Philosophy of Ancient China
Major Philosophical Schools of Ancient China: Confucianism
The founder of philosophy in Ancient China is considered to be Kongzi (known as Confucius in the Westernized form), who lived from 551 to 479 BCE. His given name was Qiu, and he bore the courtesy name Zhongni. In his early years, he studied ancient rites and traditions, began his official service at the age of twenty-six, and embarked on his teaching career at thirty. In the book Lunyu (Analects), recorded by his disciples, Confucius reflects on his life journey: "At fifteen, I devoted my thoughts to learning. At thirty, I achieved independence. At forty, I freed myself from doubts. At fifty, I understood the will of Heaven. At sixty, I learned to distinguish between truth and falsehood. At seventy, I followed the inclinations of my heart without transgressing the rites."
In the conception of Heaven that Confucius refers to, he adhered to tradition. For him, Heaven represented the highest power. However, he emphasized not the glorification of Heaven but rather the reverence and fear of its inevitability; Heaven designates each person's place in society, encourages or punishes them. Heaven is destiny, the Dao.
The focus of Confucius and his followers lies in the relationships among people, issues of education, and ethical concerns. Yet, all their ideals are not directed toward the future; rather, they are rooted in the past. The reverence for the past is a distinctive feature of the Confucian worldview. "I transmit but do not create. I believe in antiquity and love it," he states.
The mechanism that allows for the preservation of order and stability in society is ritual (li), which consists of many elements. The sacred ritual, through its very course, automatically ensures the reproduction of the old and precludes innovation.
Confucian ethics relies on concepts such as "reciprocity," the "Golden Mean" (zhongyong), and "benevolence" (ren). Regarding reciprocity, Lunyu states: "Can one govern by a single word throughout life?" The Master replied: "That word is reciprocity. Do not do unto others what you do not wish for yourself."
The "Golden Mean" represents the highest principle, although people have lost it: "To indulge in extremes is as unworthy as failing to act... Since it is difficult to find people who adhere to the mean in their behavior, one must contend with either the indiscreet or the cautious. The indiscreet seize everything, while the cautious avoid disgraceful actions."
As for benevolence, he asserts: "If a person is resolute, persistent, and sparing of words, then they are close to benevolence." When asked about benevolence, Confucius replied: "In your dealings with others, treat them as if you were welcoming esteemed guests. Use the people as if you were conducting an important sacrifice. Do not do unto others what you do not wish for yourself, and then in the state and family, you will not encounter hostility."
He who adheres to the moral principles of Confucianism is called a "noble man" (junzi), in contrast to the "petty person" (xiaoren), who lacks high moral qualities. There are many characteristics of the "noble man." Here is one: "The noble man worries about morality; the petty person cares about the best arrangements. The noble man thinks about not violating the laws; the petty person thinks about how to gain benefits... The noble man, when faced with adversity, endures it with courage. The petty person, when falling into hardship, disintegrates."
Confucius believed that the key to governing the people lay in the moral example set by rulers towards their subjects, while the people were expected to demonstrate obedience and respect towards their superiors.
"The Rectification of Names" (zhengming) is the culmination of the Confucian veneration of the past. In a world marked by flux, rulers must remain vigilant to ensure that societal structures remain unchanged. The Rectification of Names signifies aligning the state of affairs with their established, "past" meanings. Governance in the state should begin with the rectification of names. When asked why this is necessary, Confucius replied: "The noble man is cautious about what he does not know. If names are incorrect, then words lack foundation. When words lack foundation, actions cannot be accomplished. If actions cannot be accomplished, then ritual and music do not flourish. If ritual and music do not flourish, punishments are not administered correctly. If punishments are not administered correctly, the people do not know how to conduct themselves. Therefore, the noble man, in giving names, must proclaim them correctly and ensure that what he proclaims is correctly enacted. There should be nothing incorrect in the words of the noble man."
