Scholastics
St. Thomas Aquinas
Thomas Aquinas (1225/1226–1274) stands as the preeminent figure of scholastic philosophy. In Catholic institutions, his system is prescribed as the only true philosophy, a mandate in effect since the 1879 rescript of Leo XIII. Consequently, the philosophy of St. Thomas possesses more than historical significance. It continues to exert a vital influence comparable to that of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel—indeed, it remains more potent than the latter two. In most matters, St. Thomas adheres so closely to Aristotle that, to the Catholic mind, the Stagirite is viewed as an authority nearly equal to the Church Fathers. Criticizing his philosophical positions is considered little short of blasphemy. This was not always the case. In Aquinas’s era, the struggle to establish Aristotle’s supremacy over Plato was still unfolding. Aquinas’s influence secured Aristotle’s victory until the Renaissance, after which Plato—whose works became more widely known than they had been in the Middle Ages—regained prominence among most philosophers. In the seventeenth century, one could be both orthodox and a Cartesian; even Malebranche, a priest, faced no censure for his views. Today, however, such intellectual liberties are a thing of the past. Members of the Catholic Church are required to accept the system of St. Thomas unconditionally if they wish to engage in philosophy.
Life and Intellectual Formation
St. Thomas was the son of the Count of Aquino, whose castle stood near Monte Cassino in the Kingdom of Naples, where the education of the “Angel Doctor” began. After six years at the University of Naples under Frederick II, he joined the Dominican Order and moved to Cologne to study under Albert the Great, the leading Aristotelian of the age. Following periods in Cologne and Paris, St. Thomas returned to Italy in 1259, where he remained for the rest of his life, save for a three-year interval from 1269 to 1272. During that time in Paris, the Dominicans faced difficulties with university authorities over their commitment to Aristotelianism; they were suspected of harboring heretical sympathies for the Averroists, a powerful faction at the university. Relying on their interpretation of Aristotle, the Averroists argued that the individual soul is not immortal, claiming that immortality belongs only to an impersonal intellect shared among rational beings. When challenged on the grounds that this contradicted Catholic teaching, the Averroists resorted to the ruse of “dual truth,” asserting that one truth exists in philosophy based on reason, and another in theology based on revelation. This brought disrepute upon Aristotle, and St. Thomas’s task in Paris was to rectify the damage caused by such an uncritical embrace of Arab doctrines. He accomplished this with remarkable success.
The Aristotelian Synthesis
Unlike his predecessors, Aquinas possessed a truly comprehensive knowledge of Aristotle’s works. His friend, William of Moerbeke, provided him with translations from the Greek, and Aquinas himself produced extensive commentaries. Before him, interpretations of Aristotle had been obscured by Neoplatonic overlays. Aquinas followed the authentic Aristotle and held a disdain for Platonism, even in the form presented by St. Augustine. He succeeded in convincing church representatives that Aristotle’s system, rather than Plato’s, should serve as the foundation of Christian philosophy. He argued that both Muslim and Christian Averroists had misinterpreted the Stagirite. Personally, I would assert that “On the Soul” leads far more naturally to the views of Averroes than to those of Aquinas. However, the Church has maintained a different opinion since the time of St. Thomas. Furthermore, I would contend that Aristotle’s views on most logical and philosophical issues were not definitive. As the subsequent development of philosophy has shown, they were largely erroneous. Adherence to this view is prohibited for all Catholic philosophers and educators.
The most significant work of St. Thomas, the Summa contra Gentiles, was composed between 1259 and 1264. Its purpose is to affirm the truth of the Christian religion through arguments addressed to a reader presumed to be non-Christian—likely someone well-versed in Arab philosophy. St. Thomas also wrote the Summa Theologiae, which holds almost equal significance but is of somewhat less interest to us here, as it relies more heavily on arguments that presuppose the truth of Christianity.
What the reader will find in the following pages is a concise summary of the content of the Summa contra Gentiles.
The Nature of Wisdom and Natural Reason
First, let us consider what is meant by wisdom. A person may be wise in a particular undertaking, such as building houses, which means he knows the means to achieve a specific goal. However, all specific goals are subordinated to the goal of the Universe, and wisdom per se concerns the goal of the Universe. As for the goal of the Universe, it lies in the good of reason, that is, in truth. Attaining wisdom in this sense is the highest, most exalted, useful, and delightful of all pursuits. All this is demonstrated by reference to the authority of “The Philosopher,” namely, Aristotle.
