Philosophy of the Modern Era
Nietzsche
Nietzsche (1844—1900) justifiably considered himself a follower of Schopenhauer, yet he surpasses Schopenhauer in many respects, particularly because his teachings are consistent and coherent. Schopenhauer’s Eastern ethics of self-denial did not align with his metaphysics of the omnipotence of will. In Nietzsche’s philosophy, the will is primary not only metaphysically but also ethically. Although Nietzsche held a professorial position, he was more of a literary philosopher than an academic one. He did not invent any new specialized theories in ontology or epistemology; rather, his most significant contributions lie primarily in ethics and his incisive historical critique. I will largely confine my discussion to his ethics and critique of religion, as these aspects of his work have rendered him influential.
Nietzsche’s life was simple. His father was a Protestant pastor, and Nietzsche received a deeply religious upbringing. He excelled in classical studies and philology at the university to such an extent that, in 1869, even before obtaining his degree, he was offered a professorship in philology at Basel, which he accepted. He never enjoyed good health and, after several sick leaves, was compelled to retire in 1879. Following this, Nietzsche lived in Switzerland and Italy. In 1888, he suffered a mental breakdown, remaining in that condition until his death. Nietzsche passionately admired Wagner, but their relationship soured after the composition of the opera “Parsifal,” which Nietzsche found overly Christian and imbued with self-denial. After their falling out, he harshly criticized Wagner, even going so far as to accuse him of being Jewish. Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s overarching worldview remained closely aligned with Wagner’s, reflected in the latter’s musical cycle “The Ring of the Nibelung.” Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch closely resembles Siegfried, except for the fact that he knows Greek. This may seem strange, but it is not my fault.
Nietzsche was not consciously a Romantic; in fact, he often critiques Romantics sharply. Consciously, his worldview was Hellenic, yet devoid of an orphic element. He expressed admiration for the pre-Socratics, with the exception of Pythagoras, and harbored a particular inclination towards Heraclitus. Aristotle’s magnanimous man bears a strong resemblance to Nietzsche’s noble man, yet Nietzsche primarily contends that Greek philosophers, from Socrates onward, fell short of their predecessors. He could not forgive Socrates for his plebeian origins, labeling him a “roturier” and accusing him of corrupting the noble Athenian youth with democratic moral principles. He especially condemns Plato for his tendency toward moralizing. However, it is clear that Nietzsche does not want to condemn Plato entirely; in an attempt to excuse him, he speculates that Plato was likely insincere and preached virtue merely as a means of keeping the lower classes in obedience. He once referred to him as “the great Cagliostro.” Nietzsche appreciates Democritus and Epicurus, but his allegiance to the latter seems illogical unless interpreted as a genuine admiration for Lucretius.
Philosophical Affinities and Disagreements
As one might expect, Nietzsche held a low opinion of Kant, whom he called “a moral fanatic à la Rousseau.” Despite critiquing the Romantics, Nietzsche’s worldview owes much to them: it is an aristocratic anarchism of the Byronic type, and his admiration for Byron comes as no surprise. He sought to unite two types of values that do not easily harmonize: on one hand, he favored ruthlessness, war, and aristocratic pride; on the other, he cherished philosophy, literature, art, and especially music. Historically, these values coexisted during the Renaissance. Pope Julius II, who conquered Bologna and utilized Michelangelo’s talents, serves as an example of the kind of leader Nietzsche would wish to see at the helm of government. It is natural to compare Nietzsche with Machiavelli, despite the significant differences between the two. Machiavelli was a man of action whose opinions were shaped in close contact with societal affairs and kept pace with his era. He was neither pedantic nor systematic, and his political philosophy does not form a coherent whole. Nietzsche, by contrast, was a professor and essentially a scholar, a philosopher consciously opposing the dominant political and ethical currents of his time. However, their similarities run deeper. Nietzsche’s political philosophy is analogous to the political philosophy articulated in “The Prince” (but not in the “Discourses”), though it is developed and applied more broadly. Both Nietzsche and Machiavelli possess an ethical framework directed toward power and intentionally anti-Christian in character, with Nietzsche’s anti-Christian stance being more pronounced. For Nietzsche, Napoleon was to be regarded in the same light as Cesare Borgia was for Machiavelli: a great man vanquished by petty adversaries.
