Philosophy of the Modern Era

Locke's Political Philosophy

The Social Contract

In the political thought of the seventeenth century, two principal types of theories concerning the origin of government emerged. The first, exemplified by Robert Filmer, posits that God bestowed power upon certain individuals, whose authority and that of their heirs constitutes legitimate government; opposing this government is viewed not only as treason but also as an act of blasphemy. This perspective draws upon the venerable traditions of antiquity, where, in nearly all early civilizations, the monarch’s person was considered sacred. Unsurprisingly, kings found these theories quite agreeable. The aristocracy, meanwhile, had reasons both to support and to contest them, as emphasizing hereditary power could secure royal backing in their struggle against the burgeoning merchant class. Where the aristocracy's fear and disdain for the middle class were greater than for the king, these motivations prevailed; conversely, in instances where the aristocracy could grasp supreme power, they inclined toward opposition against the king and thus rejected the theories of the divine right of kings.

The second principal type of theory, represented by Locke, asserts that civil governmental authority is the result of a social contract and is fundamentally a terrestrial affair, rather than a divine imposition. Some writers within this tradition viewed the social contract as a historical fact, while others regarded it as a legal abstraction; nonetheless, they were united in their aim to justify the earthly origins of governmental power. In fact, apart from the supposed contract, they found little to counter the theories of the divine right of kings. Except for the rebels, everyone felt the need to establish some basis for obeying the government; it would be imprudent to claim that for the majority, governmental authority was merely convenient. Government, in some sense, must possess the right to demand obedience, and the right derived from a contract seems to be the sole alternative to divine decree. Consequently, the doctrine that government was established on contractual foundations became widely popular among all opponents of the divine right of kings. Hints of this theory can be found in Thomas Aquinas, but its serious development began with Grotius.

The theory of the contract could also take forms that justified tyranny. Hobbes, for instance, argued that the contract to cede all power to an elected sovereign existed solely among the citizens, with the sovereign not being a party to the agreement and thus inevitably wielding unlimited power. Perhaps this theory initially justified Cromwell's totalitarian state, and following the Restoration, it found justification under Charles II’s rule. However, in Locke's interpretation, the government is a party to the contract; if it fails to fulfill its part, resistance against it can be deemed legitimate. Locke’s theory is essentially more or less democratic, though its democratic element is constrained by the implied view that those without property should not be considered citizens.

Let us examine Locke's views on this matter.

Firstly, consider one of his definitions of political power: “I hold that political power is the right to create laws with the right to impose the death penalty and, consequently, all lesser punishments for the regulation and protection of property, the right to use the forces of society to enforce laws, and to protect the state from foreign invasion—all in the name of the common good.”

The author notes that government serves as a means to resolve misunderstandings arising in the natural state, where each individual acts as their own judge. Yet, when the disputing party is the king, government no longer fulfills this role, as the king serves both as judge and plaintiff. This framing led to the notion that governments should not be endowed with absolute power and that justice must remain independent from executive authority. Such arguments later gained significant traction in both England and America, but that is not our current focus.

According to natural law of self-preservation, Locke asserts that every person has the right to kill an assailant in defense of themselves or their property. Political society arises where individuals relinquish this right in favor of society or law. Absolute monarchy, he argues, is not a form of civil governance, as it lacks impartial authority capable of resolving disputes between the monarch and his subjects; in essence, the monarch remains within the bounds of the natural state in relation to his subjects. It is futile to hope that a title of king will render a man, naturally impulsive and unjust, virtuous.

“A man who would be brazen and unjust in the forests of America would not become better on the throne, where science and religion might be called upon to justify all he does to his subjects, and the sword would quickly silence anyone who dared to doubt.”

“Absolute monarchy resembles individuals who, having defended themselves against ferrets and foxes, complacently believe themselves safeguarded against lions.”

Civil society is subject to the authority of the simple majority, unless an agreement has been reached to require some other majority exceeding the simple majority (as in the United States when discussing constitutional amendments or treaty ratification). This sounds democratic, but it should be noted that Locke assumes women and the poor are excluded from citizenship.