St. Thomas declares his aim to be the proclamation of the truth as professed by canonical teaching. However, he must appeal to the aid of natural reason, for pagans do not accept the authority of Sacred Scripture. Natural reason remains insufficient regarding God. It can demonstrate certain parts of the doctrine, but certainly not all. It can prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, yet it cannot establish the Trinity, the Incarnation, or the Last Judgment. All that can be proven through reason is in full accordance with Christian doctrine, and nothing in revelation contradicts it. Nevertheless, one must delineate those parts of the doctrine that can be proven through reason from those that cannot be known apart from revelation.
Accordingly, in the four books of the Summa contra Gentiles, the first three make no reference to revelation except to show its complete harmony with the conclusions of reason. Only in the fourth book are questions considered that cannot be understood without revelation.
Proving the Existence of God
The first step is to prove the existence of God. Some believe this is unnecessary, claiming that God’s existence is self-evident. This would be true if we knew the essence of God, for, as will be demonstrated, in God essence and existence coincide. However, the essence of God remains unknown to us, save for a very imperfect understanding. Wise people know more about the essence of God than the ignorant, and angels know more than both; yet no creature knows it sufficiently to derive the existence of God from its essence. On this basis, the ontological proof is rejected.
Religious truth that can be proven may also be grasped through faith. Philosophical proofs are difficult and accessible only to the learned; faith, however, is necessary for the unlearned, the young, and those whose daily affairs leave no leisure for the study of philosophy. For them, revelation suffices.
Some assert that God can be known only through faith. They argue that if the principles of proof are derived from sensory experience, as stated in the Second Analytic, then anything beyond sensory perception cannot be proven. This conclusion is erroneous. Even if it were true, God could still be known through His sensory manifestations.
The existence of God is proven, as in the philosophy of The Philosopher, by the argument of the unmoved mover. Things fall into two categories: some are merely moved, while others move and are themselves moved. All that is moved is set in motion by something else, and since an infinite regress is impossible, we must ultimately arrive at something that moves without being moved itself. This unmoved mover is God. One might object that this proof presupposes the eternity of motion—a principle rejected by Catholics. Yet such an objection is misplaced. The proof holds when one starts from the hypothesis of eternal motion, but it becomes even more compelling when one begins from the opposing hypothesis, which acknowledges a beginning and thus a first cause. In the Summa Theologiae, five proofs for the existence of God are presented.
- First is the proof of the unmoved mover, as discussed.
- Second is the proof of the first cause, which again rests on the impossibility of infinite regress.
- Third is the proof that a finite source of all necessity must exist; this argument differs little from the second.
- Fourth is the proof that we observe varying degrees of perfection in the world, which must have their source in something absolutely perfect.
- Fifth is the proof that even inanimate things serve a purpose.
This must be an end established by a being outside of them, for only living beings can possess an internal purpose.
Defining the Divine Nature
Returning to the Summa contra Gentiles, having proved the existence of God, we can express many definitions about Him, though these will, in a certain sense, be negative. God’s nature becomes known to us through what He is not. God is eternal because He is unmoved; He is incorruptible because there is no passive potentiality in Him. David Dinant, a materialistic pantheist of the early thirteenth century, “dreamed” that God is identical to primary matter. This is nonsense, for primary matter is pure passivity, while God is pure activity. In God, there is no complexity, and thus He is not a body, since bodies are composed of parts.
God is His own essence; otherwise, He would not be simple but would consist of essence and existence. In God, essence and existence are identical. He contains no accidents, cannot be specified by any substantial differences, exists beyond all categories, and cannot be defined. However, God encompasses the perfection of every kind. Things are similar to God in some respects and not in others. It is more fitting to say that things are similar to God than that God is similar to things.
God is goodness and His own goodness; He is the good of every good. He is intellectual, and His act of intellect is His essence. He knows through His essence and knows Himself in a perfect manner. (Let us recall that John Scotus held a different view on this matter.)
Although there is no complexity in the divine intellect, it is nonetheless granted knowledge of many things. This may seem difficult to reconcile, yet one must consider that the objects of His knowledge do not possess a separate existence within Him. They do not exist per se, as Plato assumed, for the forms of natural things cannot exist or be known apart from matter. Nevertheless, God must possess knowledge of all things prior to the creation of the world. This difficulty is resolved as follows: “The concept of the divine intellect, as He knows Himself, which is His Word, is not only a likeness of the known God but also of all things, of which the divine essence serves as a likeness. Therefore, God is granted knowledge of many things; it is granted to one intelligible form, which is the divine essence, and one known concept, which is the divine Word.” Each form, being positive, represents a perfection. The divine intellect includes within its essence the characteristics of each thing, discerning where it is similar to Him and where it is distinct; for instance, the essence of a plant constitutes life but not knowledge, while the essence of an animal constitutes knowledge but not reason. Thus, a plant is similar to God in that it is alive, but distinct in that it lacks knowledge; an animal is similar to God in that it possesses knowledge, but distinct in that it lacks reason. In every case, the distinction between creation and God is negative.
