Theoretical and Epistemological Problems in Western Philosophy of The 19th-20th Centuries

Positivism and its Stages of Development

The problems of epistemology and science have occupied a central place in philosophical inquiry since the dawn of modern philosophy. Even Bacon and Descartes connected humanity’s successes in mastering nature and regulating social life with the expansion of knowledge and the advancement of science. Subsequently, Locke, Hume, the philosophers of the French Enlightenment, and particularly Kant, devoted paramount attention to epistemological issues. However, during this period, questions arose concerning what humanity can know, the limits—if any—of human knowledge, and the methods and means through which knowledge is acquired.

In non-classical philosophy, epistemological problems emerge in a different context. It shows little interest in the relationship between scientific knowledge and the objects of that knowledge, except in early positivism and Machism, where this concern is somewhat present. Nor does it engage with how our knowledge and various ideas come into being. As Karl Popper notes, "The question of the pathways through which a new idea—be it a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory—comes to an individual may hold significant interest for empirical psychology, but it is entirely irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge... For an assertion to undergo logical analysis, it must first be presented to us. Someone must initially formulate such an assertion and then subject it to logical examination." Thus, the focus shifts to issues related to the scientific character of scientific knowledge itself (as paradoxical as this may sound), its content and truth, the relationship between knowledge and consciousness, the development of science, and its significance in social life.

Positivism and its Stages of Development

Positivism emerged in the 1830s. Its founder was the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857). The English philosophers John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) are also regarded as foundational figures of positivism. Their ideas constitute the core of the first stage in the development of positivism, and without a doubt, it is Comte who deserves credit for articulating its fundamental principles.

Of course, positivism did not arise in a vacuum. Comte himself identified Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo—those who stood at the genesis of new science grounded in empirical facts and experimentation—as his precursors. Among the forerunners of positivism, one must also mention Hume and Kant, who proclaimed that our knowledge is limited to phenomena, rather than the things-in-themselves, their essence, or "inner" nature.

It is essential to briefly mention the social conditions that precipitated positivism. Such a condition was Comte's dissatisfaction with the prevailing state of society. "Thus, the task of positivism," Comte states, "is to generalize science and unify social order. In other words, the aim of positivism is to construct a philosophy of sciences as the foundation of a new social religion. The social doctrine is the goal of positivism, while the scientific doctrine serves as the means." According to Comte, the level of societal development is determined by the evolution of thought, the dominant type of philosophical thinking, or the phase of intellectual progress within society and each individual.

Comte posits that the fundamental tenet of positivism is that true philosophy recognizes: "Our knowledge is confined to phenomena, and this knowledge of phenomena is relative, not absolute. We know neither the essence nor even the actual manner of the emergence of a given fact; we can only discern its relationships to other facts through continuity and similarity." This, in essence, forms the credo of Mill’s positivism. Previous philosophy maintained that the task of science was to uncover the underlying causes of phenomena, to reveal the essence underpinning those phenomena. Positive philosophy contends that science should describe phenomena and establish the laws governing their interrelations. On this basis, science can and must provide predictions about the future, forecasting social practice.

Another crucial aspect of Comte's philosophy is the notion that humanity progresses through three stages or phases: theological, metaphysical, and positive.

The theological phase of intellectual development is characterized by the search for the causes of all natural and social phenomena in forces beyond nature and society, in gods who govern natural processes. Religion stands as the dominant worldview and dictates its method for explaining phenomena. Naturally, religion itself is not static; it evolves from polytheism to monotheism, yet the approach to phenomena remains unchanged.

The metaphysical phase of intellectual development succeeds the theological phase and is marked by the replacement of otherworldly forces and deities with first causes and primordial essences—substances that exist beyond experience and give rise to the phenomena accessible to us. Metaphysical philosophy directs knowledge towards the pursuit of substances lying behind phenomena, attempting to answer the question of why certain phenomena occur and to identify the invisible causes of their emergence and existence. While myth and religion in the theological stage illustrate how gods govern the world and determine the existence of objects and phenomena, metaphysical philosophy strives to elucidate why particular phenomena manifest.

