Theoretical and Epistemological Problems in Western Philosophy of The 19th-20th Centuries

Neopositivism

Neopositivism, manifesting as logical positivism, arises and develops within the framework of the "Vienna Circle," led by Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) and including figures such as Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) and Otto Neurath (1882-1945). The foundational works of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), British philosophers Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Alfred Ayer (1910-1989), as well as members of the "Lviv-Warsaw School," including Polish philosophers Alfred Tarski (1902-1983), Jan Łukasiewicz (1878-1956), and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890-1963), played a significant role in shaping neopositivism.

Neopositivism represents both a continuation and an advancement, overcoming the limitations of empiriocriticism. While Machism focused exclusively on the primary elements of the world—sensations—following Hume in declaring them the essential source of our knowledge, the development of science, particularly theoretical physics, demonstrated that science cannot be reduced to sensory data or perceptions. Neopositivism acknowledges this reality, emphasizing the crucial role of hypotheses and theories in scientific inquiry. Furthermore, it maintains that the question of how we know lies outside its purview; from the neopositivist perspective, the subject of philosophy is science itself and its language. The task of philosophy, then, is to delineate scientific knowledge from other forms of knowledge, establishing a demarcation line—according to Karl Popper—between scientific and non-scientific knowledge, such as everyday, religious, and particularly metaphysical claims.

In logical positivism, all statements are categorized into three types: anti-scientific, non-scientific, and scientific (true or false). Anti-scientific statements do not genuinely qualify as propositions but merely resemble them in their outward structure, such as "the river flows in iambic." Non-scientific statements primarily encompass philosophical concepts—determinism, necessity, being, the meaning of life, and so forth—which, from the perspective of logical positivism, lack scientific content because they are unverifiable. While these statements may hold existential significance, they bear no relation to science. Neopositivists contend that traditional philosophy resembles religion, which, despite lacking empirical foundation, provides many believers with comfort, confidence, and hope.

Truly scientific statements are those verified by reference to facts. In this context, neopositivists equate the term "fact" with a scientific fact. "When we use the word 'fact,'" writes R. Carnap, "we mean it in the context of a singular assertion. When it comes to general, universal statements, which are laws, they can be considered scientific only if they can be logically reduced to atomic, protocol statements verifiable by reference to simple, atomic facts. Atomic facts are of the nature: 'Today at noon, the sun is shining.' We need only look out the window to ascertain the truth or falsity of this assertion; it is subject to experimental verification. Ohm's Law for a segment of a circuit can be deemed a scientific statement because, through logical rules, we can reduce it to a statement such as: 'Take a piece of copper wire of such and such length and cross-section, pass a current of such and such strength through it, and at the ends of the copper wire, you will measure such and such voltage.' We need only perform this experiment to determine the truth or falsity of Ohm's Law. The principle by which statements are tested for scientific validity in logical positivism is known as the principle of verification. Consequently, genuinely scientific statements are recognized as protocol statements that capture our atomic sensations and perceptions. Theories serve as a fixation, a generalization of our empirical experiences, documenting the element of repeatability in our experiences and thus the predictability of future events. Scientific laws signify little more than the affirmation of the repeatability of defined states and relationships. "All laws are based on observations of certain regularities," Carnap states. Their distinction from simple protocol statements lies in the fact that they are formulated through induction.

However, logical positivism encounters insurmountable difficulties here. If science is a system of protocol statements and laws derived from them through induction, then it becomes impossible to draw a clear line between scientific and non-scientific, metaphysical statements. The principle of verification proves inadequate, as not all scientific laws can be reduced to protocol statements. As K. Popper aptly observes, "In their quest to eliminate metaphysics, the positivists (referring to logical positivists) simultaneously obliterate the natural sciences, for scientific laws, like metaphysical assertions, cannot be reduced to elementary statements about sensory experience." Moreover, based on the principle of verification through induction, we can only draw probable conclusions and can never be certain that these statements or laws reflect reality. Thus, in this respect, scientific laws bear little distinction from traditionally philosophical conclusions and propositions.