The Aristocratic Ethics of Power
Nietzsche’s critique of religion and philosophy is entirely governed by ethical motives. He admires certain qualities that he believed, perhaps rightly, are attainable only by an aristocratic minority. In his view, the majority should serve as a means to elevate this minority and should not be regarded as having any independent claims to happiness or well-being. Nietzsche frequently refers to ordinary people as “bungled and botched” and expresses no objection to their suffering if it is necessary for the emergence of a great individual. Thus, the entire significance of the period from 1789 to 1815 is encapsulated in Napoleon. The revolution was what made Napoleon possible—this is its justification. We should desire the anarchic collapse of our entire civilization if its outcome would yield such a reward. Napoleon made nationalism possible—this is the excuse for it. Nearly all the elevated hopes of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche writes, owe their genesis to Napoleon.
Nietzsche relishes speaking in paradoxes, calculated to shock the average reader. He does this by taking the words “good” and “evil” in their customary senses, only to declare his preference for evil over good. In his book “Beyond Good and Evil,” he genuinely seeks to alter his readers’ perceptions of both terms. Yet, apart from rare moments, he presents his argument as though he were simply praising evil and condemning good. For instance, he denies that it is anyone’s duty to champion the triumph of good over evil. He treats such a duty as a characteristically English prejudice, typical of “that blockhead John Stuart Mill”—a thinker for whom Nietzsche harbored peculiar loathing. Of Mill he wrote: “I detest the vulgarity of this man when he says: ‘What is right for one person is right for another’—‘Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself.’ On such principles human relations would be cheerfully built upon mutual services, where every action functions as cash payment for something done in return. This hypothesis is base to the highest degree. It assumes without proof an equivalence of value between my actions and yours.”
True virtue, unlike the ordinary variety, is not meant for everyone; it must remain the exclusive preserve of an aristocratic minority. It is neither advantageous nor prudent; it isolates its possessor, stands hostile to order, and harms those who rank lower. The highest individuals must wage war against the masses and resist the democratic spirit of the age, wherein mediocre people join forces everywhere to seize power. “All that enervates, that softens, and that brings ‘the people’ or ‘women’ to the fore acts in favor of universal suffrage—that is, the dominance of ‘lower’ human beings.” Rousseau was the great corrupter for making women interesting; Harriet Beecher Stowe followed with her slaves, and then came the socialists with their protection of workers and the poor. All of this, Nietzsche insists, must be actively combated.
Will to Power and Spartan Discipline
Nietzsche’s ethics does not conform to an ethics of self-gratification in any conventional sense. He believes in Spartan discipline and in the capacity both to endure and to inflict pain for a grand purpose. Above all else, he exalts the will to power. “I assess the strength of a will,” he asserts, “by the resistance it can offer, by the quantity of pain and torture it can endure and turn to its own advantage. I do not point an accusing finger at the evil and suffering of existence; on the contrary, I cherish the hope that life may one day become even more wicked and suffering-laden than ever before.” Compassion he viewed as a weakness to be resisted: “The task is to attain that immense energy of greatness which, through discipline and the destruction of millions of the ‘unfinished and imperfect,’ can shape the man of the future. One must be able to endure and not perish in the face of the unprecedented suffering thus created.” With jubilant prophecy he foretells an era of great wars; one wonders whether he would have rejoiced had he lived to see the fulfillment of his prediction.
Yet he is by no means an idolater of the state. On the contrary, he is a passionate individualist who believes in the hero. The misfortunes of an entire nation, he declares, weigh less than the suffering of a single great individual. “All the hardships of these little people, taken together, possess no collective reality except in the feelings of powerful individuals.”
