Philosophy of the Modern Era

Locke's Political Philosophy

The Natural State and Natural Law

Locke begins his second "Treatise on Government" with the assertion that, having demonstrated the impossibility of deriving governmental power from paternal authority, he will present what he believes to be a correct understanding of the origins of the state.

He commences with the assumption of what he calls the "natural state," which precedes all human governments. In this state, natural law prevails, comprising divine mandates that are not instilled by any human legislator. It remains unclear to what extent Locke views the natural state as merely a hypothetical illustration versus a historical reality; however, I fear he tended to regard it as an actual condition that once existed. Humanity emerged from this natural state through a social contract that established civil authority. Locke also considers this emergence to be a more or less historical phenomenon, but for now, our focus is primarily on the natural state itself.

What Locke articulates regarding the natural state and natural law is largely unoriginal, echoing medieval scholastic doctrines. Thomas Aquinas states: "Every law made by men contains the properties of law only to the extent that it derives from natural law. But if it contradicts natural law in any way, it ceases to be a law; it becomes merely a perversion of the law."

Throughout the Middle Ages, natural law was often associated with the detested practice of "usury," which entailed lending money at interest. Ecclesiastical property was predominantly land, and landowners were more often debtors than lenders. However, with the emergence of Protestantism, particularly Calvinism, support primarily came from the wealthy middle classes, who were more frequently lenders than borrowers. Accordingly, Calvin and subsequently other Protestants, along with the Catholic Church, eventually sanctioned usury. Thus, the understanding of natural law evolved, yet no one questioned its existence.

Many theories that maintained faith in natural law owe their origin to it, such as the theory of laissez-faire (non-interventionist policy) and the theory of human rights. These theories are interconnected and both trace their roots to Puritanism. Two quotes cited by Tawney illustrate this connection. A committee of the House of Commons in 1604 declared: "All born free citizens have a right to inheritance—both in respect to their land and their free choice of industry—in all spheres where they apply their talents and by which they sustain their lives." In 1656, Joseph Lee wrote: "It is an indisputable maxim that each individual, by the light of nature and reason, engages in that which brings him the greatest benefit... The success of individuals will contribute to the success of society." With the exception of the phrase "by the light of nature and reason," this could have been penned in the nineteenth century.

I reiterate that Locke's theory of the state is not particularly original. In this respect, Locke resembles many individuals who have gained renown for their ideas. Generally, the person who first proposes a novel idea is so far ahead of their time that they are deemed eccentric, remaining obscure and soon forgotten. Gradually, the world comes to comprehend such an idea, and the individual who proclaims it subsequently receives all due accolades. This was the case, for instance, with Darwin, while the unfortunate Lord Monboddo became a figure of ridicule in his time.

Regarding the natural state, Locke was less original than Hobbes, who perceived this state as one characterized by a war of all against all, where life was bleak, transient, and people lived akin to beasts. Yet Hobbes was considered an atheist. The view of the natural state and natural law, which Locke inherited from his predecessors, cannot be separated from its theological foundation; where this foundation is absent, as in much of modern liberal theory, it lacks a clear logical basis.

The belief in a happy "natural state" in the distant past partially derives from biblical narratives about the age of the patriarchs and partly from ancient myths concerning the Golden Age. The prevailing belief in the corruption of the distant past only emerged alongside the theory of evolution.

Here is what may be found in Locke as the most precise definition of the natural state: "Men living together according to reason, without the customary superiority of some over others and with the right to judge one another, constitute, in essence, the natural state."

This description does not depict the life of savages but rather an imagined community of virtuous anarchists who require neither police nor courts because they always adhere to "reason," which aligns with natural law—comprising those behavioral norms believed to have divine origin (for instance, "thou shalt not kill" is part of natural law, while traffic regulations are not).

Let us consider a few quotes that may provide clearer insight into what Locke intended.

To understand the right of political authority, he states, we must consider what state is natural for humanity, namely, a state of absolute freedom that allows individuals to direct their actions and manage their property and person according to their own discretion within the bounds of natural law, without seeking permission or being subject to the will of another.

This, of course, represents a state of equality, wherein all power and jurisdiction are mutual: no individual possesses more than another. Nothing is more evident than the notion that beings of the same kind and level, born indiscriminately with identical natural endowments and employing similar capabilities, ought to be equal to one another, without subordination or submission. Unless a master or ruler arises from among them, declaring through some manifesto that his will subjugates the will of others, and unless he has been granted an obvious and clear definition of undeniable right to ownership and sovereignty.

However, while this natural state embodies freedom, it is not a state of arbitrary will: although a person in this condition possesses unchecked freedom to dispose of himself or his property, he is still not free to take his own life or that of any living being in his possession, except in cases where a purpose nobler than mere self-preservation compels him to do so. The natural state is governed by a natural law that binds each individual; reason, being such a law, instructs all humanity, for anyone who consults it, that all beings are equal and independent, and no one has the right to harm the life, health, freedom, or property of another, as we are all the property of God.

Nevertheless, it soon becomes evident that in places where most people exist in this natural state, there may still be individuals who do not live in accordance with natural law, and that natural law, incidentally, provides for what can be undertaken to confront such criminals. It is stated that in the natural state, every individual must defend himself and his property. "Whoever sheds the blood of a man shall pay with his own blood"—this is a part of natural law. I have the right even to kill a thief at the moment he is stealing my property, and this right continues to exist even after the establishment of government; yet, where there is a government, if the thief has escaped, I must forgo personal vengeance and resort to the law.