An attempt to overcome the challenges faced by logical positivists was initiated by the English philosopher Karl Raimund Popper (1902-1994), whom some historians of philosophy categorize as a logical positivist, while others classify him as a post-positivist. Yet one fact remains certain: Popper's philosophical views align with the neopositivist movement.

Like logical positivists, Popper seeks to distinguish scientific knowledge from other types of knowledge and to establish a demarcation of the provided knowledge. "The problem of finding a criterion that would give us the means to identify the differences between empirical sciences on one hand and mathematics, logic, and 'metaphysical' systems on the other, I call the problem of demarcation," Popper writes. However, unlike his predecessors, Popper does not believe that demarcation can be achieved through the principle of verification. First, he argues that affirmative examples can be found for any theory, as F. Bacon noted long ago, and second, induction cannot provide a universal conclusion. "Induction, that is, inference based on numerous observations, constitutes a myth." As a principle capable of effectuating the demarcation of scientific assertions, Popper proposes the principle of falsification. A statement or theory is deemed scientific if one can at least theoretically conceive the conditions under which the theory could be disproven. If a theory cannot be disproven under any conditions, it cannot be regarded as scientific. Through the principle of falsification, Popper acknowledges the straightforward fact that any scientific assertion qualifies as such only if the conditions under which it operates—thus, the conditions under which it does not operate—are discussed. The statement "water boils at one hundred degrees" is scientific because it is contextualized by the condition of normal atmospheric pressure. If this condition is absent (for example, when boiling water at high altitudes), then water will boil at a different temperature. The more rigorously defined the conditions under which a given scientific theory operates—and thus the conditions under which it does not work—the more scientific it is. "Metaphysical" statements are not scientific because there are no conditions under which they fail. For every disproof, arguments can be presented that expand the operational conditions of the theory. According to Popper, the advancement of science involves the formulation of hypotheses, the justification of theories, and their disproof, falsification, leading to the proposal of new hypotheses and theories.

Although Karl Popper, in his studies, primarily focuses on the problem of demarcation and the logical analysis of natural scientific knowledge, this does not imply that he neglects the analysis of social scientific knowledge. One of Popper's most renowned works, The Open Society and Its Enemies, is dedicated to an analysis of the sociological concepts of Plato, Hegel, and Marx, which, in Popper's view, contributed to the emergence of totalitarianism, Nazism, and communism. Popper refers to historicism as the perspective according to which the development of society is governed by objective laws, and by comprehending these laws, we can predict the global trajectory of societal evolution in a historical perspective. Such an approach to society is not merely unscientific; this method is fundamentally flawed and undermines people's faith in their own agency in the struggle for democracy. “...Unqualified historical prophecies lie entirely beyond the scope of the scientific method,” asserts Popper. “The future depends on us, and no historical necessity holds sway over us.” One must not conflate scientific forecasting with historical prophecy. The former relates to “the social engineering of partial solutions” or “the technology of gradual social transformations,” while the latter pertains to “utopian social engineering.” The method of “social engineering” fosters the development of practical activity among individuals aimed at improving their living conditions, cultivating responsibility for their actions, and promoting democratization, whereas social utopianism and historicism lead to diametrically opposed outcomes. “...It seems to me,” writes Popper, “that historicist metaphysics frees individuals from the burden of responsibility. If you are convinced that certain events are bound to occur, regardless of what you do to prevent them, then you can, with a clear conscience, resign yourself to the inevitability of those events.” Therefore, although Popper acknowledges Marx's significant contribution to our understanding of society, he considers the Marxist conception of historical development as a whole to be a fundamentally erroneous theory.

When discussing the neo-positivist interpretation of science, one cannot overlook the principle of conventionalism, which, according to all neo-positivists, underpins science. The essence of the principle of conventionalism lies in the view that, from the perspective of neo-positivism, scientific concepts and theories are not reflections of processes in the objective world but rather the product of an agreement among scientists. In forming this agreement, scientists may be guided by various considerations: notions of simplicity, “economy of thought,” consistency, arbitrary consensus, convenience in describing experiences, and so forth. In other words, the question of what scientific concepts and theories reflect is, in general, rendered outside the purview of science and philosophy; it becomes devoid of meaning. This principle is most comprehensively articulated in the works of the American historian and philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn (1929-1996), particularly in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).