God knows all things in a single instant. His knowledge is not habitual; it has nothing to do with discursive or demonstrative reasoning. God is, in the most literal sense, the very truth.
Divine Knowledge of Particulars
We now approach a question that troubled both Plato and Aristotle: can God know individual things, or is His knowledge limited to universals and general truths? A Christian, believing in Providence, must assert that God possesses knowledge of individual things; however, there are strong arguments against this view. St. Thomas enumerates seven such objections, which he then proceeds to refute. The seven arguments are as follows:
- Since the individual is by nature material, it cannot be known by anything immaterial.
- Individual things do not have eternal existence and cannot be known when they do not exist; therefore, they cannot be known by an incorruptible being.
- Individual things are contingent rather than necessary; therefore, there can be no certain knowledge of them, beyond the mere fact of their existence.
- Some individual things owe their existence to acts of will, which can only be known by the person from whom that will emanates.
- The number of individual things is infinite, and the infinite as such is unknowable.
- Individual things are too insignificant for God to attend to them.
- Some individual things contain evil, and God cannot know evil.
Aquinas counters that God knows individual things as their cause. He perceives things not yet in existence, much as a craftsman envisions his work while it is still in production. Future contingents remain transparent to Him because He exists outside of time, seeing each temporal event as if it were already present. Our hidden thoughts and wills are known to Him, as is an infinite number of things—a capacity inaccessible to human cognition. God knows even the seemingly insignificant, for nothing can be entirely trivial if it contains some trace of the exalted; otherwise, God would know only Himself. Furthermore, the order of the universe is so sublime that it cannot be understood without knowledge of even its most minor parts. Finally, God knows things that contain evil, for to know a good is to understand its opposite: evil.
In God resides the will; His will is His essence, and its primary object is the divine essence itself. In willing Himself, God also wills other things, for He is the end of all existence. He wills even things that do not yet exist. He desires His own being and goodness; while He also desires other things, He does not will them of necessity. In God, the will is free; His act of volition is grounded in a rational basis rather than an external cause. He cannot will what is inherently impossible; for example, He cannot make a contradiction true. Aquinas’s attempt to illustrate the limits of divine power is somewhat unconvincing; he suggests that God could not turn a man into a donkey.
In God reside ecstasy, joy, and love; hatred is unknown to Him. He embodies both contemplative and active virtues. He is happy and is His own happiness.
Creation and the Human Soul
In Book II, we turn to the question of creation. Examining this is useful for refuting errors contrary to faith. God created the world ex nihilo, contrary to the opinion of the ancients. Aquinas returns to the topic of actions that are inaccessible even to God. He cannot be a body or change Himself; He cannot suffer failure; He cannot tire, forget, repent, become angry, or feel sorrow. He cannot deprive a person of their soul, nor can He make the sum of a triangle’s angles unequal to two right angles. He is incapable of erasing the past, falling into sin, creating another God, or rendering Himself non-existent.
Book II focuses primarily on the nature of the human soul. Aquinas maintains that all rational substances are immaterial and incorruptible; angels are incorporeal, whereas in humans, the soul coexists with the body as its form, in accordance with the views of The Philosopher. A person possesses not three souls, but one, which is present in its entirety within every particle of the body. Unlike human souls, those of animals lack immortality. Reason is an essential part of the human soul, and Aquinas argues that Averroes was mistaken in asserting the existence of a single intellect shared by all people. The soul is not inherited through the seed but is created anew in each individual. This creates a difficulty: if a child is born of an illegitimate union, one might conclude that God is an accomplice to infidelity. This is, however, a sophistical objection. There is a more substantial problem, which St. Augustine grappled with, concerning the hereditary transmission of original sin; if the soul is not inherited but created anew, it is unclear how it can inherit the sin of Adam. St. Thomas, however, does not enter into this discussion.
In connection with the intellect, the problem of universals is examined. St. Thomas adopts the position of The Philosopher. Universals do not exist outside the soul, but by means of reason, which understands universals, one also gains knowledge of things existing outside the soul.
