Franciscan Scholastics - Scholastics
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Scholastics

Franciscan Scholastics

The Franciscans, as a whole, could not claim the same impeccable orthodoxy as the Dominicans. A sharp rivalry divided the two orders, and the Franciscans were disinclined to acknowledge the authority of St. Thomas. The three most significant Franciscan philosophers were Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, though St. Bonaventure and Matthew of Aquasparta are also worthy of mention.

Roger Bacon (c. 1214–1294) did not enjoy a favorable reputation among his contemporaries, yet in the modern era, he has received more praise than he perhaps deserves. Bacon was less a philosopher in the narrow sense than a polymath with a special passion for mathematics and science. In his time, science was often conflated with alchemy and suspected of association with black magic; consequently, Bacon frequently found himself in trouble due to accusations of heresy and sorcery. In 1257, St. Bonaventure, the general of the Franciscan order, placed him under supervision in Paris and forbade him from publishing his works. Nevertheless, while this ban remained in effect, the papal legate in England, Guy de Foulques, defied existing orders and commanded Bacon to present his philosophical system for the benefit of the Pope. In compliance with this directive, Bacon wrote three books in a remarkably short time: “Opus Majus,” “Opus Minus,” and “Opus Tertium.” These works apparently made a good impression, and in 1268, Bacon was permitted to return to Oxford, having been exiled to a form of imprisonment in Paris. However, nothing could teach Bacon to behave quietly. He scornfully ridiculed the pillars of contemporary learning, particularly attacking translators from Greek and Arabic, whom he dismissed as utterly ignorant.

In 1271, Bacon wrote “Compendium Studii Philosophiae,” which targeted the ignorance of the clergy. This did not enhance his popularity among his peers, and in 1278, the general of the order condemned his writings, leading to a fourteen-year imprisonment. He was released in 1292, only to pass away shortly thereafter.

Bacon possessed encyclopedic knowledge, though it remained largely unsystematized. Unlike most philosophers of his time, he held experience in high regard, illustrating its significance through his theory of rainbows. His writings contain much useful material on geography—a portion of his work that Columbus read and was undoubtedly influenced by. Bacon was also an accomplished mathematician; he cited the sixth and ninth books of Euclid and explored the problem of perspective by following Arabic sources. He considered logic a futile pursuit, yet he valued alchemy enough to write about it extensively.

To provide insight into the breadth of Bacon’s views and his method, I will summarize individual sections of his “Opus Majus.” Bacon asserts that there are four causes of human ignorance. These are the reliance on unfounded and unworthy authority, the influence of habit, the judgments of the ignorant crowd, and the concealment of one’s ignorance behind the mask of superficial wisdom. From these four maladies, of which the fourth is the most destructive, all human miseries arise.

It is erroneous to support any assertion by appealing to the wisdom of ancestors, habit, or popular consensus. To bolster this perspective, Bacon cites Seneca, Cicero, Avicenna, Averroes, Adelard of Bath, St. Jerome, and St. John Chrysostom. Clearly, Bacon believed that referencing these authorities sufficed as proof that we should not blindly venerate authority.

Bacon harbored great but not unbounded respect for Aristotle. “Only Aristotle and his followers have earned the title of philosopher in the judgment of all wise men.” Like almost all his contemporaries, Bacon employs the title “the Philosopher” when referring to Aristotle; yet even the Stagirite, he asserts, did not reach the limits of human wisdom. After him, “the king and leader of philosophy” was Avicenna. Even he failed to fully grasp the theory of rainbows, as he did not understand its ultimate cause, which, according to the Book of Genesis, lies in the dispersion of water vapors.

Nonetheless, this does not prevent Bacon from enthusiastically citing Avicenna when he approaches the discussion of the rainbow. Throughout Bacon’s works, there are statements that lean toward orthodoxy, such as the assertion that true wisdom is found solely in Scripture as interpreted by canon law and philosophy. However, Bacon’s voice sounds more sincere when he claims there is nothing reprehensible in seeking knowledge from pagans. Besides Avicenna and Averroes, he frequently cites Al-Farabi and occasionally Al-Bumuzar. Al-Bumuzar is referenced to demonstrate that mathematics was known to Noah and his sons before the Flood. This serves, in Bacon’s view, as an example of what we can learn from the infidels. Bacon lavishes praise on mathematics as the only reliable source of knowledge—aside from revelation—and as a necessary tool for astronomy and astrology.