In this work, Kuhn set out to create a new concept of scientific development. According to Kuhn, the conception of science as a cumulative process, wherein each new generation of scientists—and each good scientist—contributes to the advancement of science, resulting in a constant accumulation of scientific knowledge, does not correspond to the actual state of affairs. Kuhn identifies several periods in the development of science: the pre-paradigmatic period, the affirmation of a paradigm, the period of normal science, the period of crisis, and the period of revolution.

The pre-paradigmatic, or, more precisely, the pre-scientific period is characterized by the existence of multiple, unrelated concepts in a given field of knowledge, each explaining the same group of phenomena in different ways. This state persists until a scientific work emerges that is recognized by the majority within that field as a theory and a method for problem-solving, thus becoming a paradigm. Introducing the term “paradigm,” Kuhn writes: “I meant that some generally accepted examples of the actual practice of scientific research—examples that include laws, theories, their practical applications, and the necessary equipment—collectively provide us with models from which specific traditions of scientific research arise.” To become a paradigm, a scientific study must be, first, unprecedented and reflect a desire among scholars to propose a competing concept, and, second, be sufficiently open to allow a new generation of scientists to identify new problems within its framework. Such studies include Aristotle's physics, Ptolemy's geocentric system, Newton's mechanics and optics, Lavoisier's oxygen theory, and Einstein's theory of relativity, among others. Scientists who share a given paradigm constitute a scientific community.

The affirmation of a paradigm and the emergence of a scientific community, in Kuhn's view, signifies a transition to the period of normal science. “...The term ’normal science’ refers to research that firmly relies on one or several past scientific achievements—achievements that, for a certain time, are recognized by a particular scientific community as the foundation for its further practical activities.” A defining feature of normal science is that during this period, scientists operate within the framework of a paradigm, expanding the scope of its application, refining problems, and solving puzzles. No one sets out to discover something new; no one strives to exceed the boundaries of the paradigm. Moreover, if scientists encounter anomalies—facts that do not fit within the existing paradigm—they attempt to extend the applicability of the paradigm, and if that fails, they simply dismiss the anomalous facts. Only as anomalies accumulate to a point where they can no longer be ignored does a crisis arise in the development of science, leading to a crisis of the paradigm. “...The crisis shakes the stereotypes of scientific inquiry while simultaneously increasing the volume of data necessary for a fundamental change in the paradigm.” During a crisis, members of the scientific community face the task of changing the paradigm, entering a period of revolution. This process is extraordinarily painful. “...Even when... a new candidate paradigm emerges, scientists will resist its acceptance until they are convinced that two of the most important conditions have been met. First, the new candidate must evidently solve some disputed and generally acknowledged problem that cannot be resolved in any other way. Second, the new paradigm must promise to retain, to a significant degree, the real capacity to solve the accumulated problems in science that previous paradigms have addressed.” In this context, a new paradigm is not necessarily a progressive development in the field of science.

Regarding the notion of progress in scientific development, Kuhn advises great caution. There is no doubt about progress in the refinement of research methods, instrumentation, and technology. In this regard, the progress of science is evident, and science can serve as a model and even a definitive criterion for societal progress in general. However, when it comes to the progress concerning the correspondence between theory and objective reality in nature itself, the matter is entirely different. Kuhn contends that in this case, discussing progress is inaccurate. “...The notion of correspondence between the ontology of a theory and its ’real’ semblance in nature seems to me now, in principle, illusory,” writes Kuhn.

Thus, one may conclude that any scientific theory inherently contains an element of agreement among the scientific community regarding its truth, and its ability to function as a paradigm is largely explained by its capacity to interpret and predict facts, which closely aligns Kuhn's views in this realm with those of pragmatism.