Existentialism

Existence and Freedom

The category of freedom occupies a central position in existentialist philosophy. All existentialists assert that freedom and existence are inextricably linked. One cannot even claim that freedom is a distinctive feature or attribute of existence, for existence itself is freedom. Freedom is intrinsic solely to human being; in the realm of objects, in the world of beings, there is no freedom—there is no space for it. At the same time, human existence is unimaginable without freedom. "In reality, we are a single freedom that chooses," writes Sartre, "but we do not choose to be free; we are condemned to freedom, cast into freedom, or, as Heidegger noted, 'thrown' into it." It is crucial to note that only authentic human being is inseparably connected to freedom. If a person does not recognize themselves as a self, as an agent capable of changing their situation, if they do not acknowledge the situation itself and fail to see the possibility of its alteration, dissolving instead into the "They," considering themselves merely one being among others, they cannot be free. They exist as an object among other objects, as a tool, as a function, but not as an ex-sistence.

Why is a person free, and why is their true being inseparable from freedom? This is tied to the nature of human existence. Human being is not static, not merely existent, not complete. It is an event, a situation, an action. It is a negation of the present and a forward-directedness; it is a continuous self-devaluation, a perpetual act. "A first glance at human reality reveals to us that for it, being amounts to action." Yet human action is always connected primarily to consciousness. If we inadvertently perform some act that yields negative or positive consequences, it does not possess the character of action. In this case, oddly enough, the person is not acting. Action is always intentional; it invariably presupposes a goal, and the choice of that goal for self-being is always made freely. No objective circumstances, no situation, no past or present can constrain or determine our choice. The choice of a goal is determined solely by our consciousness, and it is always free. Circumstances, means, motives are defined by the goal, by the project. A particular state of affairs in the present can be regarded as positive or negative, good or bad, and receives its value only in relation to our goal, whether it aids or obstructs the realization of our project. The fact of the past acquires meaning only in light of the future. The content of history, Sartre notes, is always deferred. It is not given once and for all. Historical science is characterized as a fickle maiden precisely because its perspective on the past is determined by an ideal of the future that exists in the present.

However, existentialism does not concern itself with social action; it characterizes and describes not social, but individual action, asserting that this action is determined solely by the project, in the selection of which a person is free. "No factual state of affairs, however it may be (political or economic structure of society, psychological 'state,' etc.), can itself motivate action, for action is a projection towards what is not, and what is cannot, in any case, determine what is not." Objective circumstances are defined by the project; their content arises from the project, and the project itself is conditioned by freedom, by the capacity of existence to freely make choices and determine the goal of action. Closed doors are only an obstacle, a limitation of one's freedom when a person wishes to exit if they are inside the house, or enter if they are outside. If, however, the person neither wishes to exit nor enter, then the closed doors are indifferent to their goals and do not limit their freedom. In other words, the issue lies not in the circumstances but in our project, our goal. This philosophical notion is not new; it can already be found in Descartes in his third moral rule, where he teaches to "always strive to conquer oneself rather than fate, to change one's desires rather than the order of the world." This rule is foundational to existentialism's understanding of freedom. Here, freedom is not freedom from circumstances, not the recognized necessity as in Spinoza, Hegel, or Marx, but freedom from one's desires, the freedom to alter or renounce one's intentions and projects. In place of freedom "from," it posits freedom "for."

In this regard, the brief essay by Camus, "The Myth of Sisyphus," is quite illustrative. The gods condemned Sisyphus for his unwillingness to return to Hades, forcing him to roll a massive stone to the summit of a mountain, only for it to roll back down each time. The gods believed that meaningless and futile labor was the most dreadful punishment.

The task asks: is Sisyphus free, is he happy? Camus asserts that initially there was suffering. This suffering arose not so much from the exertion of raising the stone, but from Sisyphus's memories of the warm sea, the sun, the fresh air, and life’s earthly happiness. Yet gradually he comes to an awareness of his fate. "The clarity of vision that must be his torment turns into his victory. There is no fate that cannot be conquered by contempt." Sisyphus, in this new state, finds pleasant moments. Life consists not only of raising the stone but also of descending; a whole world unfolds before Sisyphus. Naturally, it is an absurd world, but it belongs to Sisyphus; he is its creator. He has triumphed over the gods who punished him with the stone. Therefore, Camus concludes: "One must imagine Sisyphus happy."

Of course, such an understanding of freedom is purely subjective; it does not lead to the adoption of any specific socio-political position, allowing for any choice. It is no coincidence that the founders of existentialism often occupied opposing political poles. Thus, Heidegger, albeit briefly, was rector of a university in fascist Germany, while Sartre and Camus were participants in the French Resistance. This understanding of freedom cannot serve as a methodology for analyzing real socio-political situations. A vivid example of this is provided by Camus's "Letters to a German Friend." The first two letters were written in 1943, one in July and the other in December, while the other two were penned in 1944. In addressing his imagined German friend, with whom he had met before the war, Camus states that victory in the war will undoubtedly lie with the "free Europeans," and Germany's defeat is inevitable. This is because those who fight against fascism are committed to freedom; their love for their homeland is inseparably linked to a striving for justice, whereas the Germans have prioritized their national interests, rejecting the principles of freedom and justice. Yet, interestingly, when speaking of Europe fighting against fascist Germany, Camus does not mention the Soviet Union, even though he undoubtedly knew and understood the USSR's role in the victory over fascism. This is not coincidental, in my view, because mentioning the USSR in this context would immediately undermine Camus's methodology. After all, Camus believed that the very freedom he speaks of, which would ensure victory over Germany, did not exist in the USSR.

The merit of existentialism, its contribution to philosophy and culture, lies in its unparalleled elevation of individual freedom, the freedom of the self, in the twentieth century. Without freedom, there is no being of a person, no individuality—this is the main slogan of existentialism. Although existentialists maintain that individuals themselves resolve the issues of their being and their freedom, their aspiration for freedom inevitably found reflection in the socio-political life of society. The student unrest in France in 1968, which led to the resignation of de Gaulle’s government, and the struggle for human rights that unfolded in the 1960s and 70s were largely inspired by the ideas of existentialism. Existentialism itself did not establish a system of positive values, but through its call to rebellion and its critique of existing culture, it contributed to the strengthening of the ideals of freedom and justice in the world.