Scholastics

St. Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas (born in 1225 or 1226, died in 1274) is regarded as the foremost representative of scholastic philosophy. In all Catholic institutions where philosophy is taught, the system of St. Thomas is prescribed as the only true philosophy; this has been mandatory since the rescript issued by Leo XIII in 1879. Consequently, the philosophy of St. Thomas not only possesses historical significance but continues to exert a vital influence, akin to that of the philosophical teachings of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, indeed more so than the latter two. In most matters, St. Thomas adheres so closely to Aristotle that, in the eyes of Catholics, the Stagirite is regarded as an authority nearly equal to one of the Church Fathers; criticism of Aristotle on matters of pure philosophy has come to be considered almost blasphemous. This status was not always the case. In the time of Aquinas, the struggle for Aristotle's place against Plato was still forthcoming. Aquinas's influence secured Aristotle's victory up to the Renaissance; thereafter, Plato, whose teachings became more widely known than in the Middle Ages, regained prominence in the views of most philosophers. In the seventeenth century, one could be both orthodox and a Cartesian; despite Malebranche being a priest, he faced no attacks. However, in our day, such liberties belong to the past; members of the Catholic Church are required to unconditionally accept the system of St. Thomas if they engage in philosophy.

St. Thomas was the son of the Count of Aquino, whose castle was situated near Monte Cassino in the Kingdom of Naples, where the education of the "Angel Doctor" began. He spent six years at the University of Frederick II in Naples; then he joined the Dominican Order and went to Cologne to continue his studies under the guidance of Albert the Great, who was the leading Aristotelian among the philosophers of that time. After spending some time in Cologne and Paris, St. Thomas returned to Italy in 1259, where he spent the rest of his life, except for three years from 1269 to 1272. During those three years, he was in Paris, where the Dominicans encountered difficulties with the university authorities due to their adherence to Aristotelianism; they were suspected of heretical sympathies with the Averroists, who constituted a powerful faction at the university. The Averroists, based on their interpretation of Aristotle, claimed that the soul, being individual, is not immortal; immortality belongs only to the intellect, which is impersonal and one among various rational beings. When the Averroists were brought to account, citing that such doctrine contradicted Catholic teaching, they resorted to the ruse of "dual truth": there exists one truth in philosophy, based on reason, and another in theology, based on revelation. All this brought disrepute upon Aristotle, and St. Thomas's task in Paris was precisely to rectify the harm caused by an overly close adherence to Arab doctrines. He accomplished this task with remarkable success.

In contrast to his predecessors, Aquinas possessed a truly comprehensive knowledge of Aristotle's works. A friend of Aquinas, William of Moerbeke, provided him with translations from Greek, while he himself wrote commentaries. Prior to Aquinas, people's conceptions of Aristotle had been obscured by Neoplatonic overlays. He followed the authentic Aristotle and held a disdain for Platonism, even in the form presented in St. Augustine's teachings. Aquinas succeeded in convincing church representatives that Aristotle's system should be preferred over that of Plato as the foundation of Christian philosophy, asserting that both Muslim and Christian Averroists had misinterpreted Aristotle. Personally, I would assert that "On the Soul" leads far more naturally to the views of Averroes than to those of Aquinas; however, the Church has maintained a different opinion since the time of St. Thomas. Furthermore, I would contend that Aristotle's views on most logical and philosophical issues were not definitive and, as the subsequent development of philosophy has shown, were largely erroneous; but adherence to this view is likewise prohibited for all Catholic philosophers and philosophy educators.

The most significant work of St. Thomas, the "Summa contra Gentiles," was composed between 1259 and 1264. Its purpose is to affirm the truth of the Christian religion through arguments addressed to a reader presumed to be non-Christian; likely, this fictional reader is someone well-versed in Arab philosophy. St. Thomas also wrote another book, the "Summa Theologiae," which holds almost equal significance but presents somewhat lesser interest to us, as it employs fewer arguments that do not presuppose the truth of Christianity.