Ethics and Divine Providence
The third book addresses ethical questions. Evil is unintentional; it is not essential but possesses a contingent cause rooted in the good. All things tend to resemble God, who is the ultimate end of all creation. Human happiness does not consist in carnal pleasures, honors, fame, wealth, worldly power, or bodily goods; it is not sensual in nature. Furthermore, the highest happiness for a person cannot consist in actions grounded in moral virtue, for these serve only as means; the highest happiness lies in the knowledge of God. Yet, the knowledge of God that most people possess is insufficient to attain this end; knowledge obtained through proofs is equally inadequate, as is that acquired through faith alone. In this life, we are not granted the vision of God in His essence; in the coming world, however, we shall behold Him face to face. St. Thomas warns that this is not to be taken literally, for God has no face. This vision will be achieved not by our natural powers but through divine light, and even then, we shall not be able to comprehend the entirety of God. This vision makes us partakers of eternal life, which exists beyond time.
Divine providence does not exclude the existence of evil, chance, free will, fortune, or happiness. Evil is caused by secondary causes, much like a good artist working with poor tools.
Angels are not equal; they are divided into ranks. Each angel is a unique representative of its kind, for as incorporeal beings, angels differ only by their species, not by their position in space.
Astrology must be rejected, despite the conventional arguments brought forth in its favor. When asked whether fate exists, Aquinas responds that while we might assign the name ‘fate’ to the order by which providence strikes our mind, it is wiser to refrain from doing so, as ‘fate’ is a pagan term. From this follows an argument for the efficacy of prayer, notwithstanding the fact that the will of providence cannot be changed. (I found this argument difficult to comprehend.) God occasionally performs miracles, but no one else possesses this power. Magic, however, is possible through the agency of demons; it has nothing in common with genuine miracles and occurs without the influence of the stars.
The divine law directs us to love God and, to a lesser extent, our neighbor. It prohibits fornication, as a father must be present to assist in raising children. The law forbids contraception as contrary to nature, though it does not prohibit lifelong celibacy on the same grounds. Marriage must be indissoluble because a father is necessary for the upbringing of children, both because he is more rational than the mother and because he possesses the physical strength required for discipline. Not every carnal union is sinful, for some are natural; however, to suggest that marriage is as virtuous as abstinence is to fall into the heresy of Jovinian. Marriage must be founded on strict monogamy:
- polygamy is degrading to women
- polyandry prevents the identification of a child’s true father
- Incest would complicate family life and must therefore be prohibited
The argument against the incestuous love of siblings is particularly interesting. If the love of husband and wife were combined with that of brother and sister, the resulting mutual attraction would be so intense as to lead to excessively frequent unions.
These ethical arguments regarding gender relations are grounded entirely in rational considerations rather than divine commandments. Throughout the first three books, the Angel Doctor is eager to conclude his examination of a question with citations showing that reason has led him to conclusions in harmony with Sacred Scripture. He appeals to authority only once the rational goal has been achieved.
The question of voluntary poverty is addressed in an extraordinarily lively and interesting manner. As one might expect, Thomas Aquinas ultimately arrives at a conclusion fully consistent with the principles of the mendicant orders. Yet, the objections to his view are formulated with such force and realism that they suggest he had heard them directly from the secular clergy.
Thomas Aquinas then turns to the problems of sin, predestination, and election, largely adhering to the views of St. Augustine. By committing a mortal sin, a person permanently forfeits an eternal end, and thus their deserved fate is eternal punishment. No one can be freed from sin except through grace; nevertheless, the sinner remains culpable if they fail to turn toward the path of righteousness. While a person requires grace to remain on that path, no one can merit such divine assistance. God is not the cause of sin, yet He allows some to become entrenched in it while freeing others. Regarding the problem of predestination, St. Thomas’s view appears to coincide with that of St. Augustine: it is impossible to explain why some are chosen to ascend to heaven while others remain cursed to descend into hell. St. Thomas also maintained that unbaptized individuals cannot enter heaven. This truth, however, does not belong to the domain of reason; it is revealed to us in the text of John (3:5).
Theological Doctrines and Sacraments
The fourth book addresses the Trinity, the Incarnation, papal supremacy, the sacraments, and the resurrection of the body. Overall, this book is directed less toward philosophers than toward theologians, and I shall touch upon it only briefly.
There are three types of knowledge of God: through reason, through revelation, and through intuition of things previously known only through revelation. Aquinas, however, says almost nothing of the third type. A writer inclined toward mysticism would have devoted more attention to this category than to the other two, but Aquinas possessed a temperament that was logical rather than mystical.
The Greek Church is accused of two things: denying the double procession of the Holy Spirit and failing to recognize papal supremacy. Aquinas cautions the reader that although Christ was conceived of the Holy Spirit, this should not be understood as meaning that He was the son of the Holy Spirit in the flesh.