Nietzsche is no nationalist, nor does he exhibit any excessive admiration for Germany. He envisions an international ruling race that shall dominate the earth—“a new, broad aristocracy based on the most rigorous self-discipline, in which the will of philosopher-rulers and artist-tyrants shall be stamped upon millennia.”
He is not an anti-Semite, although he considers that Germany already has as many Jews as it can digest and ought not to permit any further influx. He has no love for the New Testament, but he speaks of the Old Testament with immense admiration. In fairness to Nietzsche, it should be observed that many contemporary doctrines claiming kinship with his ethical outlook directly contradict his explicitly stated views.
Critique of Women and Christianity
Two aspects of his ethics merit special attention: first, his hostility toward women; second, his scathing critique of Christianity. He never tires of vehemently denouncing women. In his pseudo-prophetic work “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” he writes that women are as yet incapable of friendship: they remain cats and birds or, at best, cows. “Man is to be trained for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior: all else is folly.” This warrior’s recreation must be of a rather peculiar kind, if judged by Nietzsche’s most famous aphorism on the subject: “Are you visiting a woman? Do not forget the whip!”
He is not always so ferocious, though he is consistently contemptuous. In “The Will to Power,” he writes: “We take pleasure in woman as in a more elegant, delicate, and ethereal creature. What a delight to meet a creature whose head is filled only with dances, nonsense, and finery! Woman has always been a recreation to every thorough and masculine soul.” Yet even these appealing qualities belong to women only so long as they are kept in subjection by manly men. The moment women achieve any independence, they become unbearable. “Woman has so many reasons for shame; in woman there lie so many pedantic, superficial traits, the mannerisms of a schoolmistress, petty self-assurance, debauchery, and immodesty… All this has hitherto been best restrained and suppressed by fear of man.” So he writes in “Beyond Good and Evil,” adding that women must be viewed as property, after the manner of Eastern peoples. All his diatribes against women are presented as self-evident truths. They are supported neither by historical evidence nor by his own experience of women, which was almost entirely confined to his sister.
Slave Morality and the Rejection of Christian Values
Nietzsche objects to Christianity because it embraces what he terms slave morality. It is instructive to contrast his arguments with those of the French philosophers who preceded the Revolution. They held that Christian dogmas are false; that Christianity teaches submission to what is taken for the will of God, whereas a self-respecting human being should bow to no higher authority; and that the Christian churches have become allies of tyrants, aiding the enemies of democracy to deny freedom and perpetuate the oppression of the poor. Nietzsche is indifferent to the metaphysical truth of Christianity or any other religion; convinced that no religion is true, he judges all religions solely by their social consequences. He agrees with the French philosophers in protesting against submission to the supposed will of God, but he replaces this with submission to the will of earthly “artist-tyrants.” Submission is commendable (for everyone except these superhumans), but not submission to the Christian God. As for the alliance of Christian churches with tyrants and enemies of democracy, he argues that this is the exact reverse of the truth. In his view, the French Revolution and socialism are, in spirit, identical to Christianity. He rejects all of them for the selfsame reason: he refuses to regard human beings as equal in any respect.
Buddhism and Christianity, he asserts, are equally “nihilistic” religions in that they deny the natural difference in value between one individual and another, yet Buddhism provokes far less of his hostility. Christianity is degenerative and laden with decaying elements. Its driving force is the revolt of the “unfinished and imperfect.” This revolt was initiated by the Jews and imported into Christianity by “holy epileptics” such as St. Paul, whom Nietzsche deprives of all integrity. “The New Testament is the gospel of entirely despicable varieties of humanity.” Christianity is the most fatal and seductive lie that has ever existed. No man of true stature has ever resembled the Christian ideal—not even the heroes of Plutarch’s “Lives.” Christianity must be condemned for denying the value of “pride, the passion of distance, great responsibility, overflowing exuberance, the beautiful bestiality, the instincts of war and conquest, the deification of passion, revenge, anger, sensuality, risk, and knowledge.” Nietzsche asserts that all these qualities are good, whereas Christianity condemns them as evil.
