Utilitarians - Philosophy of the Modern Era
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Philosophy of the Modern Era

Utilitarians

Throughout the period from Kant to Nietzsche, professional philosophers in Britain were scarcely influenced by their German contemporaries; the sole exception was Sir William Hamilton, who himself wielded little influence. While Coleridge and Carlyle were deeply affected by Kant, Fichte, and the German Romantics, they were not philosophers in the specialized sense of the term. Someone once reportedly mentioned Kant in conversation with James Mill, who, after a brief pause, remarked, “I fully understand what the poor man Kant was trying to do.”

Such acknowledgment was rare; generally, total silence prevailed regarding the Germans. Bentham and his school inherited the fundamental traits of their philosophy from Locke, Hartley, and Helvétius. Their significance was political rather than strictly philosophical—acting as leaders of British Philosophical Radicalism, they inadvertently laid the groundwork for the doctrines of socialism.

Jeremy Bentham and the Foundations of Philosophical Radicalism

Jeremy Bentham, the recognized head of “Philosophical Radicalism,” was far from the figure one might expect to lead such a movement. Born in 1748, he became a radical only in 1808. Painfully shy, he could scarcely bear the presence of unfamiliar company without trepidation. As a writer he was immensely prolific, yet he never took the trouble to publish his works himself; what appeared under his name had been gathered and printed by his well-meaning friends. His primary interest lay in jurisprudence, where he considered Helvétius and Beccaria his most significant predecessors, and it was through legal theory that he turned his attention to ethics and politics.

Bentham founded his entire philosophy on two principles: the “principle of association” and the “greatest happiness principle.” Hartley had emphasized the principle of association in 1749; before him, although the association of ideas was recognized, thinkers such as Locke regarded it merely as a source of trivial errors. Following Hartley, Bentham made it the central principle of psychology, recognizing the association of ideas with ideas as well as with language. Through this principle, Bentham sought to provide a deterministic interpretation of mental phenomena. Essentially, this is the same doctrine as the modern theory of “conditioned reflexes,” derived from Pavlov’s experiments. The chief difference between them is that Pavlov’s conditioned reflex is physiological, whereas the association of ideas is purely mental. Thus, Pavlov’s work can be given a materialistic explanation, as behaviorists have done, whereas the association of ideas leads to a psychology more or less independent of physiology. From a scientific perspective, the principle of the conditioned reflex represents an evolution of the older doctrine. Pavlov’s principle posits that if a reflex exists whereby stimulus B evokes response C, and an animal is frequently subjected to stimulus A simultaneously with B, stimulus A will eventually elicit response C even in the absence of stimulus B. Determining the precise circumstances under which this occurs is the task of experiment. If we replace A, B, and C with ideas, Pavlov’s principle transforms into the principle of the association of ideas.

Both principles are undoubtedly valid within a certain domain; the only contentious issue concerns the boundary of that domain. Bentham and his followers exaggerated the scope of Hartley’s principle, much as certain behaviorists have exaggerated the applicability of Pavlov’s teachings.

For Bentham, psychological determinism was significant because he desired to establish a legal code and a broader social system that would automatically render individuals virtuous. His second principle, the greatest happiness principle, was necessary to define the concept of “virtue.”

Bentham asserted that good is pleasure or happiness—terms he used interchangeably—while evil is suffering. Therefore, one state of affairs is preferable to another if the balance tilts in favor of pleasure over suffering. Of all possible conditions, the best is that in which pleasure far exceeds suffering.

Utilitarianism contained nothing novel when Bentham adopted it. Hutcheson had first proposed the concept in 1725, though Bentham attributed it to Priestley, who had no special claim to it; the core idea was already present in Locke. Bentham’s merit lay not in inventing the concept, but in applying it with relentless vigor to practical problems.

The Utilitarian Approach to Law and Social Order

Bentham argued that good is happiness in general, and that every individual invariably strives for what he considers his own happiness. The duty of the legislator is therefore to establish a harmony between public and personal interests. It is in society’s interest that I refrain from theft, but my own interest is engaged only where an effective criminal law exists. Thus, criminal law serves to align individual interests with those of society, which constitutes its justification.

A person should be punished under criminal law solely to prevent crime, not out of hatred for the offender. That punishment be inevitable is far more important than that it be severe. In Bentham’s day, many petty offenses in England were punishable by death, leading juries to frequently acquit defendants to spare them so extreme a penalty. Bentham advocated abolishing the death penalty for all crimes except the most serious, and during his lifetime the criminal code was accordingly softened.

