Existentialism

Human Existence and Its Modes

From these foundational premises, existentialism approaches the problem of human existence. It distinguishes between the objective knowledge of humanity provided by sociology, psychology, and anthropology, and the knowledge imparted by existential philosophy, which concerns the being of man.

In "Being and Time," Heidegger defines human existence, the essence of humanity, as Dasein (being-there), characterized by an all-encompassing trait: "care." This "care" unfolds through existential structures: "being-in-the-world," projection into the future, and "being-with-internal-worldly beings." All of these are a priori existential structures, phenomena unique to human existence that express its various dimensions.

"Being-in-the-world" articulates that aspect of human existence where individuals live within society and cannot be conceived apart from it; one cannot first imagine a person in isolation and then as part of society with others. The existential understanding provided by existential philosophy is not knowledge in the conventional sense. Human being is not definable within a concept; otherwise, existentialism would merely be a variant of metaphysics. In existential philosophy, human being is disclosed and revealed, but not defined. It remains indeterminate; otherwise, it would become a mere entity. "Existential philosophy would immediately perish if it assumed it possessed knowledge of what a human being is."

"Being-in-the-world" also represents a defined temporal moment in human existence. If time is the unity of elements from the past, future, and present, then "being-in-the-world" expresses the moment of the past in human being.

The mode of projection into the future conveys that human existence is not merely what it is. Moreover, human being encompasses what it is not. Human existence is never complete; thus, it is not an entity. A person is always greater than what they are, for they are not just an individual but also a project. "A person is always more than what they know about themselves. They are not the same in every instance; they are a path—not merely existence established as being, but the possibilities present within it, granted by freedom, from which an individual, through their actual actions, decides what they are." Projection embodies the future moment in human existence, highlighting its incompleteness, its forward orientation, and its movement toward death.

The third mode of human existence, "being-with-internal-worldly beings," characterizes the human relationship to the surrounding things, wherein these objects are perceived not merely as tools for a specific task but as simple and comprehensible things meant to accompany our lives, acting as extensions of ourselves. An artisan or farmer’s relationship with their tools exemplifies this, contrasting sharply with a modern worker's attitude toward their instruments. In the former case, the object characterizes the owner; in the latter, it exists merely as an impersonal tool, entirely dehumanized. While in the first instance, the object accompanies the owner throughout life, reflecting their attitude, in the second, it merely exists as a production tool. In the first case, the object is our extension; in the second, we become an extension of the object, serving the things.

Within the structure of care, Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic modes of human existence. In the former, a person feels the call of existence, their temporality, the precariousness and instability of their being, its aimlessness, disconnection from the present, and singularity. In contrast, in the latter case, an individual perceives themselves as an entity among other entities, as a human in general, as a thinking being, as a willful being, as a producer, and so forth. Here, they are just like anyone else. A person enters the world of "man"—an impersonal realm of being-one-with-another (the term "man" is used in German in impersonal constructions), where another can take their place, just as they can take anyone else's. In this world, a person is alienated; as Camus notes in his eponymous story, they are cast into it against their will and are destined to leave it without their choice. Their life is governed by family, organization, and state, which dictate their goals and regard them merely as a means to achieve them.

Yet, Jaspers attempts to soften and mitigate the world's estrangement, its hostility, and indifference to humanity, allowing for the contradiction of "humanity - world." "The reality of the world cannot be ignored," he writes. "To feel the harshness of reality is the only path that leads to oneself. To be real in the world, even if achieving one's aims is impossible, remains a condition of one's existence. Therefore, the ethos lies in living together with others within the apparatus of power, without allowing it to consume oneself." However, he too warns that our contemporary technological world undermines uniqueness and individuality, erasing existence, fostering alienation, and calls for steadfast resistance against it.

A person in the world, a person in society, is alienated. This alienation manifests in the fact that within society, they are integrated into the realm of being, themselves being an entity (a citizen of a country, a man, a son, a father, a steelworker, a union member, etc.), performing a defined function. Their existence is of no concern to anyone. Existentialism understands alienation differently than classical philosophy. While classical philosophy interprets alienation as a process of transforming the products of human activity through human nature or social causes, as seen in Marx's perspective, into dominating forces over humanity, existentialism finds its expression in the notion that a person, as a uniqueness, as an exception, as an existence, is unnecessary to society and does not exist within it. In this sense, they exist only in being-for-itself. This condition is fundamentally intrinsic to human being and cannot be altered by any social transformations.

Existence in the natural and social world undoubtedly corresponds to human nature, although existentialism opposes the controversial notion of "human nature." A person can only live in society. The contradiction and absurdity of human existence, according to Camus, lie in the fact that humans and the material world, humans and society, do not exist without one another, even though the existence of the world and society precludes existence itself. Yet, this position, paradoxically, is a necessary condition for human existence—not only in the sense that only within society can the prerequisites, conditions, and means for human existence be created, but also in a purely existential sense.

Ecstatic existence, which, according to Heidegger, represents true Being, reveals itself in ecstatic states but cannot be sustained, let alone made permanent. Existence demands that a person, in their conduct and actions, heed only its call and follow its promptings, thus bearing total responsibility for all their actions. It seems to say: "You must listen only to yourself, your uniqueness, and bear total responsibility for all your deeds." However, this is difficult; it is beyond human capability. Consequently, individuals flee into society, where they adhere to its rules, laws, and norms, thereby alleviating their burden of responsibility. This makes life easier for them, but there they lose their uniqueness and become like everyone else. What compels them to return to themselves? Care, longing, and above all, fear. "Heidegger coldly examines the human fate and declares that existence is insignificant," writes Camus. "The only reality at all levels of being becomes 'care.' For one who has lost themselves in the world and its distractions, care appears as a fleeting moment of fear. Yet, once this fear reaches self-awareness, it becomes anxiety, the persistent atmosphere in which existence reveals itself." Metaphysical fear, the fear of death, returns a person from the world to themselves, to their own existence, compelling them to realize their uniqueness. This situation is aptly illustrated in Leo Tolstoy's story "The Death of Ivan Ilyich," where a high-ranking provincial official, having built a respectable career and possessing a seemingly decent family, suddenly becomes gravely ill, feeling the inevitability of death, and abruptly realizes that his life has been poorly lived, that he is alone and unwanted.

However, this does not imply that a person becomes aware of themselves as an existence solely by confronting death. In other life situations, which Jaspers terms "border situations," when the fundamental conditions of human existence are disrupted, one suddenly becomes aware of their singularity and exceptionality, temporality, and solitude, experiencing their existence. The way out of any situation is found by the individual themselves; they are free to make any choice.