Following Averroes, Bacon asserts that the active intellect is a substance essentially separate from the soul. To support this view, which contradicts the perspective of St. Thomas, Bacon cites various eminent theologians, including Grosseteste, the Bishop of Lincoln. The passages in Aristotle that seemingly contradict this view, Bacon claims, result from erroneous translation. He cites Plato not from the original text but from second-hand sources, such as Cicero, or even third-hand sources, like the Arabic commentaries of Porphyry. This does not imply that Bacon holds a high regard for Porphyry, whose doctrine of universals he describes as “childish.”

In modern times, Bacon has been praised for asserting that experience, as a source of knowledge, surpasses argument. Undoubtedly, Bacon’s interests and scientific method distinguish him sharply from the typical scholasticism of his day. His inclination toward encyclopedism aligns him with Arab thinkers, who influenced him far more deeply than most other Christian philosophers. These Arab thinkers shared Bacon’s interest in science, as well as his belief in magic and astrology, whereas Christians generally regarded magic as a sinful pursuit and astrology as deception. While Bacon stands in stark contrast to other medieval Christian philosophers, he exerted little influence on his contemporaries, and his philosophy was arguably less scientific than is sometimes claimed. English authors often assert that Bacon invented gunpowder, but this claim is baseless.

St. Bonaventure and the Augustinian Tradition

St. Bonaventure (1221–1274), the very individual who, as general of the Franciscan order, prohibited Bacon from publishing his works, was a man of an entirely different character. Bonaventure adhered to the tradition of St. Anselm, whose ontological proof he supported. He viewed the rise of Aristotelianism as a movement fundamentally hostile to Christianity. He believed in the existence of Platonic ideas, though he maintained that complete knowledge of them is granted only to God. In Bonaventure’s writings, St. Augustine is a constant presence, while references to Arab thinkers and the philosophers of pagan antiquity are rare.

Matthew of Aquasparta (circa 1235–1302) was a follower of Bonaventure, though he was not entirely untouched by the influence of the new philosophy. A Franciscan who eventually became a cardinal, he opposed St. Thomas from an Augustinian perspective. Nevertheless, Aristotle had already become ‘the Philosopher’ for him, and he cites him constantly. While Matthew of Aquasparta frequently mentions Avicenna and respectfully cites St. Anselm and Pseudo-Dionysius, the highest authority in his eyes remains St. Augustine. He asserts that we must find a middle path between Plato and Aristotle. He characterizes the ideas of Plato as ‘the grossest error,’ claiming they possess wisdom but lack knowledge. Conversely, he finds Aristotle equally mistaken, as he asserts knowledge but lacks wisdom. Our knowledge, Matthew concludes, is provoked by both lower and higher factors: external objects and the ideal intellect.

Duns Scotus and the Franciscan Polemic

The Franciscan polemic against Aquinas continued with Duns Scotus (circa 1270–1308). Born either in Scotland or in Ulster, he joined the Franciscan order in Oxford and spent his final years in Paris. In opposition to St. Thomas, Duns Scotus defended the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, a position that eventually garnered support from the University of Paris and the entire Catholic Church. Duns Scotus is an Augustinian, though in a less extreme form than Bonaventure or even Matthew of Aquasparta; his disagreements with St. Thomas, like those of his predecessors, stem from a greater infusion of Platonism—filtered through Augustine—into his philosophy.

Duns Scotus explores, for instance, the question: “Can a traveler arrive at exact and pure truth through natural means with the aid of his reason, if he does not receive special illumination from the uncreated light?” He answers this in the negative. He supports his position in his introductory argument exclusively with quotations from St. Augustine. He does, however, acknowledge the difficulty posed by the text of Romans 1:20. This passage states: “For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.”

Duns Scotus was a moderate realist who championed free will and displayed a distinct tendency toward Pelagianism. He asserted that being coincides with essence. His primary interest lay in the evident—specifically, those truths that can be known without formal proof. He categorized these into 1) principles known by themselves, 2) things known through experience, and 3) our own actions. Ultimately, however, he maintained that without divine light, human knowledge remains unattainable.