The greatest objection to the natural state lies in the fact that, as long as it exists, each person serves as a judge in their own case, as they must rely solely on themselves to defend their rights. For this evil, government serves as a remedy, though it is not a natural remedy. According to Locke, the natural state was avoided through a contract that established the state. No contract terminates the natural state, except that which creates the state itself. The various governments of independent states now exist in a natural state in relation to one another.

The natural state, as reported in the excerpt seemingly directed against Hobbes, is not identical to a state of war; rather, it is closer to its opposite. After clarifying the right to kill a thief on the grounds that the thief might have considered waging war against me, Locke states: "And here we have a clear distinction between the natural state and a state of war (which some confuse), which are as far apart as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance, and protection is from a state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction."

Perhaps the natural law should be viewed as a law that encompasses a broader realm than the natural state, as the former addresses thieves and murderers, whereas the latter lacks such criminals. This at least offers a way out of the apparent contradiction in Locke's thought, where he sometimes portrays the natural state as one in which everyone is virtuous, while at other times discusses what might justly be done in the natural state to counteract the aggressive actions of villains.

Some tenets of Locke's natural law are exceedingly peculiar. For example, he states that prisoners in a just war are slaves according to natural law. He also asserts that by the law of nature, every person has the right to punish an assault against themselves or their property, even with death. He makes no exceptions, so that if I catch a petty thief, I evidently possess the right, under natural law, to shoot him.

In Locke's political philosophy, property holds a primary place and is regarded as the main reason for establishing civil authority. "The chief and primary purpose of people uniting in a state and submitting to the authority of government is the preservation of their property, which is significantly lacking in the natural state."

Overall, the theory of the natural state and natural law is, in one sense, clear, yet in another, quite perplexing. It is clear that Locke thought deeply, but it remains unclear how he arrived at such conclusions. As we have seen, Locke's ethics are utilitarian, yet when examining "rights," he does not express utilitarian considerations. Something similar permeates the entire philosophy of law as it is presented by lawyers. Legal rights can be defined as follows: in general terms, a person has a legal right to turn to the law for protection against insult. A person generally possesses a legal right to their property, yet if, for instance, they have an illegal stash of cocaine, they have no legal remedy against someone who steals it. However, the legislator must determine what legal rights to create and inevitably returns to the concept of natural rights as those which the law ought to safeguard.

I endeavor, as much as possible, to reason within the framework of Locke's theory but without theological terminology. If we assume that ethics and the classification of actions as "right" and "wrong" logically precede the existing law, it becomes possible to rearticulate the theory in terms that do not rely on mythical history. To arrive at natural law, we might pose the question thus: if law and government are absent, what kinds of actions by A against B justify B if he seeks vengeance against A, and what forms of retribution are justified in other cases? It is commonly believed that one cannot condemn a person for defending themselves against an attack by a murderer, even if the situation necessitates the killing of the assailant. Likewise, one has the right to defend their wife and children or even any member of society. The existence of law against murderers becomes irrelevant in instances where, as may easily occur, the person under attack might die before the police can be summoned; thus, we return to natural rights. A person also has the right to defend their property, though opinions vary concerning the extent of bodily harm they may inflict upon a thief.

In the relationships between states, as Locke points out, the natural law is pertinent. Under what circumstances is war justified? Until a world government exists, the answer to this question will remain purely ethical rather than legal. The response must be framed in the same manner as one would address the behavior of an individual in a state of anarchy.

Legal theory is predicated on the view that the "rights" of individuals must be safeguarded by the state. In other words, when a person is subjected to an affront that warrants vengeance, the principles of natural law dictate that the just law should act in such a way that retribution is executed by the state. If you witness a man assaulting your brother with the intent to kill, you possess the right to slay him, provided you cannot otherwise save your brother. In the natural state—at least according to Locke—if a man has killed your brother, you have the right to kill him in return. However, where law exists, you forfeit this right, which is assumed by the state. Should you kill in self-defense or to protect another, you will need to demonstrate to the court that this was indeed the motive for your act.

We may then equate natural law with moral rules, to the extent that they are independent of just legal statutes. Such rules must exist if there is to be any distinction between bad and good laws. For Locke, the matter is straightforward: since moral rules are established by God, they should be sought in the Bible. When the theological foundation is dismantled, the question becomes more complex. Yet as long as ethical distinctions between right and wrong actions are acknowledged, we can assert that in a society lacking government, the question of which actions ought to be deemed right from an ethical standpoint—and which wrong— is resolved by natural law, and the just law should, as far as possible, be guided and inspired by natural law.

In its absolute form, the doctrine that the individual possesses certain inalienable rights is incompatible with utilitarianism, which posits that right actions are those that most promote the general happiness. However, for this theory to serve as a suitable foundation for law, it need not hold true in every conceivable case; it suffices that it is valid in the overwhelming majority of instances. We can all envision situations in which murder would be justified, yet these cases are rare and do not warrant arguments against the illegality of murder. Similarly, while I am not asserting this as fact, it is preferable from a utilitarian perspective to provide each individual with a certain realm of personal freedom. If this is so, then the theory of Human Rights will serve as a fitting basis for corresponding laws, even if these rights were to be deemed exceptional. The utilitarian must study the theory that is considered the foundation for laws in terms of its practical implications; he cannot condemn it ab initio as contrary to his own ethical framework.