“The emergence of political society depends on the consent of individuals to unite and form a society.” It is somewhat dubious that such consent could ever be genuinely achieved, although one might concede that, except for the Jews, the emergence of states preceded recorded history.

The civil contract that establishes government binds only those who entered into it; a son must re-express his consent to the contract made by his father. (It is clear that all this follows from Locke's foundational propositions, but it is not very realistic. A young American, upon reaching the age of 21 and declaring, “I refuse to consider myself bound by the contract that established the United States,” would find himself in a precarious position.)

The reader is informed that the power of the government, conditioned by the contract, never contradicts the common good. I have just quoted a statement concerning governmental power, which concluded with, “And all this only in the name of the good of society.” It seems Locke never thought to ask himself who should judge the good of society. Clearly, if the government were to assume this role, it would always decide in its favor. Locke would presumably argue that the decision should be made by the majority of citizens. However, many matters must be resolved more swiftly than a popular opinion can be established; among these, the issues of war and peace are perhaps the most significant. The only recourse in such cases is to grant society or its representatives a certain portion of power, such as the ability to bring officials to trial and punish them for actions deemed harmful to the public. Yet this is far from a perfect solution.

I have already cited a position that I shall repeat once more: “The primary and most important goal of people uniting in a state and submitting to the will of the government is the protection of their property.” In accordance with this theory, Locke asserts: “No one can be deprived of any part of his property without his consent.”

Even more astonishing is his claim that, although military command holds power over the life and death of its soldiers, it lacks the right to dispose of their money. This implies that in any army, it would be deemed inappropriate to penalize minor disciplinary infractions with fines, whereas corporal punishment, such as flogging, would be permitted. This illustrates the absurdity to which Locke descends in his reverence for property.

One might suppose that the question of taxation would present difficulties for Locke, but this is not the case. He argues that government expenditures must be borne by the citizens, but only with their consent, meaning the consent of the majority. However, one might ask, why should the consent of the majority suffice? We have been told that the consent of each individual is required to permit the government to seize any portion of his property. I concede that a person's tacit consent to taxation according to the decision of the majority is presumed to be an inherent part of his citizenship, which, in turn, is regarded as a voluntary act. Yet, this often starkly contradicts the facts. Most individuals do not possess genuine freedom of choice regarding the state to which they wish to belong, and there is very little freedom at present to be without a state at all.

Consider, for example, a pacifist who disapproves of war. No matter where they live, the government will take a portion of their income for military purposes. To which law can one appeal in this situation? I can conceive many responses, but I do not believe any of them would align with Locke’s views. He incorporates the principle of majority rule into his theory without adequate consideration, offering no transition from his individualistic premises to this principle, save for the mythical social contract.

The social contract, in this sense, is mythical even when, at a certain period, a contract did indeed exist that established a particular government, such as in the case of the United States. At the time the Constitution was adopted, people possessed the freedom to choose. Even then, many voted against the Constitution and thus were not parties to the agreement. They could certainly have left the country. However, by remaining there, they were considered bound by a contract to which they did not consent. In practice, it is typically difficult to leave one’s country. In cases where individuals were born after the adoption of the Constitution, their consent to the contract is even more illusory.

The question of individual rights in relation to government is indeed a complex issue. Democrats too easily assert that when a government represents the majority, it has the right to coerce the minority. This must be correct, since coercion is the essence of government. Yet, if the sacred right of the majority is imposed too rigidly, it can become as tyrannical as the divine right of kings. In his "Treatises of Government," Locke speaks little on this matter but examines it more thoroughly in his "Letters on Toleration," where he argues that no believer in God can be punished for his religious views.

The doctrine that the state was formed through a social contract is certainly pre-evolutionary. The state, much like measles and whooping cough, seems to have gradually arisen, although, akin to those diseases, it may have been introduced suddenly in new regions, such as the islands of the South Seas. Before people began studying anthropology, they had no notion of the psychological processes that prompted the emergence of the state, nor of the fantastic reasons that led individuals to adopt institutions and customs that later proved beneficial. Yet, as a legal abstraction justifying the emergence of government, the theory of the social contract contains a measure of truth.