Non-Classical Philosophy in The West

Positivism and Marxism as Opposition to Modern European Philosophical Classics

Positivism emerged in the mid-19th century. Throughout its prolonged existence, this movement has undergone three generations (trends). While they share certain commonalities, there are also distinctions that define their individuality. A unifying thread is their concern with the relationship between philosophy and science, rooted in the paradigm of thought introduced by Immanuel Kant: namely, whether metaphysics (philosophy) can be regarded as a science in comparison to the natural sciences. A shared tenet is the identification of the subject matter of science with empirical data; from this standpoint, metaphysical philosophy, as knowledge of an essence that cannot be observed, lacks any justification for existence. Thus, when we assert that positivism is a philosophy, it presents itself as a rather peculiar philosophy, as it simultaneously negates philosophy itself. For positivists, philosophy is conceived as a systematic science.

The differing generations of positivists are characterized by the frameworks of explanation and models of argumentation borrowed from the special sciences. The first generation of positivism (classical positivism) is personified by Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). They believed that their era marked a time of peaceful societal development, wherein science aids in overcoming social conflicts. Classical positivism is defined by its social orientation and the aspiration to apply science for the rational organization of society. Its proponents frequently employed an evolutionary explanatory framework.

The classical positivists held that all positive knowledge about reality (hence the term "positivism") could only be derived from the results of specific special sciences, and that philosophy in its traditional sense had become obsolete. Comte justified this assertion by referring to the law of the intellectual evolution of humanity that he had discovered (or borrowed from A. Saint-Simon), known as the law of three stages. These stages—theological, metaphysical, and scientific—sequentially replace one another and are necessary for the final establishment and formation of human thought. The metaphysical (philosophical) stage is fleeting and temporary in the progress of humanity; instead of explaining phenomena through supernatural factors, as was customary during the dominance of the theological stage, it introduces essences or embodied abstractions in their place. “The metaphysical state should thus ultimately be regarded as a kind of chronic illness, naturally inherent in the evolution of our thought—whether individual or collective—at the threshold between childhood and maturity.” Therefore, for Comte, philosophy as a growing ailment is already retreating into the past, making way for the scientific (positive) stage.

A similar orientation can be observed in the second generation of positivism—empirio-criticism. The most original representatives of this trend were the Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and the German philosopher Richard Avenarius (1843-1896), who was a professor of philosophy in Zurich from 1877 until his death. Avenarius introduced the term "empirio-criticism" to denote a philosophical position that transcends the division between opposing factions in philosophy and appeals to experience, which cannot be interpreted either materialistically or idealistically.

Influenced by the successes and challenges associated with the development of natural sciences at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the representatives of empirio-criticism engaged in a revision of the fundamental concepts of classical philosophy (causality, matter, motion, space, time, etc.) and questioned the legitimacy of metaphysical inquiry as a whole. In one of his works, Mach stated: “My guiding idea is that all metaphysical concepts, as something superfluous and disruptive to the economy of science, must be banished from it.” Philosophical notions like “cause” and “effect” hinder economical thinking in science, as they overly simplify the relationships in nature. Consequently, he remarked, “I have long tried to replace the notion of cause with the mathematical notion of function.” By considering colors, tones, smells, heat, and cold as the elements of the world—recalling Berkeley—Mach believed that in some cases this could enable him to rise above the conflict of differing philosophical positions: “Professor X, who theoretically considers himself a solipsist, is practically, beyond all doubt, not one when he thanks the minister for a received order or when he lectures in his classroom.”

The third generation of positivism is known as neo-positivism, which began its development in the late 1920s. The principal tenets of neo-positivism are:

1. The rejection of all previous philosophy as devoid of scientific meaning.
2. If we are to speak of philosophy as a specific type of activity, its task is to analyze both natural and artificial languages.

The first variant of neo-positivism was logical positivism, represented by the Vienna Circle, including figures like Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) and Rudolf Carnap (1891-1971). According to logical positivists, the ultimate goal of logical analysis of language is to exclude from science all those problems and statements arising from the misuse of language and violations of its logical rules. They classified all worldview problems as pseudo-problems. Language analysis is essential for constructing a logical model of meaningful reasoning. Statements that cannot be empirically verified are deemed non-scientific. Thus, the task of philosophy is to identify and subsequently eliminate pseudo-problems from science. This is achieved through the principle of verification, according to which any scientific proposition must be reducible to a set of protocol sentences that document the results of experience. However, it soon became evident that these demands of the logical positivists could, in fact, hinder the development of science, since science evolves through the formulation of hypotheses that cannot be empirically substantiated for a certain period. To consider their content as pseudo-problems and exclude them from science would effectively close off avenues for its advancement.