Among other representatives of ancient Confucianism, Mencius and Xunzi stand out for their contrasts. Mencius (372-289 BCE) developed pathways for better governance and sought means to realize his ideals in practice. "The Dao of governing the people," he wrote, "is this: those who have constant occupations possess constant good feelings. Those who lack constant occupations do not possess constant good feelings. When they lack constant good feelings, they become dissolute, amoral, capable of any wrongdoing. When they commit crimes, they are punished. This means casting a net of law over the people. Is it necessary to cast a net of law over the people when a humane and sagacious ruler is in power? Therefore, the sagacious ruler must be attentive, frugal, and adhere to ritual with respect to their subordinates, and when taxing the people, must be moderate." In his teachings, the same Confucian categories persist: order, virtue, benevolence, and justice. His thoughts on human nature are particularly intriguing: "The inclination of human nature towards goodness resembles water's tendency to flow downward... If human nature succumbs to the natural manifestations of emotions, it can be good. This is what I mean when I say that human nature is good. When a person behaves improperly, it is not due to a defect in their natural qualities. All people possess feelings of compassion, feelings of shame and outrage, feelings of respect and reverence, feelings of truth and falsehood. The feeling of compassion is the foundation of benevolence. The feeling of shame and outrage is the foundation of justice. The feeling of respect and reverence is the foundation of ritual. The feeling of truth and falsehood is the foundation of knowledge. Benevolence, justice, ritual, and the capacity for knowledge do not arise externally; they are always inherent within us; we simply do not contemplate them."
Xunzi (313-238 BCE) refuted Mencius's assertion of the goodness of human nature. "Mencius said: 'Man by nature is good.' I say that this is incorrect... Man is by nature evil," he wrote. "In ancient times, the wise, seeing that man is inherently evil, knowing that he is unruly, follows the wrong path, seeks disorder, and cannot be tamed, thus created the authority of the ruler to oversee the people... Even if a person possesses remarkable qualities and wisdom by nature, they still require a wise teacher and must follow him in all things; they should choose good people as friends and associate with them."
Mohism
The founder of this school is Mozi, who was born in the year of Confucius's death (479 BCE) and died in 400 BCE. The school lasted two centuries and perished during the reign of Emperor Qin Shi Huang. The primary text of this school, Mozi, is the result of collective creativity.
The representatives of this school opposed Confucianism. While the cult of Heaven persisted among them, the Mohists liberated individuals from the state and officialdom as intermediaries in their relations with Heaven. Mozi taught that "to revere fate is pointless; if one disregards fate, there will be no calamity." According to his teachings, the will of Heaven does not dictate what occurs on earth; Heaven merely wishes for people to love one another. The representatives of the school advocated for universal love towards all people, rather than the limited affection for one's own, and kin towards kin that characterized Confucianism. They opposed the inequality of people, with Mozi declaring, "My aim is to eradicate all of this." They criticized Confucianism for its extreme adherence to antiquity and tradition. The philosophers of this school were against all wars.
Mozi was extraordinarily convinced of the truth of his teachings: “To attempt to refute my reasoning using the words of other schools is akin to trying to break a stone with an egg. Even if every egg in the world were shattered, the stone would remain unchanged; it would not be broken.”
Later Moists defined all the fundamental concepts of their teacher's ethics, reinterpreting the key ethical categories of Confucianism from the perspective of universal love among people. Here are a few examples: “Justice is the resolute intention to love all people in the world and the ability to be of service to them. However, it is not necessary to be of service to everyone simultaneously and immediately”; “Loyalty is the mode of action whereby what benefits people is pursued by a noble man, even at the cost of self-compulsion.”
Legalism
This school is also known as the school of lawgivers, or in Chinese, "Fa-jia." The representatives of this school opposed the Confucian ritual (“li”) with “fa” (law), which they directly associated with punishment: law and punishment went hand in hand, one evoking the other. It was perhaps assumed that human nature would inevitably lead to lawbreaking. In the Legalist worldview regarding governance, moral persuasion is entirely rejected; instead, the policy of legal punishment is justified based on laws that are consciously established by the ruler. Conscience is not a reliable means of fostering obedience; thus, one must rely solely on the fear inherent in people—fear is the primary instrument of governance.
In governance, the representatives of the school provoked a process of devaluation of nobility and proposed the principle of appointing positions based on ability. Practically, this led to a permanent renewal of the bureaucratic apparatus. A well-known theorist and practitioner of Legalism was Gongsun Yang, better known in history as Shang Yang (390—338 BCE), who met a tragic end (being torn apart by a chariot). Interestingly, all prominent Legalists ended their lives rather sadly, as victims of the violence they propagated. Shang Yang believed that, by nature, humans are evil and can only be restrained through punishment and fear. He attributed characteristics of human nature to the foundation of social history, which he divided into three periods: self-interest, benevolence, and legalism. Earlier, when people were simpler, more honest, and at the same time more foolish, they could be governed by reason. However, now that people have become cunning, dishonest, and intelligent, they can only be governed by force. Here is one of the many governance recipes from the Legalists’ book “Shang Jun Shu”: “People inherently seek order; however, their actions breed chaos. Therefore, where people are strictly punished for minor offenses, those offenses disappear, and there are simply no severe crimes to arise. This is what it means to ’establish order before chaos emerges.’ Where people are strictly punished for severe crimes and lightly punished for minor offenses, not only can severe crimes not be prevented, but minor offenses cannot be curtailed either. This is what it means to ’establish order after chaos has already erupted.’” A model state from a governance perspective is one where there are few rewards and many punishments. Their optimal ratio is 1:9, meaning one reward for every nine punishments. Illegal acts are eradicated not by rewards, but exclusively through punishment.
