Philosophy of the Modern Era
Philosophical Liberalism
The emergence of liberalism in politics and philosophy provides a framework for examining a significant question. How do political and social circumstances influence exceptional thinkers, and, conversely, how do these individuals shape subsequent social and political developments?
One must avoid two common but opposing errors. Those more familiar with books than with life often overestimate the influence of philosophers. When they observe a political party claiming to follow a certain thinker, they assume the party’s actions are dictated by those teachings. Yet, the philosopher’s role is often illusory; the party would likely have acted in the same manner regardless of such endorsement. Until recently, most writers exaggerated this influence. The reaction against this error, however, has produced a new one: viewing theorists as passive products of their environment, incapable of affecting the course of events. In this view, ideas are merely froth on the surface of deeper currents driven by material and technical forces. Social change is no more a result of thought than a river’s flow is caused by the bubbles that reveal its direction. I believe the truth lies between these extremes. There is an ongoing interaction between ideas and practical life. Asking which is the primary cause is as futile as debating the priority of the chicken or the egg. Rather than indulging in abstract speculation, I will analyze one key aspect of this relationship: the development of liberalism and its offshoots from the late 17th century to the present.
Characteristics of Early Liberalism
Early liberalism, born in England and the Netherlands, possessed distinct characteristics. It championed religious tolerance, maintaining a Protestant ethos that favored moderation over fanaticism and dismissed religious wars as folly. It respected commerce and industry, favoring the rising middle class over the monarchy and aristocracy. It held property in high regard, especially when acquired through the owner’s labor. While the principle of hereditary power was not entirely rejected, it was increasingly restricted. The divine right of kings was denied, and the view took hold that every community has the right to establish its own form of government. Implicitly, early liberalism tended toward democracy, albeit tempered by property rights. An unspoken belief emerged that all people are born equal and that subsequent inequality is a product of circumstance. This view placed great importance on education as a corrective to inherited traits. Moreover, there was a general wariness of government, as it was almost universally controlled by kings or aristocrats who rarely understood or respected the needs of merchants. This prejudice was softened by the hope that these needs would soon be properly recognized.
Early liberalism was optimistic, energetic, and philosophical, as it represented rising forces that seemed destined to secure victory and bring great benefits to humanity. It opposed the medieval remnants in both politics and philosophy, for these theories had long been used to sanction the power of church and king, justify persecution, and impede the progress of science. Yet it was equally hostile to the contemporary fanaticism of the Calvinists and Anabaptists. By seeking to end political and theological disputes, it aimed to free energy for the pursuits of commerce and science. These included:
- the founding of the East India Company and the Bank of England
- the development of the theory of gravitation
- the discovery of the circulation of blood
Throughout the Western world, fanaticism gave way to enlightenment, the fear of Spanish power diminished, and the prosperity of all classes increased. For a century, these hopes remained undimmed, culminating in the French Revolution. This upheaval led to Napoleon and, subsequently, the Holy Alliance. Following these events, liberalism had to pause before the optimism of the 19th century could be revived.
The Evolution of Individualism in Philosophy
Before addressing the details, it is necessary to consider the general structure of the liberal movement from the 17th to the 19th century, which evolved from a simple to a more complex form. The distinguishing feature of the liberal movement, broadly understood, is individualism; yet this term remains unclear without further definition. Greek philosophers, including Aristotle, were not individualists in the sense I intend here, as they viewed man essentially as a member of society. Plato’s Republic, for instance, defined a good society rather than a good individual. However, with the decline of political freedom following Alexander the Great, individualism emerged through the Cynics and Stoics. Stoic philosophy held that a person could live well under any social conditions, a view shared by early Christianity before it gained control over the state. In the Middle Ages, while mystics maintained the individualistic tendencies of Christian ethics, the dominant synthesis of dogma, law, and custom subordinated both theoretical conviction and practical morality to the authority of the Catholic Church. In that era, truth and goodness were determined not by individual thought, but by the collective wisdom of church councils.
The first significant breach in this system was made by Protestantism, which asserted that Ecumenical Councils could err. Thus, truth was no longer viewed as a matter of social consensus but as an individual initiative. As different people arrived at various conclusions, conflict became inevitable; theological questions were settled not in the assemblies of bishops, but on the battlefield. Yet, since neither side could fully obliterate the other, it eventually became clear that a method must be found to reconcile intellectual and ethical individualism with the established order of social life. This was one of the central problems that early liberalism sought to resolve.
Meanwhile, individualism permeated philosophy. Descartes’ foundational premise, “I think, therefore I am,” established the basis of knowledge as unique to each person. The individual’s starting point was their own existence rather than the existence of other people or the community at large. His emphasis on the reliability of clear and distinct ideas moves in the same direction. It is through the introspective examination of our thoughts that we ascertain whether our ideas are indeed clear and distinct. Most philosophers following Descartes shared this individualistic perspective to varying degrees.