What the reader will find in the following pages is a concise summary of the content of the "Summa contra Gentiles."

First, let us consider what is meant by "wisdom." A person may be wise in a particular undertaking, such as building houses; this means that he knows the means to achieve some specific goal. However, all specific goals are subordinated to the goal of the Universe, and wisdom per se concerns the goal of the Universe. As for the goal of the Universe, it lies in the good of reason, that is, in truth. Attaining wisdom in this sense is the highest, most exalted, useful, and delightful of all pursuits. All this is demonstrated by reference to the authority of "The Philosopher," namely, Aristotle.

My aim, declares St. Thomas, is to proclaim the truth professed by canonical teaching. However, here I must appeal to the aid of natural reason, for pagans do not accept the authority of Sacred Scripture. Yet natural reason is insufficient regarding God; it can only prove some parts of the doctrine, but certainly not all. It can demonstrate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, but not the Trinity, the Incarnation, or the Last Judgment. All that can be proved through reason (as it pertains to this) is in full accordance with Christian doctrine, and there is nothing in revelation that contradicts reason. However, it is important to delineate and separate those parts of the doctrine that can be proven through reason from those that cannot be known apart from revelation. Accordingly, in the four books into which the "Summa" is divided, the first three make no references to revelation, except to show that it is in complete harmony with the conclusions reached through reason; only in the fourth book are questions considered that cannot be understood without revelation.

The first step is to prove the existence of God. Some believe that this is unnecessary, for the existence of God (as they claim) is self-evident. This would be true if we knew the essence of God, for (as will be demonstrated later) in God essence and existence coincide. However, the essence of God remains unknown to us, except for a very imperfect knowledge. Wise people know more about the essence of God than ignorant people, and angels know more than both; yet no creature knows it sufficiently to derive the existence of God from its essence. On this basis, the ontological proof is rejected.

It is important to remember that that religious truth which can be proved can also be grasped through faith. Proofs are difficult and accessible only to learned individuals; faith, however, is also necessary for the unlearned, the young, and those whose engagement in affairs leaves no leisure for studying philosophy. For them, revelation suffices.

Some assert that God can be known only through faith. They cite as a reason that if the principles of proof become known to us through sensory experience, as stated in the "Second Analytic," then anything beyond sensory perception cannot be proved. But this conclusion is erroneous; and even if it were true, God could still be known through his sensory manifestations.

The existence of God is proven, as in Aristotle’s philosophy, by the argument of the unmoved mover. Things can be categorized into two groups—some are merely moved, while others move and are themselves moved. All that is moved is set in motion by something else, and since an infinite regress is impossible, we must ultimately arrive at something that moves without being itself moved. This unmoved mover is God. One might object that this proof presupposes the eternity of motion—a principle rejected by Catholics. However, such an objection would be erroneous: the proof holds when one starts from the hypothesis of eternal motion, but it becomes even more compelling when one begins from the opposing hypothesis, which acknowledges a beginning and thus a first cause. In the Summa Theologiae, five proofs for the existence of God are presented. First, there is the proof of the unmoved mover, as discussed above. Second, there is the proof of the first cause, which again rests on the impossibility of infinite regress. Third, there is the proof that a finite source of all necessity must exist; this argument is little different from the second proof. Fourth, there is the proof that we observe varying degrees of perfection in the world, which must have their source in something absolutely perfect. Fifth, there is the proof that we find even inanimate things serving a purpose, which must be an end established by some being outside of them, for only living beings can have an internal purpose.

Let us return to the Summa contra Gentiles; having proved the existence of God, we can now express many definitions about Him, but all of these will, in a certain sense, be negative: God's nature becomes known to us through negative definitions. God is eternal because He is unmoved; He is incorruptible because there is no passive potentiality in Him. David Dinant (a materialistic pantheist of the early thirteenth century) "dreamed" that God is the same as primary matter; this is nonsense, for primary matter is pure passivity, while God is pure activity. In God, there is no complexity, and thus He is not a body, since bodies are composed of parts.

