Philosophy of the Modern Era

Locke's Political Philosophy

Stops and Balances

The theory that the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government should be separated is a defining characteristic of liberalism; it arose in England during the struggle against the Stuarts and is most clearly articulated by Locke, at least in regard to the legislative and executive functions. He argued that the legislative and executive powers must be divided to prevent the abuse of power. It is essential to understand that when he speaks of legislative power, he refers to Parliament, and when he mentions executive power, he implicitly means the king; this distinction is evident in his emotional expressions, regardless of his attempts at logical reasoning. Accordingly, he regards legislative power as virtuous, while he generally views executive power as morally suspect.

Locke asserts that legislative power should be supreme, except in instances when it is supplanted by society. Thus, akin to the English House of Commons, representatives of legislative authority must periodically be elected through popular vote. The condition that the people must reelect the legislative body, if taken seriously, condemns that portion of authority which the British constitution granted to the king and lords as part of the legislative power during Locke's lifetime.

In a well-ordered government, Locke notes, legislative and executive powers are distinct from one another. Yet, this raises the question: what should be done if a conflict arises between them? It is suggested that if the executive fails to convene legislative bodies in a timely manner, it effectively enters a state of war with the people and may be overthrown by force. This viewpoint, evidently influenced by the events surrounding Charles I—who attempted to govern without Parliament from 1628 to 1640—asserts that such actions must be curtailed, even if this requires civil war.

“To unjust and unlawful force,” he asserts, “there is no recourse but equal force.” Practically, this stance proves ineffective unless there exists an authority with the legal right to declare when force is “unjust and unlawful.” Charles I's attempt to levy ship money without parliamentary consent was denounced by his adversaries as “unjust and unlawful,” whereas he believed it to be just and legitimate. Only military success in the civil war demonstrated that his interpretation of the constitution was incorrect. The same uncertainty arose during the American Civil War: Did the States have the right to secede? No one could say, and it was only the North’s victory that resolved this legal question. The belief, prevalent among Locke and many writers of his time, that any honest individual could discern what is just and lawful, overlooks the impact of party prejudice on both sides or the challenges in establishing a court within or beyond human conscience—one that could authoritatively resolve disputed matters. Practically, such significant questions, if urgent enough, are resolved through force rather than justice and law.

To some extent, albeit obliquely, Locke acknowledges this reality. He states that in the dispute between legislative and executive powers, there are often no judges on earth. Since the heavens do not provide a clear judgment, this effectively means that resolution can only be attained through struggle, as it is commonly believed that the heavens grant victory to the righteous. Such a perspective is inherent to any doctrine stemming from the separation of governmental powers. Where such doctrines are enshrined in a constitution, the sole way to avert a sporadic civil war is to resort to compromise and common sense. However, compromise and common sense are qualities of the mind and cannot be codified within a constitution.

It is remarkable that Locke says nothing regarding the judiciary, despite it being a pressing issue in his time. Until the revolution, the king could dismiss judges at any moment, resulting in their condemnation of the king's enemies and justification of his allies. Following the revolution, judges were made irremovable, except when demanded by both houses of Parliament. This was believed to ensure that judges would base their decisions on the law; in practice, however, in cases involving party interests, the judge's sympathies merely replaced those of the king. Yet, it is possible that wherever the principles of “stops and balances” prevail, the judiciary became a third independent branch of government alongside the legislative and executive powers.

The history of the doctrine of “stops and balances” is intriguing. In England—the country of its origin—it aimed to limit the power of the king, who fully controlled the executive branch before the revolution. Gradually, however, the executive authority became dependent on Parliament, as the ministry could not function without a majority in the House of Commons. The executive thus effectively became, if not in form, a committee elected by Parliament, resulting in a diminishing separation of legislative from executive power. This process has continued over the past fifty years or so: we refer to the prime minister's right to dissolve Parliament and the strengthening of party discipline. Now, the question of which party should be in power is decided by a parliamentary majority, yet once this is resolved, it can hardly decide anything further. Any legislation can scarcely be enacted without government representation. Therefore, the government merges legislative and executive functions, its power limited only by the necessity of conducting general elections from time to time. This system stands in stark contrast to Locke's principles.

In France, Montesquieu fervently championed this theory; during the French Revolution, it was supported by more moderate factions, but with the triumph of the Jacobins, it was momentarily forgotten. Naturally, Napoleon saw no utility in it, yet it revived during the Restoration, only to vanish again with the rise of Napoleon III. It reemerged in 1871, culminating in the adoption of a constitution that afforded the president very little power while preventing the government from dissolving the chambers. Consequently, the chamber of deputies was vested with considerable power in relation to both the government and the electorate. There existed a greater separation of powers than in contemporary England, yet less than ought to be according to Locke's principles, as legislative authority surpassed executive authority. What the French constitution will become after the current war remains uncertain.

The United States exemplifies the country where Locke's principles regarding the separation of powers have found their fullest application, with the president and Congress entirely independent of one another, and the Supreme Court independent of both. As a result, the constitution has rendered the Supreme Court part of the legislative power, as what it declares unlawful is considered illegal. The fact that its authority nominally pertains solely to the interpretation of laws effectively enhances this power, as it complicates criticism of what is presented as purely legal judgments. This speaks volumes about the political astuteness of Americans, whose constitution has only once led them to armed conflict.

Locke's political philosophy, while broadly correct and beneficial prior to the Industrial Revolution, has increasingly failed to address the most critical issues since then. The power of property concentrated in vast corporations has surpassed anything Locke could have conceived. The necessary functions of the state, particularly in education, have grown immensely. Nationalism has engendered alliances, at times leading to a merger of economic and political power, making war an integral aspect of competition. The individual citizen possesses far less power and independence than he was theorized to have according to Locke. Our age is characterized by organization, with its conflicts arising between organizations rather than between individual citizens. The natural state, to use Locke's expression, still exists among states. A new international social contract is required before we can enjoy the promised benefits of government. Should an international government be established, much of Locke's political philosophy would once again become applicable, although none of it would pertain to private property.