals, through their reason, could comprehend these laws and consequently construct their social relations, transform nature, and redefine themselves. The faith in reason, science, and progress lies at the core of the worldview of the modern era.

However, by declaring humanity responsible for truth, Descartes inadvertently laid the groundwork for the pitfalls of modernism, for he severed truth from being, scattering them across different realms—subject and object. Antiquity and the Middle Ages upheld a unity, a congruence between truth and being. This unity was famously articulated by Parmenides in his assertion: "What is thought and what is is the same," and expressed in the view that the essence of the cosmos, the essence of being, was identified with the Logos—reason, the law responsible for being, as it was inseparable from it. In the Middle Ages, God embodied the unity of truth and being; He is both the creator of being and the bearer of truth. Thus, the comprehension of truth in both cases equated to a comprehension of being. This explains the confidence and completeness of philosophical systems in Antiquity and the Middle Ages.

In modern philosophy, while humanity is proclaimed responsible for truth, it is not held accountable for being; individuals did not create it. Hegel was the sole thinker of modernity who attempted to reunite truth with existence, yet his voice went unheard. Humanity emerged merely as a knowing subject, albeit one recognized as capable of comprehending truth and structuring its actions accordingly. Yet, by the late eighteenth century, at the very onset of the practical realization of the modernist project, Kant expressed doubt regarding humanity's capacity for adequate knowledge of the world. The nineteenth century demonstrated that significant issues arose even with the practical implementation of the modernist project. The slogans under which the French Revolution unfolded remained mere slogans, failing to manifest in reality. The twentieth century amplified these doubts further. Two world wars, unleashed in the heart of educated Europe, claimed tens of millions of lives, while the arms race and global crises, including AIDS, brought humanity to the brink of survival, irrevocably undermining faith in the "rationality" of the world and the capabilities of reason. Even the consumer successes of the "golden billion" appear questionable when assessed in terms of the intrinsic value of humanity, individual freedom, and holistic development.

Already in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche, within his philosophy, proclaimed the futility of reason’s claims to truth and the necessity for a reevaluation of the entire value system. This marked a direct expression of the crisis of modernity and the beginning of postmodernity—though only the beginning. The twentieth century intensified these tendencies, manifesting in phenomenology, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, and existentialism. However, until the last third of the twentieth century, we can still speak of an era of modernism. The primary reason for this state of affairs lies in the prevailing belief during this period in the objectivity of being, which, albeit manifested through linguistic structures, retained its credibility. "Language is the house of being," Heidegger asserts. It is only when society enters the post-industrial phase, transitioning into an information society and becoming increasingly enveloped by the network of the Internet, that one can justly claim the advent of postmodernism.