God is His own essence; otherwise, He would not be simple but would consist of essence and existence. (This is an important point.) In God, essence and existence are identical to one another. In God, there are no accidents. He cannot be specified by any substantial differences; He exists beyond all kinds; He cannot be defined. However, God encompasses the perfection of every kind. Things are similar to God in some respects and not in others. It is more fitting to say that things are similar to God than that God is similar to things.

God is goodness and His own goodness; He is the good of every good. He is intellectual, and His act of intellect is His essence. He knows through His essence and knows Himself in a perfect manner. (Let us recall that John Scotus held a different view on this matter.)

Although there is no complexity in the divine intellect, it is nonetheless granted knowledge of many things. This may present a difficulty, but it must be considered that the things known by Him do not have a separate existence in Him. They do not exist per se, as Plato assumed, for the forms of natural things cannot exist or be known apart from matter. Nevertheless, God must have access to the knowledge of things prior to the creation of the world. This difficulty is resolved as follows: “The concept of the divine intellect, as He knows Himself, which is His Word, is not only a likeness of the known God but also of all things, of which the divine essence serves as a likeness. Therefore, God is granted knowledge of many things; it is granted to one intelligible form, which is the divine essence, and one known concept, which is the divine Word.” Each form, as something positive, represents a perfection. The divine intellect includes in its essence that which is characteristic of each thing, knowing where it is similar to Him and where it is distinct from Him; for instance, the essence of a plant constitutes life and not knowledge, while the essence of an animal constitutes knowledge and not reason. Thus, a plant is similar to God in that it is alive, but it is distinct from Him in that it lacks knowledge; an animal is similar to God in that it possesses knowledge, but it is distinct from Him in that it lacks reason. Always, the distinction of creation from God is of a negative nature.

God knows all things in the same instant. His knowledge is not habitual; it has nothing to do with discursive or demonstrative knowledge. God is the very truth. (This should be understood in the literal sense.)

Now we approach a question that has already troubled both Plato and Aristotle. Can God know individual things, or is His knowledge limited to universals and general truths? A Christian, believing in Providence, must assert that God has access to knowledge of individual things; however, strong arguments are made against this view. St. Thomas enumerates seven such arguments, and then he takes to refuting them. Here are the seven arguments:

1. Since the individual is by its nature material, it cannot be known by anything immaterial.
2. Individual things do not have eternal existence and cannot be known when they do not exist; therefore, they cannot be known by an incorruptible being.
3. Individual things are contingent and not necessary; therefore, there is no certain knowledge about them, except that they exist.
4. Some individual things owe their existence to acts of will, which can only be known by the person from whom the will emanates.
5. The number of individual things is infinite, and the infinite as such is unknowable.
6. Individual things are too insignificant for God to pay attention to them.
7. In some individual things, there is evil, and God cannot know evil.

Aquinas counters that God knows individual things as their cause; that He knows things not yet existing, just as a craftsman knows when he is crafting something; that He knows future contingents, for He exists outside of time and thus sees each thing in time as if it already existed; that He knows our thoughts and hidden wills; and that He knows an infinite number of things, although this is inaccessible to us. God knows insignificant things, for nothing can be entirely insignificant and not contain something exalted; otherwise, God would have knowledge of only Himself. Furthermore, the order of the universe is supremely exalted and cannot be known without knowledge of even the most insignificant parts. Finally, God knows things that contain evil, for knowing something good entails knowing its opposite—evil.

In God is contained will; His will is His essence, and its main object is the divine essence. Wishing for Himself, God also wishes for other things, for God is the end of all things. He wishes even for things that do not yet exist. He desires His own being and goodness; other things, although He desires them, He wishes not necessarily. In God, the will is free; His act of will can be attributed to a rational basis rather than a cause. He cannot wish for things that are impossible in themselves; for example, He cannot make a contradiction true. Aquinas’s example that there is something beyond divine power is not very successful: he states that God could not turn a man into a donkey.

