Theoretical and Epistemological Problems in Western Philosophy of The 19th-20th Centuries

Pragmatism

Pragmatism emerges in the late 19th to early 20th century in the United States, founded by American thinkers Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910), and John Dewey (1859-1952). By the early 20th century, pragmatism spread to England, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and even China; yet many historians of philosophy regard it as a distinctly American philosophy—not merely because its creators are American philosophers, but because they see pragmatism as an expression of the American spirit and practicality (the term "pragmatism" etymologically derives from the Greek word pragma, meaning deed or action). This does not imply that pragmatism lacked predecessors in European philosophy; it resonates with philosophical systems such as positivism and the philosophy of life, but its understanding of truth as utility, success, and functionality distinguishes it from other philosophical currents.

For pragmatism, the human being is primarily not a knowing entity but a "doing" one, and the process of action is inextricably linked to belief. The overcoming of doubt and the attainment of belief represent the central aim of knowledge. Thus, according to C.S. Peirce, the process of knowing is not a reflection of reality within the human mind; knowledge is not a correspondence to an imagined image of reality but rather the resolution of doubt and the attainment of belief, the formation of a habit of action. "The activity of thought," Peirce states, "is initiated by irritation caused by doubt, and ceases once belief is achieved; thus, the attainment of belief is the sole function of thought." Since belief is a habit of action, one could also assert: "The entire function of thought is to produce habits of action, and everything related to thought that does not pertain to its purpose is merely an accretion upon it, but not part of it."

But what, then, of the content of thought, of ideas? What do they reflect or express? The answer to this question lies in Peirce's concept of meaning, which articulates the principle of Peirce. From Peirce's perspective, the content of the meaning of an idea or concept should be sought not in the relationship between the idea, image, and prototype or object, but in the relationship of the concept to the subject. The content of meaning, from Peirce's viewpoint, unfolds in what the given concept signifies for the subject, what practical consequences it entails, and what practical results it provokes. "Consider what practical consequences we believe can arise from the object of our concept. The concept of all these consequences constitutes the complete notion of the object." This formulation encapsulates the "principle of Peirce." He reduces the concept of a thing or object entirely to the sensory-practical consequences and the sensations it evokes within us. There is nothing more to the concept of the object. The nature of the object of thought—whether material or ideal, actually existing or merely imagined, physical or mental—holds little significance for pragmatism. What matters is that it compels us to act in a certain way and is reduced to this experience. The sensations that constitute the content of our experience may be elicited by objects outside of us and phenomena, as well as by any experiences and states of our consciousness. The experience of a scientist in the laboratory and the "experience" of believers in church are equally real and significant, both for their participants and intrinsically. If the object is significant solely in terms of the beliefs, actions, and consequences it incites within us, then it becomes less relevant for the act itself whether our practical actions are provoked by real phenomena impacting our senses and, consequently, our thoughts, or merely by states of our consciousness.

From this understanding of the nature of knowledge, pragmatism approaches the interpretation of truth. Any statement, idea, or theory reveals itself in the consequences it generates for our behavior and actions. However, the consequences of the influence of ideas on our behavior can be varied: they may facilitate the realization of our intentions and the attainment of results, or they may hinder this process. The judgments and theories that assist in the fulfillment of our intentions and help us achieve results should be recognized as true. "Truth," according to Peirce, "is distinguished from falsehood simply in that an action based on it, upon mature reflection, will lead us to the goal we seek, rather than away from it." Yet in this scenario, we encounter at least two difficulties: first, the notion of truth takes on a purely subjectivist, even subjectively relativistic character, and second, this understanding of truth does not provide answers regarding the truthfulness of judgments whose consequences are absent from our lived experience.

Peirce attempts to address the first issue by proposing that a judgment should be considered true if it has become a belief that researchers of the issue would recognize as true under conditions of unlimited experience. Thus, truth acquires an intersubjective character.

The distinctly American approach is articulated, even terminologically, by William James (1842-1910) in addressing the second difficulty. “Truth,” he asserts, “is largely based on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs possess ’force’ as long as no one contradicts them, much like banknotes hold value until their acceptance is refused... ’You accept my verification of something, and I accept yours about something else. We trade our truths with one another.’” Thus, James contends that if you have not experienced the practical consequences of a particular statement, you may still judge its truth or falsehood based on the testimony of someone whose experience includes those practical outcomes, provided they do not contradict your own. “I trust your experience, and you trust mine, exchanging our experiences regarding truth as if they were currency, believing in the existing rate of exchange.”

A pivotal role in the propagation and development of pragmatism belongs to John Dewey (1859-1952), whom American philosophers themselves regard as the foremost American philosopher of the first half of the 20th century. Dewey's pragmatic conception is termed "instrumentalism" within philosophy.

The central notion in Dewey’s philosophy is that of “experience.” Yet this concept assumes a different meaning for Dewey than it does in classical philosophy and even among his immediate predecessors. In classical philosophy, the term “experience” is employed epistemologically as a crucial element of the cognitive process. Even for Peirce and James, “experience” carries significant epistemological weight. While James discusses the religious and moral experience of humanity, for Dewey, the term takes on a broad, everyday significance, encompassing all that a person engages with in life. “The value of the concept of experience for philosophical reflection lies in the fact,” Dewey writes, “that it denotes not only the field, the sun, clouds, and rain, as well as seeds and harvests, but also the individual who works, plans, invents, uses things, suffers, and enjoys. Experience signifies all that is felt in experience, the world of events and persons; it denotes the world perceived through experience, the activity and fate of humanity.”

For Dewey, the individual is a biological being who must adapt to the surrounding environment to survive—a notion he borrows from Darwin. If the world surrounding humanity were stable and constant, individuals might rely solely on instincts, customs, and traditions. However, the world is mutable; events within it are often random, placing each of us in a problematic situation that engenders uncertainty, doubt, and discomfort in our existence. Therefore, knowledge becomes essential. It empowers us to adapt to the changing environment, transforming problematic situations into stable ones. Knowledge thus serves as the instrument (hence the term instrumentalism) that enables us to overcome doubt and attain belief. The truth of any assertion lies in its capacity to fulfill an instrumental role, aiding us in resolving a problematic situation. “If ideas, meanings, concepts, and theories are instrumental concerning the alleviation of specific concerns or confusion, then the test of their reliability and value resides in their successful execution of this task.” The focus here is not on whether ideas correspond to something in reality, but rather on their efficacy and instrumentality.

In this regard, the pragmatic interpretation of religious dogmas and experiences holds particular interest. Can these be considered true? Pragmatism addresses this question based on principles of utility and instrumentality. Does a believer gain or lose compared to an atheist? According to James, the believer certainly gains. For if it turns out (after death) that God does not exist, the believer loses nothing; yet if it turns out that God does exist, the believer gains, as they will be rewarded for their faith. Both James and Dewey maintain that in this life, faith assists individuals in overcoming difficulties and achieving success in their endeavors and problem-solving. Hence, the question of the scientific or unscientific nature of religion should be set aside and replaced with inquiries into its utility and instrumentality.