Ancient Philosophy

Understanding Humanity in Ancient Philosophy

In the eyes of ancient philosophers, humanity is but a fragment of the Cosmos. It is a reflection of the Cosmos, a microcosm that mirrors the macrocosm in all its features. The differences between the macrocosm and microcosm are not qualitative, but merely quantitative. Yet, since humanity merely imitates the Cosmos, it remains entirely subject to the forces that govern it. These forces are represented by the Logos and Fate, with Fate being considered even superior to the Logos. If the Logos embodies the rational and lawful principles of the Cosmos, with the gods as its "personified carriers," then Fate symbolizes the unity of the rational and the irrational, the necessary and the contingent. It transcends the Logos, surpasses the gods, and even the Fates, the Moirai, are not subject to Zeus, the king of the gods.

From this arises a significant conclusion regarding the Greek understanding of humanity and human life. Individuals are wholly governed by fate, which cannot be altered. Humanity exists merely as an appendage of the Cosmos, rather than as a self-sufficient and original entity. Greek philosophy lacks the concept of "personality" in the modern sense. The Greek individual is devoid of the psychological experiences, torments, and doubts that characterize later thought. Indeed, while Greek myths recount the heroic deeds of figures celebrated as kings, philosophers, and Olympians, such actions are perceived not as personal merits or manifestations of physical and intellectual individuality, will, and aspirations, but as embodiments of fate, expressions of the actions of higher, cosmically grounded forces. Considering the widespread Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls in both Greek and Roman antiquity, it becomes even clearer that great deeds are not the achievements of individuals but mere expressions of fate's decrees. However, the Greek does not feel psychological constraint or oppression in this regard. Their worldview is not characterized by a pessimistic outlook on life or existence. As noted by the Russian scholar of ancient culture A.F. Losev, ancient sensibility is "heroically fatalistic." In the Greek or Roman perspective, since such a fate has been assigned to me (though no one can fully know their fate, as it is a unity of necessity and chance), I must manifest "it in life." This embodies a more general ancient principle of a cosmic nature: the part is subordinated to the whole, the singular to the universal. Only the latter possesses true existence and perfection.

Yet, the ancient belief in fate does not imply that the philosophy of antiquity neglects existential and ethical questions. Although human life is governed by fate, knowledge of it is not granted to us. Therefore, humanity retains the capacity for choice in its actions. Indeed, pre-Socratic philosophy showed little interest in ethical issues. However, beginning with Socrates, ancient Greek philosophy pivots toward ethical concerns, which come to the forefront in the Hellenistic period of ancient thought.

For Socrates, the primary aim of philosophy is for individuals to know themselves. Yet, to know oneself entails understanding the universal, immutable principles of goodness, virtue, and justice. Only by grasping what virtue is and what constitutes the good and the beautiful can one be virtuous. Only actions aligned with virtue lead to bliss and life’s happiness. Socrates identified three cardinal virtues: moderation (the knowledge of how to tame one’s passions), courage (the knowledge of how to confront dangers), and justice (the knowledge of how to adhere to divine and human laws). "He claimed that there is but one good—knowledge—and one evil—ignorance."

The ethical issues raised by Socrates were further explored by philosophers of the Socratic schools, particularly the Cynic and Cyrenaic traditions. The Cynic school was founded by Antisthenes of Athens, with one of its most renowned representatives being Diogenes of Sinope. The name of the school derives from the gymnasium of Cynosarges (literally "the place of the dog"), where Antisthenes conducted his discussions. Like Socrates, the Cynics believed that human happiness coincides with virtue. However, unlike him, they perceived the essence of happiness in autarky—the complete moral autonomy of the individual, independent from societal norms and the surrounding world. "The wise man needs nothing and no one, for all that belongs to others belongs to him." One must live in accordance with nature and in unity with it. Honor, wealth, and pleasure are not true goods. Knowledge, art, morality, family, and homeland are mere empty words. Humanity requires only that which is utterly essential, without which one cannot survive. The ideal for the Cynics is Heracles. Culture and civilization do not bring individuals closer to true happiness but lead them further away from it. Moreover, the Cynics maintain that virtues can be taught. Diogenes speaks of two kinds of exercises: those for the soul and those for the body, asserting that no success in life is possible without practice. Thus, for the Cynics, philosophy is not so much a science of understanding truth, though knowledge is essential for virtue, but rather a way of life. Both Antisthenes and, especially, Diogenes proclaimed their philosophy primarily through their way of life, though their persuasive rhetoric was remarkably powerful. Diogenes, famously, lived for a time in a clay tub, relying solely on the bare necessities, teaching that disdain for pleasure, through habit, becomes the highest form of enjoyment.