In God reside ecstasy, joy, and love; hatred is unknown to Him. He embodies both contemplative and active virtues. He is happy and is His own happiness.

Now (in Book II) we turn to the question of creations. Examining this question is useful for refuting errors contrary to faith. God created the world ex nihilo, contrary to the opinion of the ancients. Furthermore, Aquinas returns to the topic of actions that are inaccessible even to God. He cannot be a body or change Himself; He cannot suffer failure; He cannot tire, forget, repent, become angry, or feel sorrow; He cannot deprive a person of their soul or make the sum of a triangle's angles unequal to two right angles. He is incapable of erasing the past, falling into sin, creating another God, or rendering Himself non-existent.

Primarily, Book II is dedicated to the problem of the human soul. All rational substances are immaterial and incorruptible; angels are incorporeal, while in humans, the soul coexists with the body. According to Aristotle's views, it is the form of the body. In a person, there is not three souls, but only one. The entire soul is wholly present in each particle of the body. The souls of animals, unlike those of humans, do not possess immortality. Reason is a part of each human's soul; Averroes was mistaken in asserting that there exists only one intellect to which various people are related. The soul is not inherited through seed but is created anew in each individual. Indeed, this raises a difficulty: when a child is born of an illegitimate union, one might think that God is an accomplice to marital infidelity. Yet this is a sophistical objection. (There is also a substantial objection, which St. Augustine grappled with: it concerns the hereditary transmission of original sin. For it is the soul that sins, and if the soul is not inherited but created anew, how can it inherit Adam's sin? But St. Thomas does not enter into this discussion.)

In connection with the question of the intellect, the problem of universals is examined. St. Thomas adopts Aristotle's position. Universals do not exist outside the soul, but through reason, knowing universals, one also knows things outside the soul.

The third book primarily addresses ethical questions. Evil is unintentional; it is not essential but has a contingent cause that lies within the good. All things tend to resemble God, who is the end of all things. Human happiness does not consist in carnal pleasures, honors, fame, wealth, worldly power, or bodily goods; it is not sensual in nature. The highest happiness for a person cannot consist in actions grounded in moral virtue, for these serve only as means; the highest happiness lies in the knowledge of God. However, the knowledge of God that most people possess is by no means sufficient to attain the highest happiness; knowledge of God obtained through proofs is also insufficient; even that knowledge acquired through faith is not enough. In this present life, we are not granted to see God and His essence or to attain the highest happiness; yet in the coming world, we shall behold Him face to face. (Not in a literal sense, warns St. Thomas, for God has no face.) This will be achieved not by our natural powers but through divine light; and even then, we shall not be able to see all of God. This vision makes us partakers of eternal life, that is, life beyond time.

Divine providence does not exclude evil, chance, free will, fortune, or happiness. Evil is caused by secondary causes, much like a good artist working with poor tools.

Angels are not equal among themselves; they are divided into ranks. Each angel is a unique representative of its kind, for angels are incorporeal and therefore can differ only by their species distinctions, not by their position in space.

Astrology must be rejected, for conventional arguments are brought forth in favor of this. When asked, "Is there fate?" Aquinas responds that we can assign the name "fate" to the order by which providence strikes our mind, but it is wiser not to do so, for "fate" is a pagan term. From this follows an argument for the usefulness of prayers, despite the fact that the will of providence cannot be changed. (I could not comprehend this argument.) God occasionally works miracles, but no one else can do this. Magic, however, is possible through demons; yet it has nothing in common with genuine miracles and occurs without the aid of stars.