In the positive phase, the mind, convinced of the futility of any inquiry into causes and essences, confines itself to observation and classification of phenomena, as well as the discovery of immutable relationships of sequence and similarity among things: in short, the unveiling of the laws governing phenomena. At this point, reason concludes that it can respond only to the question of "how," rather than "why." The task of science is to describe phenomena and their interrelations, rather than to seek out "underlying causes." In a manner akin to Hegel’s dialectic of negation, we again return to the question of "how?"—but now at a new stage of development, the stage of positive science. “The metaphysician believes he can grasp the causes and essences of surrounding phenomena, while the positivist, acknowledging his limitations, restricts himself to revealing the laws that govern the succession of these phenomena.”

Of course, these phases or forms of philosophical thought do not exist in pure form. Throughout history, even in the theological stage, other phases—metaphysical and positive—coexisted. It is noteworthy that genetically, during the first historical period, the theological stage predominated, while in the second historical period, the metaphysical phase gained ground, culminating in the 19th century with the ascendancy of positivism. Moreover, in various fields of knowledge, the transition and alternation of degrees or phases occur at different times. Based on the study of the formation of particular sciences and their transition to the positive stage, Comte categorizes the sciences as follows: 1) mathematics, which includes “the science of numbers, geometry, mechanics”; 2) astronomy; 3) physics; 4) chemistry; 5) biology; 6) sociology, or social science. All sciences are interdependent; they are branches of a singular tree of knowledge, with more complex sciences relying on the principles of simpler ones.

What then remains for philosophy if science is reduced to the description of phenomena observed in experience? Classical positivism does not deny the significance of philosophy; rather, it posits that philosophy is “innate to human nature.” According to Spencer, “...philosophy is the knowledge of the highest generalities,” and the task of philosophy is, based on the generalization of the positive sciences, to uncover the universal laws governing the development of the world and knowledge. Such laws include Comte’s law of the three phases of intellectual development and Spencer’s law of evolution. Mill argues that philosophy should become the philosophy of science, defining it as follows: “The philosophy of science is... nothing other than science itself, considered not in terms of its results, the truths it ascertains, but in terms of the processes by which the mind attains these results, the signs by which it recognizes these truths, and the orderly and methodical arrangement of these for the sake of achieving greater clarity of understanding, as well as the most comprehensive and convenient application: in a word, it is the logic of science.” In short, Mill maintains that philosophy is the theory of knowledge of positive science, developing general methods for the apprehension of phenomena.

The second stage in the development of positivism is empiriocriticism, or Machism, named after Ernst Mach (1838-1916), an Austrian philosopher and physicist. Alongside Mach, the German philosopher Richard Avenarius (1843-1896) is also considered a founder of empiriocriticism, though Mach’s ideas gained wider prominence. Consequently, when discussing this stage in the evolution of positivism, the focus centers on Mach’s perspectives.

Machism emerged in response to the crisis in physics that erupted at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. With the discovery of radioactivity and the divisibility of the atom, it became apparent that Newton’s laws, once deemed universal, do not apply in the realm of the microcosm. Physicists faced pressing questions: what are the laws of physics by nature? Are they reflections of an objective reality existing beyond us, or are they somewhat arbitrary constructs of our minds? In this context, Mach proposed that the ultimate reality with which scientists deal in experience consists of the “primary elements of the world,” manifesting in one instance as physical phenomena—such as the dependence of color on sunlight—and in another as psychological experiences—such as the dependence of color on the structure of our eyes. The last element we confront in the process of knowledge is sensation; there is no substance behind the elements of the world.

“...The complete exclusion of sensory experiences,” Mach writes, “is an impossible task; on the contrary, we regard them as the sole direct source of physics...” The idea of substance “finds not the slightest foundation in the elements...” The primary principle guiding our thought in the analysis and generalization of experiential data, that is, sensations, is the principle of economy or minimal expenditure of effort.

Thus, while classical positivism, represented by Comte and Spencer, expels first causes, primordial essences, and substances from science, unwavering in the objective existence of experiential facts, Machism already questions the existence of objective reality and experience, asserting that the ultimate reality consists of primary elements of the world, which simultaneously belong to both the physical (objective) and the psychological (subjective) realms.

However, empiriocriticism did not long hold sway over the minds of philosophers and physicists, despite initially enjoying support from many in the field. By the 1920s, it began to yield ground to a new movement known as “neopositivism,” or new positivism.