Christianity, he argues, seeks to humble the human heart, but this is a mistake. In the wild beast there is something magnificent that is lost when it is tamed. The criminals with whom Dostoevsky mingled were superior men, for they possessed greater self-respect. Nietzsche despises remorse, penance, and redemption, describing them as a “folie circulaire.” It is difficult for us to free ourselves from such a way of thinking. “We are the heirs of two thousand years of the vivisection of conscience and self-crucifixion.” A particularly eloquent passage concerning Pascal deserves quotation, as it best illustrates Nietzsche’s hostility toward Christianity. “Why do we contend against Christianity? Because it seeks to destroy the strong, to break their spirit, to exploit moments of fatigue and weakness, to transform their proud confidence into anxiety and distress. It knows how to poison the noblest instincts and infect them with illness until their strength, their will to power, turns against them—until the strong perish from excessive self-contempt and self-sacrifice: an abhorrent mode of destruction, the most infamous example of which is Pascal.”
In place of the Christian saint, Nietzsche wishes to set what he calls the noble man—not as a representative of all humanity, but as a ruling aristocrat. The noble man is capable of cruelty and, when occasion demands, of what is vulgarly regarded as crime. He acknowledges a sense of duty only toward those who are his equals. He patronizes artists, poets, and all who possess a craft, but he does so as a being of a higher order than those who merely know how to produce something. From the example of warriors he has learned to link death with the cause for which he fights, to sacrifice much, and to treat his aim with a seriousness that spares no one. He adheres to relentless discipline and permits himself violence and treachery in war. He recognizes the role that cruelty plays in aristocratic superiority: “Almost everything we call ‘higher culture’ is based on the spiritualization and intensification of cruelty.” The noble man is, in essence, the embodiment of the will to power.
Critical Assessment of Nietzschean Philosophy
What are we to think of Nietzsche’s teachings? How far are they true? Are they, in any respect, beneficial? Is there anything objective in them, or are they merely the fantasies of a sick mind obsessed with power?
One cannot deny Nietzsche’s immense influence, though it has been felt more by artists and writers than by academic philosophers. It must also be conceded that his prophecies regarding the future have proved more accurate than those of liberals or socialists. If Nietzsche is merely a symptom of a disease, it is a disease widely prevalent in the modern world. Nevertheless, much in his philosophy must be dismissed as pure megalomania. Speaking of Spinoza, he writes: “What personal timidity and vulnerability this masquerade of a sick recluse reveals!” The very same thing may be said of Nietzsche himself, and with less hesitation, since he had no scruples about saying it of Spinoza. It is obvious that in his daydreams he saw himself as a warrior, not a professor, and that all the men he admired were military commanders. His opinions about women were an objectification of his own feelings toward them, which were plainly feelings of fear. “Do not forget the whip!”—yet nine women out of ten would have wrested that whip from him, and he knew it. He therefore kept his distance from them, soothing his wounded vanity with cruel remarks.
He condemns Christian love because he sees it as born of fear: I fear my neighbor may injure me, so I assure him of my love. If I were stronger and braver, I would openly display the contempt I undoubtedly feel. It is clear that Nietzsche could not conceive of anyone genuinely loving all humanity, for he himself experienced only hatred and fear, which he was compelled to mask under a guise of arrogant indifference. His noble man, the figure he aspired to embody in his dreams, is entirely devoid of compassion, merciless, cunning, malevolent, occupied solely with his own power. King Lear, on the brink of madness, exclaims:
… I do not yet know How I shall take my revenge, but it will be Something more terrible than anything the world has seen.
In a few words, this encapsulates Nietzsche’s entire philosophy.
