The Historical Development of Philosophy

New Philosophy

The Development of Philosophy in the Renaissance (Nicholas of Cusa, Paracelsus, Giordano Bruno)

In the early modern era, philosophical thought began to liberate itself in two distinct ways. On one hand, as new problems arose that sparked philosophical interest, purely theological questions were either relegated to the background or intertwined with broader cosmological issues, allowing philosophy to free itself from the constraints of theology. On the other hand, with the emergence of new scientific perspectives that transcended the horizons of ancient thought, philosophy increasingly distanced itself from the systems of antiquity that had initially dominated the Renaissance. However, this liberation of philosophical thought was not merely a reaction to external influences; rather, it stemmed from the same spirit of the age that prompted these accompanying changes within culture itself. Thus, the signs of free thought emerged not only after the upheaval but often in advance of it as precursors. For instance, in the 13th century, the Franciscan monk Roger Bacon (1214—1292), alongside his notions of inner illumination through which scientific knowledge is granted as divine revelation, proclaimed experience, experimentation, and mathematics as the three foundational pillars of science. This thirst for intellectual independence and the quest for new sources of knowledge became even more pronounced at the beginning of the 15th century, finding vibrant expression in the works of the scholarly cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401—1464). In many cases, this drive was rooted not only in the scientific tradition but also in Platonism and Neoplatonism, influenced by the superstitions of the time, particularly in astrology and alchemy, which flourished during this period and can themselves be seen as symptoms of the desire to discover new sources of knowledge that characterized the dawn of modernity. These pseudosciences, leaving a distinctive mark on the culture of the era, can rightly be termed "sciences of superstition" due to their amalgamation of ancient scientific traditions, fragments of Aristotelian physics, Neoplatonic ideas of emanation, and Eastern mysticism, which had been brought to the West by the Arabs during the Middle Ages, blended with indigenous ancient pagan superstitions. In this kind of blending, despite its wild fantasticality, distinct ideas began to emerge, which, through a gradual clarification, became fertile seeds for the development of a new philosophy. Thus, specific thoughts from this fantastical mysticism of the transitional period found their way into the systems of Spinoza and Leibniz, and even, through later mystics, into the religious-philosophical reflections of the 19th century, especially in the later form of Schelling's philosophy.

A quintessential representative of this mystical trend, which serves as one among many symptoms of the era marking the liberation of thought from the shackles of medieval worldviews, is the German physician Theophrastus Paracelsus (1493—1541). He played a pivotal role in the synthesis of alchemy and astrology that characterizes the spirit of mystical sciences of this time, while simultaneously reforming medicine, liberating it from the bondage of Galenic tradition that had reduced it to a mere craft by advocating for direct observation of nature. In doing so, he articulated numerous general philosophical ideas that significantly influenced subsequent developments. The mystical current in the science of the following century, drawing its foundations from the teachings of ancient mystics such as Meister Eckhart (1260—1327) and his disciples, primarily relied on Paracelsus; through certain theologians and the cobbler Jacob Boehme (1575—1624), whose elevated thoughts, combined with naïve fantasticality, further influenced later epochs.

However, even during this period, the mystical direction gradually receded under the influence of the rapidly expanding horizons that resulted from the great geographical discoveries at the end of the 15th century and the successful development of the natural sciences that began in the early 16th century. During this time, astronomy—the most extensive branch of natural science—captured significant interest. The great work of Copernicus, published in 1543, brought about a substantial upheaval in scientific perspectives, deeply affecting the modern era. Subsequently, by the end of the 16th century, significant progress was noted in physics and observational natural sciences. The influence of this advancement soon became apparent in the formation of philosophical worldviews. In Giordano Bruno (1548—1600), a prominent thinker of this transitional period, one can clearly see the impact of the Copernican system as well as the preceding mysticism and Platonism of the Renaissance.

