Non-Classical Philosophy in The West

Problematic Domains of Leading Contemporary Philosophical Trends

Phenomenology

The emergence of the phenomenological movement is closely associated with the Austrian-born German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), whose profound influence has shaped many philosophers of the twentieth century and several currents within the philosophy of that era. His most significant works include Logical Investigations (1900-1901), Philosophy as a Strict Science (1911), Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1913), and Cartesian Meditations (1931).

Husserl recognized the state of decline in Western philosophy, attributing it to fragmentation and sterility. The original aims of scientific inquiry had been lost, unity in both issues and methodologies had vanished, and the number of philosophies had nearly equaled that of philosophers. A palpable yearning emerged for a vital philosophy capable of uniting scholars and rescuing philosophy and other European sciences from crisis. These disciplines—spanning from mathematics to psychology and further to all spiritual sciences—had lost their bearings regarding the meaning of human existence. They endeavored to persuade people that nothing is fixed, only ephemeral ideals and norms that "arise and disappear like rushing waves, as if it had always been so and would continue, with reason repeatedly turning to absurdity, and benevolence to suffering."

In Philosophy as a Strict Science, Husserl observes that the aspiration for philosophy to be a rigorous science has been inherent from its inception. Yet, throughout the history of philosophy, it has never succeeded in fulfilling such ambitious claims. Moreover, philosophy as a science had not truly commenced. While physics and natural sciences are often considered exemplary in their scientific rigor—an idea shared by Kant—Husserl argues that all sciences, including the exact ones, are imperfect. Nevertheless, these fields exhibit a tendency toward increasing scientific substance. Philosophy, however, lags significantly behind other sciences, its imperfection rooted in total lack of systematization. Alongside the objective condition of philosophy, its status is affected by the positivist attitude toward philosophy, which maintains that each science (especially physics) is its own philosophy, developing its own methodological foundations. Many have proposed psychology as a contender for the role of philosophy as a strict science, deeming it the successor to overly philosophical traditional epistemology with its inclination towards methodology. Yet Husserl firmly disagrees, asserting that psychology, "as a science of facts," is unfit as a foundation for other sciences, a position that also applies to physics.

What then hinders philosophy from establishing itself as a rigorous science and serving as the methodological foundation for all sciences? Husserl identifies two principal reasons, or two stances: naturalism and historicism. Naturalism, which has also infected psychology, tends to regard everything as nature, perceiving nothing beyond the natural realm and registering natural processes as facts, external to humanity, thus aiming to evaluate scientific knowledge with extreme objectivism. In contrast, historicism prevails within the domain of the "spiritual sciences," that is, in the realm of the humanities, viewing all spiritual phenomena as historical constructs. Positivism is founded upon naturalism, while historicism gives rise to a "worldview philosophy" that cannot serve as a foundation for the sciences due to relativism and the fluidity of subjective perceptions of the world across different social groups and eras.

In the face of the crisis affecting both philosophy and all European sciences, Husserl advocates for a return to Descartes' experience, radically revisiting the principles of coherent thinking and rediscovering such certainties that will guide us correctly toward a new philosophy, not straying even in the most abstract philosophical realms from the concrete realistic ground of everyday existence. Through this approach, one can obtain an absolutely unconditional foundation for all sciences, especially philosophy. This foundation is what Husserl designates as phenomenology. Thus, phenomenology emerges as a form of foundational philosophy, serving as the essential methodological component of any subsequent philosophical reflections and all possible sciences.

Where shall one begin? In Philosophy as a Strict Science, there is a pivotal observation: "The impetus for investigation must not arise from philosophy, but from things and problems." This implies that the search for the first "certainty," which will hold the power of apodicticity (indubitability), should commence with something unconditional. Husserl suggests: "Back to the things." This directive signifies that one must first turn to things, to what is given to us in our consciousness. This is the phenomenon, as it is revealed to consciousness. Whether there exists a certain counterpart behind this givenness—a real thing or not—Husserl does not emphasize at this stage; he merely highlights the initial condition: there exists a certain fact of consciousness. Following this, the philosopher insists that the subject of phenomenology is not these givens or facts, but the essences that underlie them. Hence, Husserl emphasizes that "pure, or transcendental phenomenology will find its grounding not as a science of facts, but as a science of essences." When representatives of the special sciences claim they deal with facts and their generalizations, dismissing the existence of essences beyond observation, Husserl counters that behind every fact, an essence lurks, something typical that forms the basis for the identification of facts, the root of the identity of things as they are given to us in consciousness. These essences he termed "eidetic forms." Based on this, two groups of sciences emerge: the sciences of facts and eidetic sciences. The former rely on the latter, as they all employ logic and mathematics, which themselves present pure essences through their abstractions.