The Cyrenaic school was founded by Aristippus of Cyrene, which gives the school its name. Aristippus and his followers, the Cyrenaics, posited that there are two states of the soul—pleasure and pain. A gentle movement is pleasure; a sharp one, pain. Humans, like all living beings, strive for pleasure and seek to avoid pain, as pain is abhorrent. By pleasure, the Cyrenaics refer to sensual enjoyment, and thus their teachings laid the foundation for hedonism—the position that sensual pleasure is the highest good, to which all moral demands ultimately reduce. "Pleasure is a good, even if it arises from the most repugnant things: even if the act is ignoble, pleasure remains good, and it is worth pursuing for its own sake." Happiness is merely the sum of partial pleasures, which represent the highest good. Therefore, one should seek pleasure for its own sake, while happiness is pursued not for itself but for the sake of partial pleasures. Wealth has no intrinsic value, but it enables pleasure; ultimately, wealth is irrelevant to pleasure since there is no distinction between the enjoyment of the rich and that of the poor.

Pleasure is perceived through sensation; however, this does not imply that Aristippus undervalues knowledge and philosophy. Aristippus asserts that it is better to be a beggar than an ignoramus, for while the former lacks only money, the latter is deprived of the semblance of humanity. In proclaiming pleasure as the aim of life, the Cyrenaics spoke of rational pleasure, asserting that one should not become a slave to pleasure. "A better fate lies not in abstaining from pleasures," declared Aristippus, "but in ruling over them, without yielding to them."

During the Hellenistic-Roman period of ancient philosophy, the problems of morality were examined most thoroughly by Epicurus and his followers, as well as by the Stoics.

Epicurus, in his ethical framework, starts from the premise that humans are sensory beings. Thus, he considers pleasure—the state of bliss—as the highest good. Virtue holds significance not in itself but in how it contributes to the attainment of pleasure. "Pleasure is both the beginning and the end of a blessed life; we recognize it as the foremost good..." Epicurus's views on ethical matters align closely with those of the Cyrenaics but diverge on two key points. Firstly, the Cyrenaics do not acknowledge pleasure in tranquility, only in motion, whereas Epicurus accepts both kinds of pleasure—those of the mind and those of the body. Secondly, the Cyrenaics argue that physical pain is worse than mental anguish, while "Epicurus considers mental pain to be more grievous because the body suffers only from the tempests of the present, while the soul is tormented by the past, the present, and the future. Similarly, the pleasures of the soul are greater than those of the body."

However, Epicurus is far from suggesting that one should pursue any and all pleasures indiscriminately. Some pleasures are genuine, while others are merely illusory, depending on the desires they fulfill. For Epicurus, there are natural desires and vain desires; among the natural, some are necessary while others are simply natural. Therefore, Epicurus posits that while pleasure is the goal of life, one should not always avoid pain. If enduring pain leads to greater pleasure, then one ought to accept it. "Thus, when we say that pleasure is the ultimate goal," Epicurus writes in his letter to Menoeceus, "we do not mean the pleasure of debauchery or sensuality, as those who do not understand or misinterpret our teachings might think; no, we mean the freedom from physical suffering and from the turmoil of the soul. For it is not endless feasting and festivals, nor the pleasure of boys or women, nor sumptuous banquets and other delights that make life sweet, but only sober reflections that explore the reasons behind our preferences and aversions, expelling thoughts that instill great anxiety in the soul." Therefore, to live sweetly means, first and foremost, to live wisely, avoiding unnecessary desires and striving for tranquility of spirit—ataraxia. Epicurus assigns great importance to knowledge in achieving pleasure, for pure enjoyment cannot be attained without understanding nature.