The divine law directs us to love God and, to a lesser extent, our neighbor. The divine law prohibits fornication, for a father must be with the mother while the children are being raised. The divine law forbids contraceptive measures as contrary to nature; however, it does not prohibit lifelong celibacy for the same reason. The bonds of marriage must be indissoluble, for a father is necessary for raising children—both because he is more rational than the mother and because he possesses greater physical strength when it comes to disciplining children. Not every carnal union is sinful, for it is natural; but to suppose that marriage is as virtuous as abstinence is to fall into the heresy of Jovinian. Marriage must be founded on the strictest monogamy: polygamy is degrading to women, and polyandry does not allow for the establishment of the true father of the child. Incest would complicate family life and must therefore be prohibited. The argument against the incestuous love of brother and sister is particularly interesting: if the love of husband and wife is combined with the love of brother and sister, the mutual attraction will be so strong that it will lead to excessively frequent unions.

It is essential to note that all this argumentation on the ethical issues of gender relations is grounded purely in rational considerations, rather than divine commandments and prohibitions. Here, as throughout the first three books, Aquinas is eager to conclude his examination of a particular question with quotes showing that reason has led him to conclusions that are entirely in harmony with Sacred Scripture; but he appeals to authority only when the stated goal has been achieved.

The question of voluntary poverty is addressed in an extraordinarily lively and interesting manner; as one might expect, Thomas Aquinas ultimately arrives at a conclusion fully consistent with the principles of mendicant orders; yet the objections to his view are formulated with such force and realism that they indicate he has indeed heard them from the mouths of the secular clergy.

Then Thomas Aquinas turns to the problems of sin, predestination, and election, adhering generally to the views of St. Augustine. By committing mortal sin, a person forever deprives themselves of an end in eternity, and thus their deserved fate is eternal punishment. No one can be freed from sin except through grace; nevertheless, the sinner deserves condemnation if they do not turn to the path of righteousness. A person requires grace to remain on the path of righteousness, yet no one can merit divine assistance. God does not serve as the cause of sin, but He allows some to become entrenched in sin while freeing others from it. As for the problem of predestination, St. Thomas's view appears to coincide with that of St. Augustine: it is impossible to explain why some are chosen and ascend to heaven while others remain cursed and descend into hell. St. Thomas also shared the opinion that unbaptized individuals cannot enter heaven. However, this truth does not belong to those that can be proven through reason alone; it is revealed to us in the text of John (3:5).

The fourth book addresses the issues of the Trinity, the Incarnation, papal supremacy, sacraments, and the resurrection of the body. Overall, this book is directed not so much at philosophers as at theologians, and I will only touch upon it briefly.

There are three types of knowledge of God: through reason, through revelation, and through intuition of things previously known only through revelation. However, Aquinas speaks almost nothing of the third type. The author, inclined toward mysticism, would have devoted more attention to this type than to the other two, but Aquinas possessed a temperament more logical than mystical.

The Greek Church is accused of two things: it denies the double procession of the Holy Spirit and does not recognize papal supremacy. Aquinas cautions the reader that, although Christ was conceived of the Holy Spirit, this should not be understood in the sense that He was the son of the Holy Spirit in the flesh.

The Sacraments possess efficacy even when administered by flawed clerics. This was a crucial tenet of Christian doctrine. The reality was that many priests lived in mortal sin, and devout individuals feared that such priests lacked the authority to perform sacraments. This created a challenging predicament; no one could ascertain whether they were truly married or if the absolution of their sins held any validity. Such uncertainties led to heresy and schism, as those inclined toward puritanism attempted to establish a distinct clergy characterized by greater moral virtue. Consequently, the Church had to assert decisively that a priest’s sinfulness does not strip him of his capacity to fulfill his spiritual duties.

