Main Philosophical Directions

Ethical Directions

A General Overview of Ethical Directions and Their Development

In the realm of epistemology, pure theoretical interests predominate, while metaphysics encompasses both theoretical and practical concerns; ethics, on the other hand, stands as a genuinely practical philosophical discipline in the truest sense of the term. Due to its practical orientation, ethics complements epistemology on one hand while opposing it on the other. Metaphysics strives to reconcile this opposition where possible. Consequently, theories of knowledge typically influence ethical directions only indirectly through metaphysics, while metaphysical and ethical directions are directly related to one another. Nevertheless, compared to metaphysics, ethical systems attain a relatively more autonomous position than other specialized philosophical disciplines. This is because aspects that play only a secondary role in metaphysics can hold significant ethical interest and thus serve to delineate specific ethical directions. This phenomenon arises from the fact that any metaphysics, no matter how strong its practical tendencies, aspires to be a comprehensive worldview, consequently placing theoretical explanations of general world problems in the foreground. Thus, the character of a metaphysical system is predominantly defined by theoretical perspectives, whereas the character of an ethical direction is determined by the motives or aims from which one seeks to explain the facts of moral life.

With respect to the free volitional acts of human beings, which form the subject of all ethical inquiries, two questions can be posed, the resolution of which ultimately determines the solution to all ethical problems: the first concerns the motives for actions that lie within the individual, while the second pertains to the external results toward which the actions are directed. The internal causes that contribute to the ethical discussion of actions and precede the volitional act—serving as its psychological conditions—are termed the motives of moral action; conversely, the external results are referred to as the aims of moral action, as we speak here only of those results that constitute the object of desire for the agent, i.e., those to which they consciously aspire. The motives and aims of an action determine its moral assessment, which thus remains one-sided and incorrect until both factors are taken into account. In reality, moral motives hold no intrinsic significance unless accompanied by objective aims and corresponding actions; on the other hand, objectively beneficial outcomes of actions can only be regarded as moral if they arise from motives we deem moral.

No matter how closely intertwined the two factors—motives and aims—may actually be, the recognition of their equal importance is achieved only gradually in the development of ethical directions. Often, this recognition is lacking in contemporary systems, which unilaterally favor either the assessment of internal motives or the evaluation of external intended aims. In general, the evolution of ethical directions begins with reflections on motives and later progresses to considerations of aims. Ancient ethics, therefore, is entirely preoccupied with the investigation of the motives underlying individual behavior. It thus constitutes, as the constant predominance of moral motives in human personality is referred to as virtue (ἀρετή), a teaching of virtue in the true sense of the word. The question "What is virtue?"—that is, "What should the connection of motives in a person be for them to be deemed moral?"—takes center stage in ancient ethics. In this regard, ancient ethics assumes the evident premise that virtue brings happiness to a person and that objective goods arise from the actions of a virtuous individual; however, the nature of these goods is not a specific focus of study in ancient ethics. This is easily explained by the fact that life goods and the external norms of conduct regulating their production are considered given within religion, morals, and law. Conversely, the question of what a person ought to be in order to contribute fruitfully to the production of these universally recognized goods emerges very early in history and finds expression long before the development of scientific ethics, manifesting in maxims and rules, for example, in the sayings of the Seven Sages in Greece. Much later—due to changes in moral outlook—questions regarding the objective significance of moral norms themselves begin to arise. The aims toward which such norms are directed or against which they seek to prevent are examined based on their value. The good is no longer seen as a self-evident goal of moral actions; questions about its essence and the source of its value arise. This, in general, represents the perspective of modern ethics in its main directions. The question "What is virtue?" either disappears entirely or, in any case, is relegated to the background. Conversely, the primary ethical interest focuses on the question "What is the moral good?" Thus, contemporary ethics is predominantly a "theory of goods." The greater complexity of the fundamental question of modern ethics corresponds to a greater variety of its recent ethical directions, which is further increased by the influence of ancient ethics, as the concept of virtue and the ethical problems primarily delineated by Greek philosophy in connection with this concept have also been carried into modern scholarship.

In its reflections on the essence of virtue, ancient ethics directly engages with pre-scientific consciousness. For the latter, the moral is perceived as an external force, manifested for individuals in specific, imposed moral commandments. These acquire obligation primarily in two forms: as religious prescriptions and state norms. To these is added the domain of customs as an indeterminate and generally unclear sphere. This state of affairs persists even at the time when science emerged, initially occupied exclusively with cosmological questions, while ethical issues were left unaddressed: the moral forces, as they present themselves to humanity in religion, law, and customs, are accepted as given, and the question of their origin never arises. The virtuous individual is one who obeys these forces; however, an even higher degree of virtue is achieved by one who sacrifices their own personality for these forces, such as the pious person who honors the gods more than required, or the courageous individual who sacrifices themselves for the state or renders eternal service to it. It is thus evident that reflections on the moral primarily focus on the various fulfillments by individuals of established moral norms. The question "What is virtue?" resolves itself from the notion of behavior conforming to the norm, in its various shades from mere adherence to external commandments to the fulfillment of voluntarily accepted duties. Therefore, all ethics begins with heteronomous morality; moral norms are regarded as given from without, and human behavior, its virtue, is evaluated purely externally in relation to norms seen as objective forces. This heteronomous morality also dominates the initial attempts at philosophy. It is reflected in the fact that morality, in general, has not yet become a subject of philosophical reflection; rather, only isolated rules of practical wisdom or religious beliefs are considered, which have no connection to theoretical contemplation of matters.