Civil law, Bentham stated, should pursue four objectives: security, abundance, safety, and equality. Notably, he did not mention freedom. In truth, he cared little for freedom, admiring the benevolent autocrats who predated the French Revolution—Catherine the Great and Emperor Francis. He held the doctrine of human rights in deep contempt. Human rights, he claimed, are “manifest nonsense; inalienable human rights are nonsense on stilts.” When the French revolutionaries formulated their Declaration of the Rights of Man, Bentham termed it “a metaphysical work”—“the ne plus ultra of metaphysics.” He contended that its provisions fell into three categories: 1) obscure, 2) false, and 3) both obscure and false.

Bentham’s ideal, like that of Epicurus, was security rather than freedom: “It is better to read of wars and storms than to live through them, dwelling instead in peace and tranquility.”

His gradual evolution toward Philosophical Radicalism sprang from two sources: on the one hand, a belief in equality derived from his calculus of pleasure and pain; on the other, an unwavering resolve to submit everything to the judgment of reason as he understood it. His devotion to equality early compelled him to advocate the equal division of property among children and to oppose the freedom of testation. Subsequently, it led him to condemn monarchy and hereditary aristocracy and to champion full democracy, including voting rights for women. His refusal to believe in anything without rational grounds brought him to reject religion, including belief in God; it likewise spurred him to criticize sharply the absurdities and injustices of criminal law, no matter how venerable their historical origins. Bentham excused nothing on the pretext of tradition. From his youth, he condemned imperialism—both English rule in America and that of other nations—regarding colonies as sheer folly.

James Mill and the Evolution of Utilitarian Thought

It was the influence of James Mill that drew Bentham into practical politics. Twenty-five years Bentham’s junior, James Mill was a fervent disciple of his doctrines and an active radical. Bentham provided Mill with a house (formerly belonging to Milton) and supported him financially while he wrote his History of India. Upon its completion, the East India Company appointed James Mill to a position—an office his son would later hold until the Company’s dissolution following the Sepoy Rebellion. James Mill idolized Condorcet and Helvétius. Like all radicals of that era, he believed in the omnipotence of education, applying these theories to the upbringing of his own son, John Stuart. The results were a mixture of good and ill. The greatest drawback was that John Stuart Mill could never fully emancipate himself from his father’s influence, even after coming to realize how narrow his father’s worldview had been.

James Mill, like Bentham, viewed pleasure as the sole good and suffering as the sole evil. Yet like Epicurus, he valued quiet pleasures above all, holding intellectual joys to be supreme and moderation to be the foremost virtue. “The word ‘extremity’ in his mouth,” his son observed, “always carried a tone of contemptuous condemnation,” adding that his father objected to the modern emphasis on feelings.

Like the rest of the utilitarian school, James Mill was an ardent opponent of romanticism in any form. He believed that reason should govern politics and hoped that public opinion would be shaped by the weight of evidence. Provided that opposing sides in a dispute were argued with equal skill, he felt a moral confidence that the majority would judge correctly. His worldview was constrained by the emotional austerity of his nature, yet within those limits he displayed exemplary diligence, impartiality, and reasonableness.

His son, John Stuart, born in 1808, carried Bentham’s ideas forward in a somewhat softened form until his death in 1873.

Throughout the middle of the nineteenth century, the influence of the Benthamites on British legislation and politics was remarkably significant, especially given their complete lack of emotional appeal.

Bentham presented numerous arguments in defense of the greatest happiness principle as the summum bonum. Some of these arguments sharply criticized rival ethical theories. In his treatise on political sophisms, he employs language that seems to foreshadow Marx. He asserts that sentimental and ascetic morality serves the interests of the ruling class and is a product of an aristocratic regime. Those who preach a morality of sacrifice, he continues, are not victims of error; they simply desire others to sacrifice themselves for them. The moral order, he posits, results from a balance of interests. The ruling corporation strives to convince everyone that a coincidence of interests between rulers and ruled already exists. Reformers, however, reveal that this coincidence has yet to materialize and endeavor to establish it. Bentham asserts that only the principle of utility can supply criteria for morality and legislation and lay the foundations for social science. His principal positive argument for this principle is that it is implicitly assumed across the most varied ethical systems—a claim that is plausible only if one significantly restricts the range of ethical systems under consideration.