The Principle of Individuation

Most Franciscans preferred to follow Duns Scotus rather than Thomas Aquinas. Scotus argued that since there is no distinction between existence and essence, the principle of individuation—that which makes one thing distinct from another—must reside in form rather than matter. The ‘principle of individuation’ was one of the most significant issues in scholasticism. This question, in various forms, has remained problematic to the present day. Setting aside the specific formulations of individual authors, we might express it as follows.

Among the properties of an individual thing, some are essential, while others are secondary. Secondary properties are those a thing can lose without losing its identity, such as a person wearing a hat. The question arises: if individual things belong to the same kind, do they always differ in essence, or can the essence in both be entirely the same? St. Thomas held the latter view regarding material substances and the former regarding immaterial ones. Duns Scotus, however, maintained that two distinct individual things always differ in essence. St. Thomas’s view relied on a theory positing that pure matter consists of indistinguishable particles that differ only in their spatial arrangement. Thus, a human, consisting of mind and body, could only differ physically from another human by the spatial position of his body. This remains a theoretical possibility even for twins who look alike as two drops of water. In contrast, Duns Scotus contends that if things are distinct, they must differ in some qualitative characteristic. Clearly, this perspective is closer to Platonism than to that of St. Thomas.

This problem must undergo various stages of development before we can articulate it in the terms of modern philosophy. The first step, undertaken by Leibniz, involved discarding the distinction between essential and secondary properties. Much of what the scholastics borrowed from the Stagirite proves unrealistic upon any attempt at precise formulation. Thus, instead of “essence,” we arrive at “all propositions that will be true regarding a given thing.” In general, however, the thing’s position in space and time remains excluded. Leibniz insists that in this sense, two things cannot be entirely identical; this is his principle of the “identity of indiscernibles.” This principle has faced criticism from physicists. They argue that two particles of matter can differ only by their position in space and time—a view complicated by the theory of relativity, which reduces space and time to relations.

Modernizing this problem requires an additional step: abandoning the concept of “substance.” Once this is done, a “thing” must be understood as a collection of qualities, as any core of pure “thingness” vanishes. It would seem to follow that if we reject substance, we are compelled to adopt a view more akin to that of Scotus than to that of Aquinas. However, this leads to significant difficulties concerning space and time. I addressed this issue, as I understand it, in the chapter “Proper Names” of my book Inquiry into Meaning and Truth.

William of Ockham and Political Philosophy

William of Ockham is the most significant scholastic after St. Thomas. The circumstances of his life remain poorly documented. He was born, it seems, between 1290 and 1300, and died on April 10, though the year—whether 1349 or 1350—is uncertain. The Black Death ravaged Europe in 1349, making that date more plausible. Most authors assert he was born in Ockham, Surrey, but Delisle Berne prefers Ockham in Yorkshire. William of Ockham studied at Oxford and later in Paris, where he was initially a student and later a rival of Duns Scotus. Ockham became embroiled in the conflict between the Franciscan order and Pope John XXII over the ideal of poverty. The Pope persecuted the Spirituals, who were supported by the order’s general, Michael of Cesena. A system had existed whereby property bestowed upon the brotherhood was transferred to the Pope, who allowed the friars to use it without incurring the sin of ownership. John XXII ended this arrangement by demanding that Franciscans accept the principle of open ownership. This sparked a rebellion among the majority of the order, led by Michael of Cesena. Ockham, summoned to Avignon to respond to accusations of heretical interpretations regarding the dogma of transubstantiation, sided with Michael of Cesena, as did another prominent figure, Marsilius of Padua. All three were excommunicated in 1328, but they escaped Avignon to seek refuge with Emperor Louis. Louis was one of two claimants to the imperial title; he was supported by Germany, while the other was backed by the Pope. The Pope excommunicated Louis, but the Emperor appealed to a General Council, and the Pope himself was subsequently accused of heresy.

It is said that upon meeting the Emperor, Ockham remarked, “Defend me with the sword, and I will defend you with the pen.” In any case, Ockham and Marsilius of Padua settled in Munich under the Emperor’s protection, where they wrote their politically significant treatises. What became of Ockham after the Emperor’s death in 1338 is uncertain. Some claim he reconciled with the Church, but this seems unlikely.