One of the final matters discussed is the resurrection of the body. Here, as elsewhere, Aquinas articulates the objections to the orthodox view with remarkable clarity. One such objection, at first glance, seems rather intricate. What fate, the saint inquires, should befall a person who has lived their life solely on human flesh, along with parents who did the same? It appears unjust that his victims should lose their bodies on the final day due to his carnivorousness; yet if their bodies are retained, what remains to constitute his own body? I am pleased to assert that this difficulty, which may initially seem insurmountable, is triumphantly overcome. The identity of the body, St. Thomas points out, does not hinge upon the retention of the same material particles; for as long as we live, the matter comprising our bodies undergoes constant change due to the processes of eating and digestion. Thus, a cannibal may receive the same body upon resurrection, even if it is not composed of the very substance from which it was formed at the moment of death. With this comforting thought, we can conclude our brief summary of the Summa contra Gentiles.

In broad strokes, Aquinas's philosophy resembles that of Aristotle and will be accepted or rejected by the reader based on their own stance toward the Stagirite’s philosophy. The originality of Aquinas is revealed in how he adapted Aristotle to Christian doctrine, subjecting his teachings to only the most minor modifications. In his time, Aquinas was regarded as a bold innovator; even after his death, many of his doctrines were condemned by the universities of Paris and Oxford. More striking than even his capacity for original thought is Aquinas's gift for systematization. Even if all his doctrines were mistaken, the Summa contra Gentiles would still remain an impressive intellectual construct. When Aquinas sets out to refute a particular doctrine, he first articulates it, often with great force and almost always striving to maintain impartiality. The clarity with which he distinguishes between proofs derived from reason and those based on revelation is remarkable. Aquinas possesses a deep understanding of Aristotle that surpasses that of any preceding Catholic philosopher.

Yet these merits scarcely suffice to justify the immense reputation of St. Thomas. His appeal to reason must be acknowledged as somewhat insincere, for the conclusion he is bound to reach is predetermined. Consider, for example, the question of the indissolubility of marriage. St. Thomas defends this principle on the grounds that a father is essential in the upbringing of children: (a) because he is more rational than the mother, (b) because, possessing greater strength, he is better equipped to administer physical punishment. A contemporary educator might counter that (a) there is no basis for asserting that men, as a whole, are more rational than women, (b) that punishments requiring great physical strength are generally undesirable in education. A modern educator could go further, noting that in today’s world, fathers rarely play a significant role in child-rearing. However, no follower of St. Thomas would renounce their belief in lifelong monogamy on these grounds, for the actual foundations of this belief are far removed from those cited in its justification.

As another example, let us consider the arguments through which St. Thomas seems to prove the existence of God. All of these, except for the appeal to the teleology evident in inanimate things, rest upon the presumed impossibility of a series that lacks a first member. Any mathematician knows that this is by no means impossible; an example that contradicts St. Thomas's premise is the series of negative integers ending with minus one. Yet even in this case, it is unlikely that a Catholic would abandon their faith in God, even if convinced of the fallibility of St. Thomas's arguments; they would devise new arguments or seek refuge in revelation.

The assertions that the essence of God is simultaneously His existence, that God is His own goodness, His own power, and so forth, lead to a conflation of the mode of existence of the particular with that of the universal—a confusion once present in Plato's thought but deemed overcome by Aristotle. The essence of God, it must be assumed, possesses the nature of a universal, whereas His existence does not. This difficulty is not easily articulated satisfactorily, for it arises within a system of logic no longer acceptable. Yet this challenge clearly indicates the presence of a certain syntactical confusion, without which much of the argumentation regarding God would lose its persuasive power.

In Aquinas, there is little true philosophical spirit. He does not aim, like the Platonic Socrates, to follow wherever the argument may lead. Aquinas is uninterested in inquiries whose outcomes are unknown beforehand. Before he begins to philosophize, Aquinas already knows the truth: it has been revealed in Catholic doctrine. If he manages to find compelling rational arguments for certain aspects of this doctrine, so much the better; if not, he need only revert to revelation. Yet the pursuit of arguments for a preordained conclusion is not philosophy but rather a system of biased reasoning. Therefore, I cannot agree with the view that Aquinas deserves to be placed on par with the finest philosophers of Greece or modern times.