Bentham’s system contains a glaring flaw. If each person pursues their own pleasure, how can we ensure that the legislator will care for the pleasure of humanity as a whole? Bentham’s own instinctive benevolence—which his psychological theories failed to account for—obscured this problem. Were he tasked with drafting a code of laws for a country, he would have based it on what he perceived to be the interests of society, not on his own interests or, consciously, those of his class. However, had he acknowledged this, he would have been forced to revise his psychological doctrine. He evidently believed that democracy, combined with appropriate oversight, could ensure that legislators pursued their personal interests only by benefiting society.

In his time, there was scant evidence to judge the efficacy of democratic institutions, making his optimism excusable; in our disillusioned age, however, it appears somewhat naïve.

Critiquing the Logical Basis of Utilitarian Ethics

In his Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill offers an argument so erroneous that it is difficult to understand how he could believe in its validity. He states: “Pleasure is the only thing that is desired. Therefore, pleasure is the only desirable thing.” He argues that just as the only things that can be seen are those that are visible, and the only things that can be heard are those that are audible, the only things that can be desired are those that are wished for. He fails to notice that while something is ‘visible’ if it can be seen, it is ‘desirable’ only if it ought to be desired. Thus, ‘desirable’ is a term that presupposes an ethical theory; we cannot deduce what is desirable from what is merely wished for. Furthermore, if each person truly and inevitably pursues their own pleasures, it is pointless to state that they ought to do something else. Kant insisted that ‘You ought’ implies ‘You can,’ and conversely, if you cannot, it is futile to say that you ought to. If every person must always strive for their own pleasures, ethics is reduced to mere prudence. You must act to promote the interests of others only in the hope that they will return the favor. Similarly, in politics, cooperation becomes a matter of mutual benefit. No other conclusions can be reasonably derived from the premises of the utilitarians.

Here, two distinct questions arise: 1) Does every individual genuinely strive for their own happiness? 2) Is collective happiness indeed the ultimate goal toward which human action ought to aspire?

The assertion that every person desires their own happiness can be interpreted in two ways, one of which is a truism, while the other is false. Regardless of what I may happen to desire, I will derive some pleasure from fulfilling that desire. In this sense, everything I wish for amounts to some form of pleasure, and it can be stated—albeit somewhat loosely—that I desire pleasure. This interpretation is the truism.

However, the claim that I desire something because of the pleasure it brings me is generally inaccurate. When I am hungry, I wish to eat, and as long as hunger persists, food provides me with pleasure. Yet hunger—the desire—comes first, while pleasure is the consequence of that desire. I do not deny that there are instances where one directly desires pleasure. If you decide to spend a free evening at the theater, you will choose the one you believe will yield the greatest pleasure. But such actions, defined by a direct desire for pleasure, are exceptional rather than significant. The primary activities of any individual are determined by desires that precede calculations of pleasure and suffering.

The object of desire can be anything: a masochist, for instance, may wish to experience pain. Undoubtedly, the masochist derives pleasure from the pain they desire; yet this pleasure arises from the desire, not vice versa. A person may wish for something that does not personally affect them, save for the desire itself. They may, for example, desire a certain country to win a war in which their own nation remains neutral. They might wish for an increase in general happiness or a decrease in collective suffering. Alternatively, they may, like Carlyle, wish for the exact opposite. As their desires change, so too do their pleasures.

The Ethical Purpose of Utilitarianism

Ethics is necessary because the desires of different people often conflict. The primary cause of such conflict is egoism: most individuals are more concerned with their own well-being than with that of others. However, conflicts can arise even in the absence of egoism. One person may desire that everyone become Catholic, while another wishes for everyone to become Calvinist. Such non-egoistic desires often incite social friction. Ethics has a dual purpose:

  • first, to find criteria for distinguishing between good and bad desires
  • second, to uphold good desires through praise and criticism while suppressing the bad.

The ethical component of utilitarianism, which is logically independent of its psychological aspect, posits that desires and actions are good if they genuinely promote collective happiness. In this context, what matters is not the intention behind the action, but its outcome. Are there substantial theoretical arguments for or against this doctrine? We have already encountered a similar question regarding Nietzsche. His ethics diverges from utilitarianism because he believes that only a minority of the human race is ethically significant, and the happiness or unhappiness of the rest should be of no consequence. I do not believe that this disagreement can be resolved through theoretical arguments akin to those used in scientific matters. It is evident that those excluded from Nietzsche’s aristocracy will object to this; thus, the subject of the dispute becomes political rather than theoretical.