The phenomenological philosophy falls within the category of eidetic sciences. It is a purely descriptive science, as it delineates the typical modes through which phenomena are presented to our consciousness. In relation to other sciences, it serves as their foundation, their "first philosophy." It corresponds to a specific method with appropriate prerequisites and phases. The first methodological prerequisite is the acknowledgment of the intentionality of consciousness. The concept of intentionality signifies that consciousness is always directed toward something. When one says, "I see," "I feel," "I know," it presupposes objects that this "someone" sees, feels, or knows. Within the intentional act, Husserl distinguishes two moments: noema (the object meaning of the intentional act, so to speak, the "what") and noesis (the manner of givenness, so to speak, the "how"). It is precisely among noemata that facts and essences are differentiated.

For phenomenological philosophy, a specific mindset and a series of methodological procedures are essential. Among these, the principle of epoché holds a significant position (from the Greek έποχή, meaning a halt in judgments). According to this principle, one must exclude from consideration (or bracket) the external world, theories, and viewpoints. This implies that the questions regarding the truth or falsity of our judgments about the world are set aside. The epoché procedure is also known as phenomenological reduction. The methodological benefit of this "bracketing" lies in avoiding the extremes of skepticism and sophistry, thereby preventing fruitless debates with them concerning reality. The natural human inclination toward the existence of a real world remains intact, and the world is continuously present. We merely sidestep, alongside the epoché, the unproductive discussions regarding the nature of "facts," their existence or non-existence, which are the subjects of specialized sciences.

What, then, remains after excluding the entire world along with our corporeality and our thoughts? The only aspect that cannot be "bracketed" as a result of such reduction is consciousness—our subjectivity, for it is always with us. This "residue" becomes the subject of the subsequent examination—transcendental reduction, the passage to pure consciousness (the "transcendental ego"). The aim of this reduction is to set aside those elements of consciousness linked to psychophysiology, which pertains to Husserl's critique of psychologism. Transcendental reduction leads to "pure consciousness," which no longer contains anything empirical. There is also a third step in the methodology—eidetic reduction. Pure consciousness is not entirely devoid of objects; it also possesses "intentionality," a directedness toward an object. However, this object is something that resides within the consciousness itself, as posited by it. This "something" is the ideal object of thought, the essence or eidolon. True knowledge is thus knowledge of essences (with logic and mathematics as prime examples). Knowledge of essences is the result of direct observation, which is termed ideation.

All three reductions enable an understanding of how, through our "pure" subjectivity, the intentional structure of consciousness constitutes the objective world. Without delving into the intricacies of Husserl's well-argued thoughts, let us note the primary outcome of phenomenology: the world we know is constituted by consciousness, and consciousness imparts meaning to the world. When we speak of the "constitution of the world" by consciousness, we refer not only to the "theoretical" modeling of a possible world, or a world of variable possibilities, but also to the practical realization of possibilities through our actions.

Towards the end of his intellectual journey, Husserl looked more closely at the concept of the "lifeworld." This is understood as the world in which we live, corresponding to our everyday existence. This "lifeworld" takes precedence over the "world" as a theoretical construct. At the level of the lifeworld, fundamental meanings are formed, and experiences are established, which modern science, initiated by Galileo, seeks to resolutely oppose. However, it has forgotten that its meaningful foundation is precisely the lifeworld, thus resorting to a substitution—"the substitution of pre-scientifically perceived nature with idealized nature." The lifeworld developed long before the emergence of modern science, exists parallel to it, and continues to assert its significance. This is not without reason. It is precisely within this lifeworld, according to Husserl, that the foundations for the existence of the sciences must be sought. The sciences are grounded on the cumulative experiences of subjects within the lifeworld and universalize their truths in accordance with those experiences.