The Historical Development of Philosophy

New Philosophy

The General Character of the Renaissance of Sciences

The period of the struggle of worldviews commences with a dispute that, although arising from a distinctly philosophical ground, only holds preliminary significance for the ensuing discord among philosophical directions. This contention ignited between representatives of the new natural sciences, which relied on independent observation and experimental methods, and defenders of the old Aristotelian physics. In this debate, Galileo stands as a notable leader, impartial and unburdened by the mystical inclinations of his time, delivering a mortal blow to Aristotelian metaphysics. However, as the aim of the natural sciences in this struggle was fundamentally to eliminate outdated and ineffective scientific views, this aspect remains preparatory. With the decline of Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy, the philosophical principles that should guide the new era remained undefined. Thus, it became essential for modern philosophy only to require alignment with the transformation of specific sciences. Consequently, the liberation from ancient authority and the recognition of the independent right of observation and impartial thought form a common foundation for emerging directions.

Nevertheless, within the very domain of natural science, which exerts a guiding influence on the newly emerging philosophical orientations, two fundamentally distinct lines of thought coexist, employing two fundamentally different methods, each capable of serving as a starting point for scientific inquiry: empirical observation of natural phenomena on one side, and mathematical abstraction and analysis of these phenomena on the other. The empirical observation and the resultant inductive method are employed with great success in astronomy by Kepler; moreover, this method is zealously applied in the descriptive branches of natural science, among which human anatomy held the foremost position at this time. The deductive method, on the other hand, is employed with brilliant skill in physical investigations by Galileo, under whose hands mechanics—the chief foundation of the new worldview alongside the astronomy reformed by Copernicus and Kepler—transforms into applied mathematics. Both methods of inquiry, the inductive, strictly empirical, and the deductive, abstract and speculative, peacefully coexist within natural science and often alternate within the works of the same investigator, corresponding to the nature of the tasks at hand. This mutual support of both methods is reflected in the friendly relationship that united two outstanding natural philosophers of the time, Kepler and Galileo, who were typifying representatives of the two aforementioned lines of thought.

However, what peacefully coexisted in specific inquiry and whose opposition was often not even consciously recognized, philosophy divides into warring worldviews. The cause of this phenomenon lies in philosophy’s intrinsic striving for rigorous self-knowledge, through which it becomes aware of the oppositions inherent in its employed methods, as well as the relationships in which new perspectives, due to their internal kinship, stand in relation to the old. Where the inductive method prevails, there, due to its close connection with scientific observation, ancient directions such as atomism, which focused primarily on the sensibly perceived course of natural phenomena, gain influence. Conversely, where the inclination is toward mathematical abstraction and deduction, the kinship with speculative investigations inevitably asserts itself, as already manifested in Plato’s union of dialectic concepts with mathematics. Thus, alongside the specific nature of various methods and the general tendency of philosophy towards the one-sided promotion of certain viewpoints, particularly the kinship with ancient worldviews significantly shapes the development of the newly emerging philosophical directions. The struggle of worldviews, whose germinal forms lie already hidden in the various directions of the new science, manifests through its transference into the realm of philosophy; the oppositions intensify to the extent that they are juxtaposed against each other in the nascent attempts to form philosophical systems.

In one regard, however, all these newly emerging, mutually hostile directions agree: they all believe that science will unveil new paths for inquiry that will lead to unexpected results. Therefore, the representatives of these directions vigorously oppose scholasticism and its spiritual leader, Aristotle, particularly against his logic, with no less energy than the great natural philosophers who lived contemporaneously. Although at times the remnants of scholastic tradition and upbringing still echo within them, the new philosophy is especially hostile towards the constraints of thought dominant in Aristotelian philosophy; it seeks to engage in discussions free from the burdens of scientific traditions, even liberated to some extent from the oppression of ecclesiastical dogmas. Yet, even the most liberated thinkers of this period had to pay homage to the religious oppression of their time. The revealed truths of faith are acknowledged by both Bacon and Hobbes, albeit they strive to avoid engaging with them as much as possible; and Descartes frequently assured that he was convinced of the harmony between his teachings and the doctrines of the Church, expressing his willingness to renounce his teachings should such harmony cease—this assurance, becoming a conditional formula of the time, was partly based on sincere belief and partly served as a banner under which philosophy hoped to secure its path to freedom.