In place of logical positivism emerged the philosophy of linguistic analysis, most notably represented by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). This movement contended that the language employed by people encompasses numerous subdivisions (layers, types), such that formally identical words bear different meanings across these linguistic subdivisions. Meaning is understood as the manner of employing a word within a specific context, and the number of such usages is countless. Linguistic analysts argued that philosophical problems arise from a misunderstanding of the logic of natural language. The task of philosophy is to uncover the sources of philosophical pseudo-problems by revealing the true meaning of words. The crisis of this variant of neo-positivism became evident in the realization that attempts to reconstruct natural language according to the model of artificial language would cause destructive harm to the entire culture typically served by the natural language of the people.

Since the 1960s, the so-called post-positivism has gained traction in Western philosophy, focusing on the patterns of scientific development within a sociocultural context and adopting a more tolerant stance towards philosophy as an essential component of culture. For instance, Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) demonstrated in his work “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” the impossibility of comprehending the essence of scientific knowledge outside its historical context. Other proponents of this trend illustrated the significant role of philosophical ideas in shaping the scientific worldview.

Philosophically, Marxism is typically associated with dialectical and historical materialism. These terms, designed to encapsulate the essence of Marxist philosophy, possess their own histories, which will be explored further. However, let us first discuss the founders of Marxism.

The Marxist doctrine was initiated by the German scholars Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). Marx completed his studies at the University of Berlin, where in 1841 he defended his doctoral dissertation in philosophy on the distinctions between the natural philosophy of Democritus and that of Epicurus. Beginning in early 1842, he engaged in journalistic activities, serving as editor for various newspapers and magazines. From 1849 onward, he lived permanently in London, focusing on scientific and political work. His creative legacy is substantial, with significant works such as “Capital,” “The Poverty of Philosophy,” and “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.” Additionally, there are well-known works co-authored with Engels, including “The Holy Family” and “The German Ideology.”

Engels, after completing his gymnasium education, gained profound knowledge in philosophy, political economy, and other sciences through self-education. He participated in the revolution in Germany during 1848-49 and, like Marx, resided in England from 1849 onward. Among his most significant philosophical works are “Anti-Dühring,” “Dialectics of Nature,” “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy,” and “The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science.”

It is evident that the formation of Marxism was not a singular act; rather, it unfolded through various stages and pivotal moments. Initially, its founders were captivated by Hegel, only to later experience the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach. The reassessment of the entire philosophical legacy, particularly that of Hegel, occurred within Marxism through the lens of a central issue: the relationship between philosophy and reality. Early on, this reality revealed itself to Marx and Engels in the form of restrictions on freedom of speech, social and legal injustice, and various manifestations of conservatism and reaction. The academic philosophy they departed from approached reality entirely in a Hegelian manner: reality was to be interpreted in a way that conformed to a logically constructed scheme, established once and for all. However, Hegel’s methodology, which was taken by his followers to the level of mere technique and template, did not align with the revolutionary and democratic sentiments of Marx and Engels, soon raising doubts about its fidelity to reality. Consequently, Marx dedicated several of his works to a critique of Hegel, whom he viewed as exhibiting a certain detachment from reality, an inclination to impose an abstract, speculative logical structure upon it. In his early critical writings, Marx valued Hegel for adopting the perspective of contemporary political economy and for considering labor (albeit alienated) as the essence of humanity, as well as for the way Hegel's speculative logic imparted a sense of connected wholeness to concepts as forms of thought. Yet, Marx's overall evaluation of Hegel's philosophy was decidedly negative: it represented a perverted, inverted reflection of reality. Nonetheless, both Marx and Engels acknowledged that in the consistent evolution of European philosophy, where the metaphysics of one era was rejected by that of another, Hegel occupies a prominent position, as he succeeded in brilliantly synthesizing 19th-century German philosophy with the entirety of metaphysics (beginning in the 17th century). Hegel's work indirectly prepared the ground for the final phase before the elimination of any metaphysics and speculative philosophy.

In the renowned “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845), Marx articulates quite clearly the ultimate resolution of the problem concerning the relationship between philosophy and reality when he asserts that philosophers have merely interpreted the world in various ways, whereas the point is to change it. Within the Marxist tradition, this assertion is often presented as though Marx unequivocally demands a shift in the goal-oriented focus of philosophy and philosophical activity, claiming that Marxist philosophy has indeed taken on a revolutionary-transformative character. However, considering the entire array of thoughts by Marx and Engels regarding the interplay of philosophy and reality, one can ascertain that, from their viewpoint, the explanatory function of philosophy remains intact; yet reality itself requires alterations that philosophy is not tasked to enact. This position may also be interpreted as the end of philosophy, with its explanatory stance towards reality giving way to a time for practical action, substantiated by scientific theory rather than philosophy itself.