Nietzsche never considered that the desire for power, which he attributes to his Übermensch, is itself born of fear. Those who do not fear their neighbors see no need to dominate them. Men who have conquered their fear lack the frenzied capacity of Nietzsche’s “tyrannical artists” to seek pleasure in music and massacre while their hearts are filled with dread at the inevitable palace coup. I shall not deny that, partly through the spread of Nietzsche’s doctrine, the real world has come to resemble his nightmare; but that nightmare does not become any less repugnant on that account.
The Psychology of Fear and Pity
It must be acknowledged that there exists a certain type of Christian ethics to which Nietzsche’s scathing critique may justly apply. Pascal and Dostoevsky, whom he himself adduces as examples, both possess something pitiable in their virtue. Pascal sacrificed his magnificent mathematical intellect to his God, thereby attributing to God the cruelty that was a cosmic extension of his own painful inner torments. Dostoevsky wished to have nothing to do with “personal pride”; he would sin merely to repent and experience the pleasure of confession. I shall not examine how far such mental aberrations should be attributed to Christianity, but I agree with Nietzsche in deeming Dostoevsky’s self-prostration contemptible. I must also agree that directness, pride, and even a measure of self-assertion are elements of the finest character. One cannot admire a virtue grounded in fear.
There are two kinds of saints: the saint by nature and the saint by fear. The saint by nature genuinely and directly loves humanity; he does good because it brings him happiness. The saint by fear, on the contrary, is like a man who refrains from stealing because he fears the police, and who would be wicked were it not for thoughts of hellfire or retribution from his neighbors. Nietzsche could conceive only of the latter type of saint: he was so filled with fear and hatred that sincere love for humanity seemed to him impossible. He could never imagine a person who, possessing the utter fearlessness and stubborn pride of the Übermensch, nonetheless inflicts no suffering because he has no desire to do so. Could it ever occur to anyone that Lincoln acted as he did out of fear of hellish torments? And yet to Nietzsche, Lincoln is pitiable, while Napoleon is great.
Defining the Aristocratic Ideal
We must now consider the central ethical problem posed by Nietzsche: should ethics be aristocratic, or are ethical principles in certain respects binding on all people alike? As I have just framed it, this question lacks clear meaning, and it is evident that our first step must be to make the subject of discussion more precise.
First, we must distinguish aristocratic ethics from aristocratic political theory. An advocate of the Benthamite principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number holds a democratic ethic; he may nevertheless believe that general happiness is best secured by an aristocratic form of governance. But Nietzsche’s position is not this. He asserts that the happiness of the common people forms no part of the good as such. Everything that is good or bad in itself exists solely for the aristocratic minority; the fate of the rest does not matter.
The next question is: how are we to define the superior minority? In practice, it is usually the race of conquerors or hereditary aristocrats, and those classified as aristocrats are generally, at least in theory, descendants of the conquering race. I believe Nietzsche would concur with this definition. “No morality is possible without good lineage,” he tells us. He contends that the noble caste is initially always barbaric, but that every elevation of humanity has been the work of an aristocratic society.
It is unclear whether Nietzsche viewed the superiority of the aristocrat as innate or as conditioned by upbringing and environment. If the latter were true, it would be difficult to justify why others should be deprived of all the advantages to which ex hypothesi they could lay equal claim. I conclude, therefore, that he regards aristocrats, as conquerors and their descendants, as biologically superior to their subjects—much as humans are superior to domesticated animals, though to a lesser degree.
What shall we mean by “biologically superior”? Following Nietzsche, we may interpret this to mean that individuals of the superior race and their descendants stand closer to the noble man in Nietzschean terms. They possess greater willpower, more courage, and a stronger will to power, while exhibiting less empathy and diminished fear and softness.
Nietzsche’s ethics can now be stated. I believe the following represents a fair summary: victors in war and their descendants are generally biologically superior to the vanquished. It is therefore desirable for all power to reside in their hands, and for governance to be conducted solely in their own interests.