However, this general principle manifests in different forms, each with diverse practical consequences. The views of the typical scientific investigator possess perhaps the least degree of individualism. When such an investigator formulates a new theory, they do so because it seems true to them; they do not bow to authority, for otherwise, they would simply adhere to the theories of their predecessors. At the same time, they appeal to commonly accepted criteria of truth, hoping to persuade others not through the power of their status but through arguments that are compelling to the individual mind. In science, any confrontation between the individual and society is essentially transitory, as scientists generally uphold the same intellectual standards, leading inquiries to typically end in agreement. This perspective is modern; during Galileo’s time, the authority of Aristotle and the Church was still regarded as at least as persuasive as the testimony of the senses. This demonstrates that while the element of individualism may not be the sole defining feature of science, it nonetheless holds substantial significance in the scientific method.
Early liberalism was individualistic in intellectual and economic matters, yet it was not emotionally or ethically inclined toward self-assertion. This form of liberalism dominated 18th-century England and was shared by the framers of the American Constitution and the French encyclopedists. During the French Revolution, liberalism was championed by more moderate parties, such as the Girondists, but with their removal, it vanished from French politics for an entire generation. In England, with the emergence of the Benthamites and the Manchester School, it regained influence after the Napoleonic Wars. Its greatest development occurred in America, where, free from the shackles of feudalism and a state church, it prevailed from 1776 to the present day, or at least until 1933.
Romanticism and the Shift Toward Nationalism
A new direction, gradually evolving into the antithesis of liberalism, began with Rousseau and reached maturity in the romantic movement and the principles of nationalism. In this phase, individualism seized not only the intellectual sphere but also the domain of the passions, revealing the anarchistic aspects of the movement. The cult of the hero, established by Carlyle and Nietzsche, is emblematic of this philosophy. This cult amalgamated various elements:
- a disdain for early industrialism
- a revulsion toward the horrors and cruelties it engendered
- a longing for the Middle Ages, which were idealized out of contempt for the modern world
There was an attempt to unite the defense of the dwindling privileges of the Church and the aristocracy with the protection of workers against the tyranny of industrialists. Furthermore, it featured a passionate assertion of the right to rebel in the name of nationalism and a proclamation of the grandeur of war in defense of “freedom.” Byron was the poet of this movement; Fichte, Carlyle, and Nietzsche were its philosophers.
However, since we cannot all become heroic leaders and not everyone can dominate, this philosophy, like all other forms of anarchism, inevitably leads, when acted upon, to the despotic rule of the most fortunate “hero.” Once such tyranny is established, the ruler will suppress in others the very ethic of self-assertion that enabled their own ascent to power. Thus, this theory of life refutes itself, as its practical application leads to something entirely different: an absolute state in which individuals are ruthlessly suppressed.
There exists yet another philosophy that represents a distinct branch of liberalism: the thought of Marx. I shall consider it later, but for now, it should simply be kept in mind.
John Locke and the Foundations of Liberal Thought
The first comprehensive exposition of the philosophy of liberalism appears in the work of Locke—the most influential, if not the most original, of the new philosophers. In England, his views harmonized so perfectly with those of the educated majority that it is difficult to trace their influence outside the sphere of theoretical philosophy. In France, however, where these ideas effectively fueled opposition to the established regime and challenged the dominance of Cartesianism, they undeniably shaped the course of events. This illustrates a general principle: a philosophy developed in a politically and economically advanced nation, which serves at home as little more than a systematization of prevailing opinion, can elsewhere foster a revolutionary atmosphere and incite change.
The principles guiding the politics of advanced nations often reach less developed countries primarily through theorists. In the former, practice inspires theory; in the latter, theory inspires practice. This distinction explains why transplanted ideas rarely prove as fruitful as they were on their native soil.
Before examining Locke’s philosophy, let us consider several distinctive features of seventeenth-century English development that informed his outlook.
Political Conflict and the English Constitutional Tradition
The conflict between the king and Parliament, which culminated in the Civil War, instilled in the English a lasting preference for compromise and moderation. It also fostered an aversion to pushing any theory to its logical extreme. The principles for which the Long Parliament initially fought garnered widespread support. These demands sought to abolish the king’s right to grant trade monopolies and to compel him to acknowledge Parliament’s exclusive authority to levy taxes. They proclaimed freedom of opinion and action within the framework of the Anglican Church—a demand famously articulated by Archbishop Laud. According to these principles, Parliament was to convene at regular intervals rather than being summoned only when the king deemed his cooperation necessary. They also opposed arbitrary arrests and the sycophantic compliance of judges with the king’s whims. Yet, many who advocated for these causes were unprepared to wage war against the Crown, viewing such an act as both treason and apostasy. Once the war broke out, the forces were nearly evenly matched.