By this time, the Empire had lost the stature it held during the Hohenstaufen era, and the Papacy, despite its ever-expanding claims, no longer commanded the same respect. Boniface VIII relocated the papal residence to Avignon at the beginning of the fourteenth century, placing the Pope in political dependence on the French king. The Empire fell even lower; it could no longer claim even a semblance of universal dominion due to the rising power of France and England. Meanwhile, the Pope’s sycophancy toward the French king undermined the basis for his own claims to universal supremacy in secular matters. Thus, the conflict between the Pope and the Emperor effectively became a conflict between France and Germany. During the reign of Edward III, England was at war with France and allied with Germany, causing England to adopt an anti-papal stance. The Pope’s enemies demanded the convening of a General Council—the only ecclesiastical body whose authority could be considered superior to that of the Pope.

The nature of the opposition to the Pope shifted during this period. Rather than merely supporting the Emperor, as had been the case previously, the movement acquired a democratic resonance, especially regarding ecclesiastical governance. This lent the opposition new strength, which ultimately contributed to the Reformation.

Although Dante (1265–1321) was a great innovator as a poet, as a thinker he lagged behind his time. His book On Monarchy is written from a Ghibelline perspective and would have been more timely a century earlier. Dante considers the Emperor and the Pope to be independent rulers, both established by divine providence. In the Divine Comedy, Satan is depicted with three mouths, eternally gnawing on Judas Iscariot, Brutus, and Cassius; all three are equally guilty of betrayal—the first against Christ, and Brutus and Cassius against Caesar. Dante’s views are interesting, both in themselves and as an expression of the layman’s perspective; yet they exerted no influence on his contemporaries and were hopelessly outdated.

Marsilius of Padua (1270–1342) initiated a new form of opposition to the papacy, one in which the emperor was assigned a role of primarily ceremonial honor. As a close friend of William of Ockham, Marsilius influenced his development of political thought, though as a theorist, Marsilius carries the greater weight. He asserts that legislative power resides in the majority of the people, who consequently possess the right to discipline their rulers. Marsilius extends this principle of popular sovereignty to the Church, incorporating laypeople into its governance. The system he proposes requires the convening of local assemblies—including lay members—to elect representatives to ecumenical councils. The authority to excommunicate and to provide authoritative interpretations of Scripture should belong solely to these councils, thereby granting all believers a voice in doctrinal matters. In this view, the Church must hold no secular power; excommunication cannot occur without the consent of civil authorities, and the pope possesses no special jurisdiction.

Ockham did not venture as far as Marsilius, yet he developed a thoroughly democratic system for electing the ecumenical council. The conciliar movement reached its peak in the early fifteenth century when it was necessary to resolve the Great Schism. It began to decline once that task was accomplished. Its original perspective, as evidenced by Marsilius, differed from the one later adopted by the Protestants. The latter called for the recognition of the right to personal judgment. They were unwilling to submit to an ecumenical council, insisting that religious belief was not a matter to be decided by an authority-laden governing apparatus. Marsilius, by contrast, consistently sought to safeguard the unity of Catholic doctrine. He desired that this aim be achieved through democratic means rather than papal absolutism. In practice, most Protestants, when they came to power, simply replaced the pope with a king. This rendered them unable to secure either personal freedom of judgment or a democratic system for resolving doctrinal questions. Nevertheless, in their opposition to the pope, they managed to draw upon the doctrines of the conciliar movement. The only scholastic preferred by Luther was Ockham. A significant portion of the Protestants continued to adhere to the doctrine of personal judgment even where Protestantism became the state religion. This constituted the main point of contention between the Independents and Presbyterians during the English Civil War.

Ockham’s political writings are presented in the style of a philosophical debate. He advances arguments both for and against various theses, sometimes reaching no definitive conclusion. While we are accustomed to a more direct form of political propaganda, the format he chose was likely quite effective in his own time.

Ockham’s method and perspective are best illustrated by a few examples from his extensive treatise, “Eight Questions Concerning the Authority of the Pope.” The first question addresses whether one individual may possess supreme authority in both the Church and the state, while the second asks whether secular authority derives directly from God. The third question inquires whether the pope has the right to grant secular jurisdiction to the emperor and other rulers. The fourth considers whether the election of the German king by electors grants him full power. Subsequent questions explore the rights the Church acquires through the bishops’ authority to anoint kings, the validity of a coronation performed by an unworthy archbishop, and whether the election of the German king by electors confers upon him the title of emperor. These were all burning questions of practical politics in Ockham’s time.