We must also consider the term “desirable.” What does “desirable” signify in Nietzsche’s philosophy? From an outsider’s perspective, Nietzsche labels as “desirable” that which he himself desires. Under this interpretation, Nietzsche’s teachings could be expressed more simply and honestly in one sentence: “I would like to have lived in Athens during the time of Pericles or in Florence during the Medici.” However, this is not philosophy; it is merely a biographical fact. The term “desirable” is not synonymous with “that which I desire”; it carries a certain claim, albeit obscured, to legislative universality. A theist might assert that what is desirable is what God desires, but Nietzsche cannot make such a claim. He could argue that he knows what is good through ethical intuition, yet he would not express it this way, as it sounds too Kantian. In explaining the term “desirable,” he might articulate the following: “If people read my works, a certain percentage of readers will come to share my desires regarding the organization of society. These individuals, inspired by the energy and determination my philosophy provides, may preserve and restore aristocracy, either as aristocrats themselves or (like me) as sycophants of the aristocracy. Thus, they will achieve a more fulfilled life than they would have as servants of the masses.”
Nietzsche’s thought contains another element that closely resembles the objections raised by “stubborn individualists” against trade unions. The victor in the struggle of all against all likely possesses certain qualities that Nietzsche admires, such as courage, resourcefulness, and willpower. However, if individuals lacking these aristocratic qualities—who constitute a vast majority—unite, they may prevail despite their individual inferiority. In this conflict between the united masses and the aristocrats, Christianity serves as the ideological front, much as the French Revolution served as a battleground. Therefore, we should resist any form of alliance among the individually weak, fearing that their combined strength may surpass that of the strong. Conversely, we should promote the union of steadfast and courageous elements within the populace. The first step toward creating such a union is to preach Nietzsche’s philosophy. It is evident that maintaining a distinction between ethics and politics is not so easy.
Practical and Political Implications
Suppose we wish—and I genuinely wish—to find arguments against Nietzsche’s ethics and politics; what might we uncover? There are substantial practical arguments demonstrating that the attempt to achieve the goals Nietzsche set would lead to something entirely different. Aristocrats by birth are now discredited. The only practically feasible form of aristocracy is that of a fascist or Nazi party. Such an organization invites opposition and will likely be defeated in war. Even if it is not defeated, it must soon devolve into nothing more than a police state, where rulers live in constant fear of being murdered and heroes are confined to concentration camps. In such a society, trust and honesty are eroded by informants. The supposed aristocracy of superhumans degenerates into a clique of trembling cowards.
These, however, are arguments of our time; they would not have held true in the past, when aristocracy was unchallenged. The government of Egypt governed according to Nietzschean principles for several millennia. The governments of nearly all great states were aristocratic until the American and French Revolutions. Therefore, we must ask ourselves: Are there sufficient reasons to prefer democracy over a form of governance that boasts such a long and prosperous history? Or rather, since we engage in philosophy rather than politics, are there objective grounds to reject the ethics through which Nietzsche supports aristocracy?
The ethical question, in contrast to the political one, concerns sympathy. Sympathy is the feeling of unhappiness arising from the suffering of others, a sentiment somewhat natural to the human condition. Little children feel sorrow when they hear other children cry. However, the development of this sentiment varies among individuals. Some take pleasure in causing suffering, while others, like the Buddha, feel they cannot be entirely happy while any living being suffers. Most people emotionally divide humanity into friends and enemies, sympathizing with the former but not the latter. Ethical systems such as Christianity and Buddhism contain within their emotional foundations a universal sympathy, while Nietzsche’s ethics exhibit a complete absence of it. (Nietzsche’s sermons often target compassion, and it is evident that he found it easy to adhere to his own commandments in this regard.)