If we attempt to identify the ideas that emerged during this transitional period as dominant and primarily defining the worldview, which exerted the greatest influence on the later development of philosophical thought, we find three such ideas: the first idea is that of the infinite, boundless unity of the cosmic whole; the second is the idea of the interconnectedness of spirit and nature, along with the related notion of development; and the third is the idea of the autonomy of individual entities and their arrangement in a sequential order from the lowest to the highest. Each of these fundamental ideas of the transitional era is predominantly associated with the name of one of its outstanding thinkers. The notion of infinity permeates the worldview of Nicholas of Cusa; the principle of development is the prevailing idea of Paracelsus; and the idea of the arrangement of beings in a sequential order forms the central theme of Bruno's philosophical thoughts. However, this should not be interpreted as if any one of these ideas exclusively belongs to a single thinker. Already in the philosophy of Cusa, although in an unclear form, one can discern the ideas of organic development and the sequential arrangement of beings, which, of course, only later achieve clarity in formulation. The latter idea, being closely linked to the concept of development, is by no means foreign to Paracelsus. The third of these thinkers, Bruno, embodies the full vigor and daring flight of thought characteristic of the Renaissance, integrating all the ideas of his predecessors with his own insights. Thus, these three core thoughts of the transitional era collectively form a unity that emerges in history, sometimes emphasizing one aspect and at other times another.

At the forefront of these ideas stands the concept of the infinity of the universe. This idea is the most significant among them, having had the deepest influence on subsequent epochs and most clearly highlighting the chasm separating the new worldview from the narrowly confined anthropocentric perspective of the medieval period. However, it is not the Copernican system itself that serves as the foundation of this new worldview, which extends the boundaries of the universe into infinity; rather, it arises from a synthesis of mystical and mathematical speculations, of which Nicholas of Cusa was a representative at that time. His thought is imbued with the idea of infinity. Under its influence, he returns to the ancient Pythagorean notions, which he uniquely transforms, attributing circular motion around a cosmic axis—passing through infinite space—to all celestial bodies, including the Earth and the Sun, alongside all other stars. However, Cusa's assertion that the Earth moves is not a product of astronomical observations or an alternative explanation of observed phenomena; it solely rests on the idea of the world's infinity. According to him, the infinity of the universe precludes the possibility of a center of the world, as in infinite space, each point holds equal significance to another.

In turn, this notion of the spatial infinity of the world, which in Cusanus merges with the idea of the world's creation in time and thus stands in stark contrast to Aristotle's teaching of the spatial finitude and temporal eternity of the universe, is grounded in Cusanus on the postulate of God's infinite omnipotence and perfection. From the Creator's omnipotence flows the necessity for the boundless manifestation of His creative power. Spatial limitation would serve as a limitation of this creative power, and thus a restriction of the Creator's very omnipotence. No less does the absolute perfection of God demand the world's infinity: individual things in the world are imperfect and limited, and this limitation can only be overcome by the infinity of the whole. The perfection of the Creator would become questionable if one were to acknowledge that the product of His creativity is imperfect. In these thoughts, the joyful spirit of the new era already emerges, wherein the Earth is no longer viewed as a vale of tears, but life in this world, perceived as a divine gift, participates alongside the world in the glory of the Divine. Nevertheless, the previously mentioned conception of the infinity and perfection of the universal whole raises the question of the distinction between God and the world; to resolve this question, Cusanus boldly expands the notion of infinity, initially denoting the infinite progress in space; the world is infinite only as a whole; God, however, as the totality of all infinities and perfections, is infinite in every attribute. The world achieves perfection only through the mutual annihilation of the limitations of individual things in their boundless interconnectedness; God is the union of infinitely many attributes, each of which is infinite. Thus, Cusanus ascends to the thought of a higher order of infinity, and he is the first to apply this concept of absolute mathematical transcendence to the transcendent notion of God. In the striving towards the boundless, manifested in the formation of concepts of infinity, as well as in the general tendency to impart mathematical form to concepts, one can discern the defining characteristic of the new era, which has surpassed Aristotle's doctrine of quality.

The second idea of the transitional epoch, the idea of the universal connection between spirit and nature and the idea of development grounded in this connection—progressing from the lowest to the highest forms of existence according to the same laws—finds its expression primarily in Paracelsus, albeit in a form obscured by a mixture of astrological and alchemical notions. All things in the world are akin; the smallest is akin to the greatest, the perfect to the imperfect, and all in the world exists in perpetual development; all, in the words of Paracelsus, is a "developing thing." These two fundamental thoughts are continually articulated by Paracelsus, and with their aid, he attempts to provide a natural philosophical foundation for his cherished mystical sciences. The stars are living beings just like humans, and through the all-encompassing natural laws, they are intimately connected to human life; thus, events occurring in the celestial realm can serve as archetypes for occurrences in the human world. In the alchemical process, elements separate from one another, akin to how this occurs in the natural process of organic growth, in history, and as it will transpire at the end of history on the Day of Judgment. Since everything that happens outside of humanity in the destinies of the human race and the life of the universe is reflected in humanity, humans are the "microcosm," a world in miniature that, through mystical force, is tightly bound to the macrocosm, the world in its vastness.