Another treatise addresses whether a ruler can seize church property without the pope’s permission. The raising of this question was intended to justify the actions of Edward III, who taxed the clergy to cover the expenses of his war with France. We should recall that Edward was an ally of the emperor.

The next treatise, Discussion on the Marriage Case, concerns whether the emperor was entitled to marry his cousin. We see that Ockham made every effort to merit the protection of the imperial sword.

The Philosophical Logic of Ockham

It is now time to turn to Ockham’s purely philosophical views, a topic addressed in the splendid study by Ernest E. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham. My subsequent characterization is largely based on this research, which presents a somewhat unusual yet, in my opinion, entirely accurate perspective. Historians of philosophy often interpret the thinkers they study in light of subsequent developments, but this method is generally erroneous. Ockham has been viewed as a philosopher marking the collapse of scholasticism, or as a precursor to Descartes or Kant. According to Moody—a viewpoint I wholeheartedly share—this is fundamentally mistaken. Ockham saw his primary task as restoring pure Aristotle, liberated from both Augustinian and Arab influences. St. Thomas pursued this same goal, though the Franciscans adhered much more closely to St. Augustine than St. Thomas did. Moody argues that Ockham’s evaluation has been distorted by a desire to discover a gradual transition from scholasticism to modern philosophy. This has compelled historians to attribute modern doctrines to Ockham when, in fact, he was merely an interpreter of Aristotle.

Ockham’s Razor and Nominalism

Ockham is most famously known for an aphorism that is absent from his works but has nonetheless come to be called Ockham’s Razor. This aphorism states: “Entities should not be multiplied without necessity.” Although Ockham did not utter this exact phrase, he expressed a similar sentiment: “It is futile to do with more that which can be done with less.” In other words, if a particular science can explain everything without positing a hypothetical entity, there is no need to posit it. I have personally witnessed the remarkable fruitfulness of this principle in logical analysis.

In logic—though seemingly not in metaphysics—Ockham was a nominalist, and the nominalist thinkers of the fifteenth century regarded him as the founder of their school. Ockham believed that the followers of Scotus misinterpreted Aristotle, a failure he attributed to the influence of Augustine, the influence of Avicenna, and a more ancient source: the treatise by Porphyry on Aristotle’s Categories. In this work, Porphyry raised three questions: 1) Are genera and species substances? 2) Are they material or immaterial? 3) If material, do they coincide with sensory objects themselves, or do they exist apart from them? By posing these questions, Porphyry inextricably linked them to Aristotle’s Categories, which led to a metaphysical interpretation of the Organon throughout the Middle Ages. Aquinas attempted to liberate the intellect from this misconception, but Duns Scotus reinstated it. Consequently, logic and the theory of knowledge became subordinate to metaphysics and theology. Ockham set about the task of separating them once again.

For Ockham, logic serves as a tool of natural philosophy that can exist independently of metaphysics. Logic is the analysis of discursive science. While science deals with things, logic does not concern itself with things as such. Things are individual, whereas universals reside among terms. Logic studies these universals, while science employs them without discussion. Logic is occupied with terms or concepts, examining them not as physical states but as meanings. The statement “Man is a species” is not a logical proposition, for it necessitates prior knowledge of man. Logic deals with things created by the mind, within the mind itself, which cannot exist except through the existence of reason. A concept is a natural sign, while a word is a conventional sign. It is essential to distinguish when we speak of a word as a thing and when we use it as a meaning. Without this distinction, we may fall into sophisms such as: “Man is a species; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is a species.”

Terms that refer to things themselves are termed “terms of the first intention,” while terms that refer to those terms are called “terms of the second intention.” Science employs terms of the first intention, whereas logic utilizes those of the second. The peculiarity of metaphysical terms lies in their ability to denote both the things signified by words of the first intention and those represented by words of the second. There are six such metaphysical terms: being, thing, something, one, true, and good. The uniqueness of these terms is that they may be predicated of one another. However, in logic, one can manage without them.