The sacraments possess efficacy even when administered by flawed clerics. This was a crucial tenet of Christian doctrine. In reality, many priests lived in mortal sin, and devout individuals feared that such men lacked the authority to perform the sacraments. This created a challenging predicament: no one could ascertain whether they were truly married or if the absolution of their sins held any validity. Such uncertainties led to heresy and schism, as those inclined toward puritanism attempted to establish a distinct clergy characterized by greater moral virtue.
Consequently, the Church had to assert decisively that a priest’s sinfulness does not strip him of his capacity to fulfill his spiritual duties.
One of the final matters discussed is the resurrection of the body. Here, as elsewhere, Aquinas articulates the objections to the orthodox view with remarkable clarity. One such objection, at first glance, seems rather thorny: what fate, the saint asks, should befall a person who has lived their life solely on human flesh, or parents who did the same? It appears unjust that the victims should lose their bodies on the final day because of the cannibal’s diet; yet if their bodies are restored, what remains to constitute his own? I am pleased to report that this difficulty, which may initially seem insurmountable, is triumphantly overcome. The identity of the body, St. Thomas points out, does not hinge upon the retention of the same material particles; as long as we live, the matter comprising our bodies undergoes constant change through eating and digestion. Thus, a cannibal may receive the same body upon resurrection, even if it is not composed of the very substance from which it was formed at the moment of death. With this comforting thought, we conclude our brief summary of the Summa contra Gentiles.
Critical Assessment of the Thomistic System
In broad strokes, Aquinas’s philosophy resembles that of Aristotle and will be accepted or rejected by the reader based on their own stance toward the Stagirite’s philosophy. The originality of Aquinas is revealed in how he adapted Aristotle to Christian doctrine, subjecting his teachings to only the most minor modifications. In his time, Aquinas was regarded as a bold innovator; even after his death, many of his doctrines were condemned by the universities of Paris and Oxford. More striking than his capacity for original thought is his gift for systematization. Even if all his doctrines were mistaken, the Summa contra Gentiles would still remain an impressive intellectual construct. When Aquinas sets out to refute a particular doctrine, he first articulates it, often with great force and almost always striving to maintain impartiality. The clarity with which he distinguishes between proofs derived from reason and those based on revelation is remarkable. Aquinas possesses a deep understanding of Aristotle that surpasses that of any preceding Catholic philosopher.
Yet these merits scarcely suffice to justify the immense reputation of St. Thomas. His appeal to reason must be acknowledged as somewhat insincere, for the conclusion he is bound to reach is predetermined. Consider, for example, the question of the indissolubility of marriage. St. Thomas defends this principle on the grounds that a father is essential in the upbringing of children. He argues that this is so because he is more rational than the mother and because, possessing greater strength, he is better equipped to administer physical punishment. A contemporary educator might counter that there is no basis for asserting that men, as a whole, are more rational than women. They might further argue that punishments requiring great physical strength are generally undesirable in education. A modern observer could go further, noting that in today’s world, fathers rarely play a significant role in child-rearing. However, no follower of St. Thomas would renounce their belief in lifelong monogamy on these grounds, for the actual foundations of this belief are far removed from those cited in its justification.
Consider, as a further example, the arguments through which St. Thomas attempts to prove the existence of God. Aside from his appeal to the teleology evident in inanimate objects, these proofs rely on the presumed impossibility of a series lacking a first member. Any mathematician knows this is by no means impossible; the series of negative integers ending in minus one provides a clear counterexample to his premise. Yet even if a Catholic were convinced of the fallibility of these arguments, they would be unlikely to abandon their faith; they would simply devise new arguments or seek refuge in revelation.
The assertions that God’s essence is identical to His existence, and that God is His own goodness, power, and so forth, conflate the mode of existence of a particular with that of a universal. This is a confusion once present in Plato’s thought but supposedly overcome by Aristotle. It must be assumed that the essence of God possesses the nature of a universal, whereas His existence does not. This difficulty is not easily resolved, as it arises within a system of logic no longer considered valid. Nevertheless, the challenge highlights a syntactical confusion, without which much of the argumentation regarding God would lose its persuasive force.
There is little true philosophical spirit in Aquinas. Unlike the Platonic Socrates, he does not follow the argument wherever it may lead; he is uninterested in inquiries whose outcomes are not already known. Before he begins to philosophize, Aquinas already possesses the truth, as it has been revealed in Catholic doctrine. If he manages to find compelling rational arguments for this doctrine, so much the better; if not, he simply retreats to revelation. Because the pursuit of arguments for a preordained conclusion is not philosophy but rather a form of apologetics, I cannot agree with the view that Aquinas deserves to be placed on a par with the finest philosophers of Greece or the modern era.
Über den Autor
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