Whatever unique imprint these views may receive in particulars due to their close connection with superstitions and mystical sciences, nevertheless, beneath the mystical veil lie two significant ideas that have had a fruitful impact on the subsequent development of philosophical thought. The first of these is the idea of the internal homogeneity of beings—when applied to humanity, it results in the concept of the microcosm—a concept that, although not novel in itself, gains new attributes by linking with the Gnostic and Neoplatonic circles of ideas. This connection occurs as a result of its separation from the original idea of emanation and the accompanying conception of the universal laws of nature, allowing it to retain relevance in the new philosophy. The second thought is that of development; Paracelsus appears to approach it from two angles: first, through observations of the development of living beings in general, and second, through observations of diseases, particularly those accompanied by fever, thus allowing him to perceive in illness a living entity and thereby reinforce his ideas of the universal life of things—ideas that he subsequently, wrapped once again in mystical concepts, applied both to the universe as a whole and to humanity and its history. Thus, although in hazy outlines, both the modern idea of the historical development of the cosmos and the idea of the development of humanity, occurring similarly to individual development, emerge in his thought.

The third of the fundamental ideas of this period, the idea of the autonomy of beings and their distribution in a gradual hierarchy, ascending from the lowest to the highest, was already prepared by Paracelsus's notion of development and his doctrine of the similarity of all things. However, this idea received its fullest development in the work of the boldest thinker of the Renaissance, the Italian Giordano Bruno. The world represents a kingdom of entities arranged in a sequential order, each possessing unity and simplicity by its nature and standing in relation to the totality of all others through its position in the hierarchy. Our own soul is also one of these entities, and from it, we draw confidence that all other beings in the universe likewise embody spiritual forces. The highest of these spiritual forces, these monads, as Bruno calls them due to their unity and simplicity, is God, the "monad of monads." The sequential order of beings as a whole is infinite; in this view, Bruno partially aligns with Cusanus's idea of infinity and partially with Paracelsus's notion of the microcosm. The emerging Copernican system of the world provides the basis for his conception of the universe's infinity. He envisions the movement of the Earth not in the Pythagorean form, as Cusanus did, but in the Copernican: the Sun serves as the center of a system consisting of the Earth and other planets. Simultaneously, for the first time, Bruno imparts to Copernicus's thought a broader philosophical significance, intertwining it with the idea of spatial infinity. While Copernicus, still permitting the sphere of fixed stars as a finite boundary of the universe, presented a new system of the world essentially as an astronomical hypothesis, transforming the Ptolemaic system into a heliocentric one, Bruno elevates it to a new worldview, one that secures his influence on the future. Under the influence of this idea of infinity, it is established not only that the Earth is a planet among other planets but also that the Sun represents a fixed star among other fixed stars, thus making Cusanus's audacious idea of the boundlessness of the universe increasingly supported by observational facts. Moreover, the idea of the microcosm in Bruno proves fruitful when applied to his newly established concept of the monad. As he allows for both external contemplation and internal insight, alongside his highly regarded observation of nature, drawing strength from the spiritual connection of our own soul with other beings, he succeeds in reducing the externally proclaimed similarity of phenomena to the internal. In this manner, Bruno uniquely merges the Neoplatonic ideas characteristic of his time with the new scientific orientation. As a monk who fled the monastery, he emerges as one of the vivid representatives of the revived, joyous worldview of this era, and naturally, he transcends Cusanus's theological perspectives in his own views. The mystical notion of God established by the cardinal is foreign to him: the monad of monads, on one hand, exists within the world, even entering the series of beings; on the other hand, as the highest of entities, it stands outside the world. Thus, Bruno's conception of God oscillates between pantheism and theism.

This confluence of perspectives, which would later come to stand in stark opposition to one another, is emblematic of the entire epoch. The dominant ideas of the forthcoming period increasingly assert themselves, albeit more or less clearly, within the worldviews of this time. However, thought here unfolds without a reliable method, driven more by the impulses of imagination than by the demands of logic. As a result, the worldviews of individual thinkers still harbor those elements that would later evolve into distinct contradictions. From the moment these differences arise, a new period begins, characterized primarily by the conflict of oppositions and the successive, one-sided development of ideas. Thus, we can designate this phase as the period of the struggle of worldviews.