Epicurus's ethics stand in stark contrast to the prevailing ancient tradition, as they are purely individualistic. He views natural law as a social contract for mutual benefit, aimed at neither causing nor suffering harm. Furthermore, Epicurus believes that justice is linked not only to the contract but also to circumstances. "Where, with the change of circumstances, the previously established justice proves futile, it was just as long as it served the benefit of the interactions among citizens, but ceased to be just once it no longer provided such benefit."

The founder of Stoicism at the end of the 4th century CE was Zeno of Citium, from the city of Cyprus. Stoicism undergoes three stages in its development: the Ancient Stoa, notable figures of which include Zeno’s successor Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Aristo, and Sphaerus; the Middle Stoa, marking the beginning of the Roman period, represented by the teachings of Panaetius and Posidonius; and the Late Stoa, with prominent figures such as Seneca, Epictetus, and Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Stoicism remained an influential philosophical current until the fall of the Roman Empire.

In their ethical teachings, the Stoics assert that the ultimate goal is defined as living in accordance with one’s nature and that of the whole, with the primary impulse of life being self-preservation. However, this impulse towards self-preservation is characteristic of all animals. "Rational beings, as perfect leaders, have been granted reason, and for them, living according to nature means living according to reason, for reason is the organizer of impulses." "What is best in a person?" writes Seneca. "Reason. By its power, one surpasses animals and stands alongside the gods." Thus, the pursuit of happiness equates to striving for virtue, which aligns life with nature rather than merely complying with it. This is achievable only if life is structured according to reason—not just human reason but cosmic reason, of which the former is merely a fragment, a spark of the latter, the Divine Reason.

Among the virtues, the Stoics emphasize understanding, courage, justice, and temperance. The vices include ignorance, cowardice, injustice, and licentiousness. Everything that falls between these categories is indifferent: life and death, wealth and poverty, health and illness. These are beyond our control, for human life is subject to fate. We can choose only between virtue and vice, good and evil. Good and virtue, evil and vice, share a similar essence. Good is that which is beneficial, and virtue is both itself and virtuous actions, just as evil encompasses both vices and wrongful deeds.

The Stoics vehemently oppose the notion that pleasure is the highest good. "Virtue is something magnificent, elevated, invincible, tireless; pleasure, in contrast, is lowly, servile, weak, transient, lurking in unnecessary places and taverns." The primary distinction between the sage and the foolish lies in the sage’s equanimity, although we often label the vicious as indifferent, including the callous and cruel. The principal passions are four: sorrow, fear, desire, and pleasure. "...Life is happy when it is aligned with its nature. Such a life is only possible if, firstly, one consistently possesses sound judgment; then, if one’s spirit is courageous and energetic, noble, resilient, and prepared for all circumstances, if one, without succumbing to anxious thoughts, attends to physical needs, if one generally takes an interest in material aspects of life without being seduced by any of them; finally, if one knows how to utilize the gifts of fortune without becoming enslaved to them," writes Seneca in a letter to his brother Gallio. "...The result of such a mindset is constant peace and freedom through the removal of all triggers for irritation and fear. Instead of pleasures, instead of fleeting, trivial, and not only distasteful but also harmful enjoyments, there arises a profound, unclouded, and enduring joy, peace and harmony of spirit, greatness intertwined with gentleness. For all cruelty arises from weakness."

According to the Stoics, the sage will engage in public affairs unless hindered. For human life is inseparable from interaction with others. Society and the state are integral to human nature. Therefore, to live in accordance with nature and to strive for self-preservation means, for the Stoics, caring for the well-being of the state, which for the sage is paramount over individual existence.