A Philosophical Dialogue Between Buddha and Nietzsche
The question arises: if a dispute were to be arranged between the Buddha and Nietzsche, would either be able to present an argument appealing to an impartial listener? I do not mean political arguments. We can imagine them both standing before the Almighty, much like Satan in the opening chapter of the Book of Job, offering counsel on the kind of world He should create. What might each say?
The Buddha would begin the discourse by speaking of the lepers, the outcasts, the homeless, and the wretched. He would speak of the poor, whose weary hands ache as they barely sustain their lives on meager rations. He would mention the wounded in battle, dying in slow agony; orphans mistreated by cruel guardians; and even the most fortunate, who are nonetheless haunted by thoughts of ruin and death. From this burden of sorrow, he would assert, we must find a path to salvation. That salvation can only come through love.
Nietzsche, whose interruption could only be quelled by the omnipotence of God, would unleash his response when his turn arrived: “Oh, Lord! Humanity must learn to develop a thicker skin. Why lament the suffering of the common folk, or even the suffering of great individuals? The common folk suffer mundanely; the sufferings of the great are noble and require no pity. Your ideal is purely negative—the absence of suffering, which can only be fully realized in non-existence. I, however, have positive ideals: I admire Alcibiades, Emperor Frederick II, and Napoleon. For such individuals, any suffering is justified. I call upon You, God, as the greatest of creative artists; do not let Your artistic impulses be restrained by the degenerative, fear-fueled prattle of this wretched psychopath.”
The Buddha, who in heaven had the opportunity to study the history of all that transpired after his death and had mastered the art of marveling at knowledge while lamenting its misuse by humanity, would respond with calm politeness: “You are mistaken, Professor Nietzsche, in thinking that my ideal is purely negative. It does encompass a negative element—the absence of suffering—but it embodies as much positivity as can be found in your teachings. Although I do not particularly admire Alcibiades or Napoleon, I too have my heroes:
- my disciple Jesus, because he taught people to love their enemies
- those who discovered how to harness the forces of nature to reduce the labor required to procure food
- the doctors who found cures for diseases
- the poets, artists, and musicians who bear the mark of divine bliss.
Love, knowledge, and the enjoyment of beauty are not negations; they are sufficient to fill the lives of the greatest individuals who have ever lived.”
“Nevertheless,” Nietzsche would reply, “your world would be bland. You should study Heraclitus, whose works remain fully preserved in the heavenly library. Your love is nothing more than pity engendered by compassion; your truth, if you are honest, is unpleasant, to be known only through suffering; and as for beauty, what is more beautiful than the tiger, whose magnificence lies in its ferocity? No, I fear that if the Lord prefers your world, we shall all perish from boredom.”
“Perhaps you will perish,” the Buddha would respond, “because you love suffering, while your love of life is mere pretense. But those who truly love life would be happy in ways that no one can be happy in the present world.”
I align myself with the Buddha—at least with the Buddha I have depicted. I do not know how to prove his correctness through arguments akin to those in mathematical or scientific disputes. I am repelled by Nietzsche because he takes pleasure in contemplating suffering, because he has elevated vanity to the level of duty, and because the people he admires most are conquerors, famed for their ability to deprive others of life.
The decisive argument against Nietzsche’s philosophy, as against any unpleasant yet internally coherent ethics, lies not in the domain of facts, but in the domain of emotions. Nietzsche scorns universal love, while I consider it the driving force behind all that I desire for the world. Nietzsche’s followers have had their successes, but we may hope that their time will soon come to an end.
Über den Autor
Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.
Quellen und Methodik
Der Inhalt basiert auf akademischen Quellen in mehreren Sprachen — darunter ukrainische, russische und englische Universitätslehrbücher sowie wissenschaftliche Ausgaben zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Texte wurden aus den Originalquellen ins Deutsche übertragen und redaktionell bearbeitet. Alle Artikel werden vor der Veröffentlichung inhaltlich und didaktisch geprüft.
Zuletzt geändert: 15/11/2026