We know things, not the forms generated by the mind; these forms are not what is known, but rather what facilitates the knowledge of things. Universals, in logic, are merely terms or concepts that affirm something about many other terms or concepts. Universal, genus, and species are all terms of the second intention and, therefore, cannot denote things. However, since ‘one’ and ‘being’ are reversible terms, if a universal were to exist in reality, it would be a term referring to a specific individual thing. A universal is simply a sign for many things. In this regard, Ockham agrees with Aquinas and differs from Averroes, Avicenna, and the Augustinians. Both Ockham and Aquinas assert that only individual things, individual minds, and acts of knowledge exist in reality. It is true that both allow for universale ante rem, but solely to explain the creation of the world. The idea of creation must have been in the mind of God before He could bring it into existence. Yet, this allowance pertains to theology rather than the explanation of human knowledge, which deals only with universale post rem. In explaining human knowledge, Ockham never concedes that universals are things. He claims that Socrates’ views align with those of Plato, but not because there exists a third thing called resemblance. Resemblance is a term of the second intention and a product of our reason. These thoughts are magnificent.

Propositions regarding events possible in the future cannot, according to Ockham, be deemed either true or false. He makes no attempt to reconcile this view with divine omnipotence. In this matter, as in all others, Ockham completely separates logic from metaphysics and theology.

A few examples of Ockham’s reasoning may be useful for understanding his views. He poses the question: “Is that which is known through understanding first, in terms of priority of emergence, the sole thing?”
Argument against: The first and proper object of knowledge is the universal.
Argument for: The object of sense and the object of knowledge coincide; thus, the first object of sense is a singular one.
Thus, the initial formulation of the question remains valid. (Evidently because both arguments appear compelling.)

Ockham continues: “The thing existing outside the soul and not being a sign is understood first through such knowledge (that is, knowledge of the singular); therefore, the singular thing is known first, for all that exists outside the soul is singular.”
Furthermore, Ockham asserts that abstract knowledge always presupposes “intuitive” knowledge—that is, knowledge based on sensory perception—which is evoked by singular things.
Ockham then enumerates four doubts that may arise in connection with the matter at hand and resolves each of them.
He ultimately provides an affirmative answer to his first question, adding that “if one considers not by priority of emergence but by priority of correspondence, the first object will be the universal.”
The question underlying all this reasoning is: to what extent is perception the source of our knowledge? Plato, in the dialogue Theaetetus, famously rejects the definition of knowledge as perception. It is clear that Ockham had no knowledge of the Theaetetus, but had he been familiar with it, he would certainly have disagreed with Plato.

To the question: “Do the sensitive soul and the rational soul truly differ in man?” Ockham responds that they do indeed differ in reality, though this is difficult to prove. One of his arguments is that we can desire through our appetite what we reject with our reason; therefore, appetite and reason must belong to different subjects. Another proof is that the senses are subjective in the sensitive soul but not in the rational soul. Furthermore, the sensitive soul is extended and material, while the rational soul is non-extended and immaterial. Ockham considers four theological objections to this view and dismisses them. In this, he adopts a stance that is perhaps unexpected. Nevertheless, he concurs with St. Thomas and diverges from Averroes by asserting that the reason of every human being is individual rather than impersonal.

The Legacy of Franciscan Scholasticism

By emphasizing the possibility of studying logic and human knowledge independently of metaphysics and theology, Ockham’s work catalyzed scientific inquiry. He argued that the Augustinians erred by declaring things unknowable and humans incapable of rational thought, only to then invoke light from infinity to make knowledge possible. In this, Ockham agreed with Aquinas, yet their approaches differed in emphasis: Aquinas remained primarily a theologian, whereas Ockham, in his logical inquiries, acted as a secular philosopher.

Ockham’s position instilled a new confidence in researchers tackling specific problems, such as his immediate successor, Nicholas of Oresme (d. 1382), who studied planetary theory. Nicholas of Oresme was in many ways a precursor to Copernicus. He presented both the geocentric and heliocentric theories and asserted that since each could explain all the data known at the time, it was impossible to determine which was true.

After William of Ockham, no great figure of scholasticism emerged. The next era of significant philosophical development would not commence until the late Renaissance.





Über den Autor

Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.

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