Another notable theorist of Legalism was Han Fei (280—233 BCE), whose views are expressed in the book “Han Fei Zi.” In this work, one can find many similarities with Confucianist Xunzi concerning the evil nature of humanity, as well as with Mozi’s position regarding the refutation of the central tenets of Confucian philosophy, alongside elements of Daoism. However, the central idea of Legalism remains unchanged: law and punishment are the primary levers of governance, with fewer incentives and more punishments. Han Fei was an advocate for centralized power, wherein the ruler sought to equalize everyone before the law and to punish both his close officials and ordinary people equally for its violation.
The School of Names
The self-designation of this school is “Min Jia,” and drawing an analogy with ancient Greek philosophy, the representatives of this school are referred to as sophists in European terms. Additionally, analogous to the trends in European medieval philosophy, this school is also known as the school of nominalists. The school focused on the relationship between things and the expression of these relations in judgments. Its representatives separated things from their properties, believing that qualities could exist independently, irrespective of any substrate. It appeared as if properties are added to things by the sensory organs of humans, and it remains problematic how these properties belong to the thing to which we attribute certain qualities. Hence, expressions like “a white horse is not a horse” seem strange to us, as their stance suggests that our eye perceives the whiteness of a certain form, yet how much it belongs to what we denote by the term “horse” remains unknown or uncertain. This argument belongs to Gongsun Long (325—250 BCE) in the treatise “Gongsun Long Zi.” For illustration, here is an excerpt from this treatise:
“- Can a white horse not be a horse?
- It can.
- How so?
- ’Horse’ denotes form; ’white’ denotes color. What denotes color is not what denotes form. Thus, I assert: ’a white horse is not a horse.’
- When you have a white horse, you cannot say you do not have a horse. And can that which cannot be said not to be a horse not be a horse? To have a white horse means to have a horse. Why then, upon becoming white, does it cease to be a horse?
- When one asks for a ’horse,’ one may provide either a bay horse or a black horse. However, when one asks for a ’white horse,’ it is not permissible to provide a bay or a black horse. Let us suppose that ’a white horse’ is nothing more than ’a horse’; in that case, whatever one requests would be the same. If whatever one requests were the same, then ’whiteness’ would not differ from ’horse.’ But when what is requested has no distinctions, why is it that a bay and a black horse can be provided at one time and not at another? Clearly, ’can’ and ’cannot’ mutually negate each other. Hence, since a bay and a black horse, which are one and the same, correspond to the desire to ’have a horse’ but do not correspond to the desire to ’have a white horse,’ the thesis ’a white horse is not a horse’ is considered incontrovertibly proven.”
The founder of the School of Names was Hui Shi (or Hui-zi). In the book “Zhuangzi,” authored by his opponent Zhuang Zhou (369—286 BCE), it is stated: “Hui Shi was extremely versatile, and his works could fill five carts. His teachings were contradictory and confusing, and his insincere words missed the mark... Hui Shi himself regarded his statements as a great view of the world and presented them to the sophists. The sophists of the world delighted in such statements alongside him. They claimed: ’An egg has feathers. A hen has three legs. A dog can become a sheep. A horse lays eggs. Fire is not hot. A chestnut horse and a crow together make three. A white dog is black. An orphaned foal has never had a mother...’ Hui Shi debated with people daily and, along with other sophists, deliberately created strange statements, which constituted the foundation of his activity. However, Hui Shi regarded his statements as the wisest and claimed: ’Who can compare with me throughout the universe?’
Despite the generally biased evaluation of Hui Shi's work in the writing of his opponent, there remains an element of objectivity, especially in the following words: “He regarded opposing the views of others as the only true occupation for himself and sought to earn fame by defeating others in debate.”
Natural Philosophers
The foundations of the teachings of those referred to in European terms as natural philosophers (that is, those most concerned with the philosophy of nature) or representatives of the school of proponents of Yin and Yang (Yin Yang Jia) also find their origins in the texts of the “I Ching” and the “Shu Jing.” From the primal chaos, the state of the beginning, emerged the division of two principles: the active—Yang and the passive—Yin. From their interaction, the five primal elements (Wu Xin)—water, fire, wood, earth, and metal—were born, which, in turn, became the foundation of all things and phenomena in nature.