A foundational work from the period of active conception by Marx and Engels of their worldview was their joint effort “The German Ideology” (1846). In this extensive and multifaceted treatise, a central focus is retained on critically assessing the prevailing philosophy in relation to reality, while concurrently proposing their own methodology for the theoretical reflection of that reality. A decisive turn towards social issues emerges, accompanied by a methodological approach that the founders of Marxism later termed the materialist conception of history. The essence of the latter lies in the idea that the premises forming the basis of social-historical theory must align with the actual premises of history itself. What are these premises? They are the individuals, their activities, and the material conditions of their lives. All of this constitutes the “ground of actual history,” serving as the starting point for theoretical inquiry. True history is that of living human individuals, in a specific interaction with nature and particular relationships among people. Consciousness is nothing but the conscious existence of individuals, while existence is the actual process of their lives. For this new methodology, the starting point is indeed the actively engaged individuals, from whose real life process the ideological reflections of that process are derived. In a succinct formulation, the essence of the materialist conception of history is expressed by Marx and Engels as follows: “It is not consciousness that determines life; rather, life determines consciousness.”

In subsequent works by Marx and Engels, the category of social being gains pivotal importance. It not only serves as a fundamental, primary concept that formally captures a new worldview orientation, but also encompasses a comprehensive research agenda, as the category of “social being” harbors a latent reserve for the unfolding of degrees of social determination. Henceforth, Marx's purely scientific endeavors were directed towards the study of material (productive) relations as the most essential part of social being, the alteration of which directly influences the transformation of political, legal, and spiritual phenomena. Marx’s immediate scientific and practical interests shifted from philosophy towards a thorough examination of capitalist productive relations, aiming to “empirically demonstrate” how the very “logic” of the capitalist mode of production gradually gives rise to its negation, ultimately leading to its replacement by a communistically organized society.

Thus, commencing with the critique of Hegelian philosophy and its relationship to reality, the founders of Marxism arrived at a total rejection of speculative philosophy, redirecting their focus towards the profound study of the society contemporary to them and towards the consolidation of revolutionary forces. In the works of Marx and Engels, one will find no intention to construct a new philosophical system to replace the old; rather, they express thoughts regarding the end of the era of philosophical systems. Here, classical Marxism aligns fully with the spirit of classical positivism. If anyone claims that positivism and 19th-century Marxism are philosophies, these would indeed be strange philosophies, for they would be philosophies that deny philosophy itself, rejecting it on the grounds that there is no longer any room for philosophizing, as all spheres of reality have been dissected by sciences, which provide positive knowledge devoid of any inventions or purely speculative constructs. As for the terms we have referenced that are typically associated with Marxist philosophy, Marx never employed the term “dialectical materialism,” and the phrase “historical materialism” appears in Engels's letters toward the end of his life. The first instance of the phrase “dialectical materialism” can be found in Engels's work “Anti-Dühring” (1878), but in a context that indicates that for Engels, dialectical materialism is merely a method, not a philosophy, and the need for philosophy diminishes to a minimum, since all positive knowledge is provided by the specialized sciences: “Modern materialism is, in essence, dialectical and requires no further philosophy that stands above other sciences. Only before each specific science arises the need to clarify its place in the overall connection of things and knowledge about things; any specific science regarding this overall connection becomes unnecessary. Thus, from all former philosophy, only the doctrine of thinking and its laws—formal logic and dialectics—retains independent existence. The rest falls into the domain of positive science about nature and history.”

From this excerpt, it is evident that Engels does not regard dialectical materialism as a distinct philosophy that replaces earlier ones, nor does he consider Marx or himself as its author. Only by being a method, a way of approaching the study of natural and historical phenomena, does dialectical materialism become a self-sufficient tool, eliminating the need for a separate philosophy that would supply imagined, purely speculative constructs. One should also take note of the small, barely noticeable word “yet” in the excerpt when referring to the remnants of former philosophy. In essence, Engels affirms the transitory nature of that remnant.

Similarly, for Marx and Engels, idealism and materialism signify only a general methodological orientation from which philosophy constructs its relationship to reality. The speculative philosophical systems of the past were equally represented from both idealistic and materialistic standpoints, and all were dismissed by the founders of Marxism, as they proffered not an investigation of the real interconnections within nature and society, but instead presented mental constructs or merely fantastical fabrications. Marx and Engels simultaneously held a high regard for dialectics. By uniting it with the materialist principle, they arrived at a method that they could indeed refer to as dialectical materialism, or materialist dialectics. This method, as Engels himself indicated, served for many years as their finest tool of labor, their sharpest weapon. Overall, from the perspective of Marx and Engels, following the advancements in natural science and the discovery of the materialist understanding of history, the sphere of possible existence for philosophy became exceedingly limited. As Engels pointed out, philosophy still encompasses the study of thinking, logic, and dialectics. Everything else falls within the realm of positive science concerning nature and history. It is clear, however, that this does not imply that Marx and Engels were devoid of philosophical motivations or inclinations towards philosophical thought. Numerous examples and dozens of brilliant pages of philosophical content can be found in their many works, which merit specific discussion, and some of these we shall address when the opportunity arises.