The political trajectory from the onset of the Civil War until Cromwell’s assumption of the Lord Protectorate unfolded in a manner that has since become familiar, though it was unprecedented at the time. The parliamentary party split into two factions: the Presbyterians and the Independents. The Presbyterians sought to preserve the state church while abolishing the episcopal institution. The Independents agreed on the matter of bishops but believed that each congregation should be free to choose its own faith without interference from a central spiritual authority. The Presbyterians, largely drawn from the upper echelons of society, held more moderate political views and hoped to reach an agreement with the king once his defeat rendered him more pliable. This policy proved impractical for two reasons. First, the king remained obstinate regarding the bishops; second, defeating him proved a formidable task, achieved only through Cromwell’s newly formed army of Independents.
Consequently, when military resistance against the king was vanquished and he refused to negotiate, the influence of the Presbyterians in Parliament’s armies waned. The defense of democracy led to the concentration of power in the hands of a minority that wielded it with utter disregard for parliamentary governance. When Charles I attempted to arrest five members of Parliament, the resulting public outcry rendered him a figure of ridicule. Cromwell, however, encountered no such difficulty. By exploiting Pride’s Purge, he expelled nearly one hundred Presbyterian members, temporarily securing a majority that obsequiously bowed to his will. When he finally decided to dissolve the entire Parliament, “not a dog barked,” as the war had rendered military power absolute and fostered a contempt for constitutional forms. Throughout Cromwell’s subsequent rule, the government of England was a military dictatorship. It was increasingly despised by the majority of the nation, yet one from which they could not liberate themselves, as only Cromwell’s supporters remained armed.
Charles II, after a lengthy period of hiding and exile in Holland, resolved upon his Restoration never to undertake such journeys again. This experience instilled in him a measure of moderation. He declared that no power could levy taxes without the sanction of Parliament and upheld the Habeas Corpus Act, which stripped the Crown of the right to make arbitrary arrests. Occasionally, by utilizing subsidies from Louis XIV, he expressed disdain for Parliament’s financial authority, but for the most part, he functioned as a constitutional monarch. Most of the restrictions on royal power initially demanded by the opponents of Charles I were acknowledged during the Restoration. Charles II treated them with due respect, understanding that subjects could inflict considerable inconveniences upon their kings.
James II, unlike his brother, lacked both refinement and cunning. His fanatical Catholicism united the Anglican Church and nonconformists against him, despite his attempts to court the latter through proclamations of religious tolerance that defied Parliament. His foreign policy further weakened his position. The Stuarts, desperate to avoid the taxes required during wartime—levies that would have rendered them dependent on Parliament—pursued a policy of subservience, first to Spain and then to France. The rising power of France fostered persistent hostility among the English toward the dominant continental force, while the revocation of the Edict of Nantes incited sharp animosity among Protestants toward Louis XIV.
Ultimately, almost everyone in England sought to be rid of James II, yet they were equally determined to avoid a return to civil war or the shadow of Cromwell’s dictatorship. Because no constitutional mechanism existed to depose the king, a revolution became inevitable; however, it had to be swift to prevent subversive elements from seizing the initiative. It was imperative to secure the rights of Parliament once and for all. The king had to depart, yet the monarchy was to be preserved—not as a monarchy by divine right, but as one subordinate to legislative bodies and Parliament. Through the unified efforts of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, this was achieved rapidly and without a single shot being fired. Compromise and moderation triumphed only after every form of intransigence had been tested and found wanting.
The new king, Dutch by birth, brought with him the commercial and theological wisdom characteristic of his homeland. He oversaw the establishment of the Bank of England and ensured the national debt was placed in trustworthy hands, meaning the monarch could no longer arbitrarily refuse to honor financial obligations. Furthermore, the Act of Toleration, while leaving Catholics and nonconformists vulnerable to various injustices, brought an end to their direct persecution. Foreign policy became resolutely anti-French and remained so, with only brief interruptions, until the defeat of Napoleon.
Über den Autor
Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.
Quellen und Methodik
Der Inhalt basiert auf akademischen Quellen in mehreren Sprachen — darunter ukrainische, russische und englische Universitätslehrbücher sowie wissenschaftliche Ausgaben zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Texte wurden aus den Originalquellen ins Deutsche übertragen und redaktionell bearbeitet. Alle Artikel werden vor der Veröffentlichung inhaltlich und didaktisch geprüft.
Zuletzt geändert: 15/11/2026