In the school of natural philosophy of the 4th century BCE, the teaching on the fundamental principles of existence, through the combination of the concepts of yang, yin, and wu, took on a systematic form. According to this framework, the world initially existed as a singular entity (qi). Subsequently, through the condensation of this qi, a process unfolds wherein the light and ethereal qi (yang-qi) ascends to form the heavens, while the murky and heavy qi (yin-qi) descends to create the earth. The forces of yang and yin gradually came to embody various oppositions present in nature. Through the model of interaction between these polar forces and the fundamental elements, natural philosophers sought to explain the causes of change and transformation in the natural world.
Daoism
The founder of Daoism is regarded as the semi-legendary figure Laozi (604-531 BCE), a contemporary of Confucius. The principal text of Daoism is the "Dao De Jing" ("The Book of Dao and Virtue"). At the heart of their worldview lies the concept of Dao. Dao is a multifaceted term; it signifies both the primordial source and the culmination of all existence, as well as the all-encompassing law of the universe. Dao is eternal, even preceding the concept of God.
The most profound, and notably the least explicit, aspect of the teaching concerns the two Dao. There exists the nameless (transitory) Dao and the Dao that bears a name. The "Dao De Jing" speaks of the former Dao in these terms: "I look at it and do not see it, and thus I call it invisible. I listen to it and do not hear it, and thus I call it inaudible. I strive to grasp it but do not attain it, and thus I call it the most subtle. Its top is not illuminated, its bottom is not obscured... I encounter it and do not see its face; I follow it and do not see its back." Another expression states: "Here is that which arises from chaos and was born before heaven and earth. Without sound and formless, it stands solitary and unchanged. It acts everywhere and knows no obstacles. It can be considered the mother of all beneath heaven. I do not know its name; I denote it with a character, calling it Dao. By giving it a name, I call it the Great. The Great is in perpetual motion."
In contrast to the first Dao, the second is directly connected to the existence of specific things. The Daoist perspective on the formation of the world unfolds as follows: non-being is primordial, and it is this Dao that bears no name. It is nameless because, by naming it, we thereby transform it into being. We can only speak of non-being in a negation. Non-being gives rise to being. Being is the Dao that has a name, the physical analogues of which are heaven and earth. Non-being (the first Dao) is the most profound foundation, the substance of all things. Being is transient, and things continually descend into non-being: "In the world, all things are born into being, and being is born from non-being"; "In the world, there exists great diversity among things, but all return to their origin. The return to the origin is called tranquility. Tranquility is termed the return to essence. The return to essence is called constancy."
At the level of specific things, Dao is always accompanied by "de": "Dao gives rise to things, where it nourishes them, cultivates them, perfects them, and sustains them. To create and not to possess, to create and not to boast, to be elder and not to command—this is called the deepest de." Perhaps "de" occupies the place of specific laws that were yet unknown at that time.
Daoists rejected the values of Confucianism (humaneness, wisdom, justice), seeing them as deviations from the Dao. Conversely, a person with higher de does not seek to perform good deeds, and thus is virtuous. Their primary quality is triumphant passivity.
This principle of passivity ("wu wei") relies on the embrace of naturalness, on the spontaneity of life, which demands no effort from individuals and is based on the rhythms of nature. "Wu wei" is the best practical realization of naturalness ("zi ran"). Hence follows the conclusion: the social order holds no significance. An ideal ruler allows all to follow their natural course—Dao. They do not intervene, nor do they obstruct the Dao: "The best ruler is the one whom the people know only exists. Somewhat lesser are those rulers who require the people to love and exalt them. Even worse are those rulers who instill fear in the people, while the very worst are those who are held in contempt by the people."
The expectation of government is as follows: "When the government is at peace, the people become simple-hearted. When the government is actively engaged, the people become unhappy." The principle of passivity extends to all aspects of societal life: "One should practice passivity, maintain tranquility... To hatred, one should respond with goodness."
In interpersonal communication, Laozi advised to adhere to three treasures: humanity, frugality, and humility. Through the first, one may become courageous; through the second, generous; and through the third, wise as a leader.
Über den Autor
Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.
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Der Inhalt basiert auf akademischen Quellen in mehreren Sprachen — darunter ukrainische, russische und englische Universitätslehrbücher sowie wissenschaftliche Ausgaben zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Texte wurden aus den Originalquellen ins Deutsche übertragen und redaktionell bearbeitet. Alle Artikel werden vor der Veröffentlichung inhaltlich und didaktisch geprüft.
Zuletzt geändert: 12/01/2025