Utilitarian ethics is democratic and anti-romantic. While democrats are naturally inclined to accept it, those who prefer a Byronic worldview can, in my opinion, be refuted only through practice. They cannot be swayed by arguments that appeal solely to facts rather than to desires.

Darwinism and the Legacy of Benthamite Competition

Philosophical Radicalism served as an intermediary school, giving rise to two systems more significant than itself: Darwinism and socialism. Darwinism is the application of Malthus’s population theory to all animal and plant life, a concept integral to the politics and economics of Bentham’s followers. It embodies universal free competition, where victory is awarded to those animals most resembling the fortunate capitalist. Darwin himself was influenced by Malthus and generally sympathized with Philosophical Radicalism. However, there is a significant distinction between the competition praised by orthodox economists and the struggle for existence proclaimed by Darwin as the driving force of evolution. “Free competition” in orthodox economics is a highly artificial concept bound by legal constraints. You may sell at a lower price than your competitor, but you are not permitted to kill them. You must not employ the armed forces of the state to aid in triumphing over foreign manufacturers. Those unfortunate enough to lack capital should not seek to improve their fortunes through revolution. The “free competition” as understood by Bentham’s followers was in no way genuinely free.

Darwinian competition lacks these constraints; “below the belt” strikes are not prohibited. In the animal kingdom, there are no limitations imposed by law, and warfare as a method of competition is not excluded. The use of the state to defeat a competitor was against the rules for Bentham’s followers, yet it cannot be dismissed from the struggle according to Darwin. Indeed, while Darwin was a liberal and Nietzsche never referred to him without disgust, Darwin’s notion of “the survival of the fittest” leads, if thoroughly comprehended, to something much more reminiscent of Nietzsche’s philosophy than of Bentham’s. Such conclusions from Darwin’s teaching, however, pertain to a later period, as Darwin’s “On the Origin of Species” was published in 1859, and its political implications were not immediately recognized.

The Emergence of Socialism from Classical Economics

In contrast, socialism emerged during the flourishing of Benthamism as a direct result of the evolution of orthodox economics. Ricardo, closely associated with Bentham, Malthus, and J. Mill, taught that the exchange value of a commodity is entirely dependent on the labor expended in its production. He published his theory in 1817, and eight years later, Thomas Hodgskin, a former naval officer, published the first socialist pamphlet, “Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital.” He argued that if, as Ricardo teaches, all value is created by labor, then all remuneration should belong to the laborers, and the share currently received by landowners and capitalists is nothing more than sheer extortion.

Meanwhile, Robert Owen, after a lengthy career as a manufacturer, arrived at a doctrine that soon came to be known as socialism. The term socialist was first applied in 1827 to Owen’s followers. He asserted that machines were displacing manual labor and that laissez-faire did not provide the working class with sufficient means to combat the might of machines. The method he proposed for addressing this evil was the earliest form of modern socialism.

Though Owen was a friend of Bentham, who invested a significant sum in Owen’s endeavors, the Philosophical Radicals did not embrace his new teachings. In fact, the advent of socialism rendered them less radical and less philosophical than they had previously been. Hodgskin garnered a following in London, which alarmed J. Mill. He wrote:

“Their notions of property appear grotesque… they seem to believe that there should be no property and that its existence is a bane for them. I have no doubt that among them there are charlatans… Fools! They do not see that what they wish for in their madness would be such a calamity for them that no one could inflict it upon them but themselves.”

This letter, penned in 1831, can be regarded as the beginning of a long struggle between capitalism and socialism. In a subsequent letter, J. Mill attributes the teachings of socialism to Hodgskin’s “mad nonsense” and adds: “These opinions, if they were to spread, would amount to a subversion of civilized society, worse than the devastating invasions of the Huns and Tatars.”

Socialism, as a political and economic doctrine, does not pertain to the history of philosophy. However, in the hands of Karl Marx, socialism acquired a philosophical foundation. His philosophy will be examined in the next chapter.





Über den Autor

Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.

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Zuletzt geändert: 15/11/2026