This accounts for the fact that the emergence of scientific ethics coincides with the sudden awareness of the heteronomy of moral prescriptions, alongside the nascent realization that only humanity itself can be the author of such prescriptions. This crucial advancement in Greece was initiated by sophistry, which fundamentally undermined the naive conception upon which ancient morality relied—the belief that religion, law, and the state are objective forces to which individuals must submit. Thus, it definitively removed the long-dominant heteronomous morality from the scene. By recognizing humans as creators of religion, customs, and law, sophistry primarily eroded the very foundation of morality itself, viewing ethics as an arbitrary product subject to the free will of the individual. This dismantling of morality, previously based on naive faith, was historically necessary to clear the way for the free ethical self-recognition that required, above all, the understanding that moral norms arise from human nature. This insight allowed for the transition from heteronomous morality to autonomous morality, and from there to scientific ethics. Such a transition was realized by Socrates, whose action holds immense significance and represents perhaps the most monumental event in the realm of philosophy: with it, Socrates introduced a discipline into philosophy that is essential for any worldview. Yet, it is important to note that Socrates took this step hoping to protect the traditional norms of good old morals from the destructive tendencies of sophists, which is why elements of the original heteronomous morality could not completely vanish from his views. By referring to written state laws and unwritten divine laws, he directly alludes to two objective forces that represent the main sources of heteronomous morality: law and religion. However, the novelty of Socrates' ethical views lies not in judgments that repeat traditional opinions, but in his reduction of virtue to knowledge, and knowledge to self-awareness, thus making the individual the creator of virtue. Yet, he understands this not as the individual, as sophistry would, but as humanity, as a being that recognizes universal laws. According to his teaching, the foundation of morality is not the external adherence to moral prescriptions, but the understanding of their necessity. Although the perspective of naive reflection, still inherent in the initial formulation of autonomous ethics, primarily views humans as purely cognitive beings, it is significant that it identifies the source of moral behavior in human consciousness. Nevertheless, within Socratic questioning and resolution, boundaries emerge that ancient ethics could not surpass. The question of the essence of virtue remains the singular problem of Socratic ethics. What constitutes the good in an objective sense? Why is a certain action moral based on its external outcome while another is not? This remains wholly unresolved. The concept of moral good is assumed to be realized: morality is rooted in universally acknowledged norms; this is the meaning of Socrates' reference to state and divine laws. Socratic ethics is, in fact, autonomous only from a subjective standpoint, in understanding virtue as a capability arising from human nature. However, regarding the goods that play a role as objects of virtue, it remains heteronomous.

By establishing a positive criterion for virtue not in the subjective influence of actions but in the immediate objective impact of the acting individual, the ethical systems of Socrates' two greatest followers, Plato and Aristotle, approach the ethical doctrine of goods, which owes its ultimate establishment mainly to more recent times. At the same time, these systems create a new opposition to each other, which has been decisive for the further development of ethics. This opposition is founded on differing understandings of the essence of virtue, leading to varying relations to the concept of good. For Plato, virtue is grounded in the innate properties of the soul, which arise from the soul's relation to the world of ideas, particularly to the highest, foundational idea concerning the notion of virtue, the idea of the good. Thus, Platonic virtue rests on the direct relation of the soul to the supersensible world; his ethics, while autonomous as it arises from the inherent nature of the human soul, is also transcendent and marks the transition from heteronomous to autonomous morality, since the transcendent ideal of virtue is conceived by Plato as a norm lying beyond the sensual human. In contrast, Aristotle, in accordance with his metaphysical understanding of the union of form and matter, considers virtue entirely as an inherent property of the human soul. Moreover, he is the first not merely to assume it as an innate capacity of the soul but to attempt to derive it from the nature of universally significant human affections. Thus, he arrives at an immanent morality, which is entirely autonomous, having wholly shed its heteronomous character.

Thus, ancient ethics, having reached the pinnacle of its development, has already proposed three main ethical directions, around which all moral systems revolve: heteronomous, transcendent, and immanent. The latter two directions, first emerging in the great systems of ancient philosophy, have differentiated into various forms in modern philosophy, primarily under the influence of the aforementioned transition from a doctrine of virtue to a doctrine of goods—this transition has given modern ethics its distinctive character. This shift depends on the same circumstances that, in antiquity, prompted reflection on ethical questions. The philosophy of the Renaissance, increasingly transcending religious and moral norms that had until then been regarded as inviolable, seeks to account for the origins of all that had previously been considered a legacy sanctified by tradition. It raises the question of the emergence of moral norms in exactly the same sense as the question of the origins of the state and legal order, religion, and culture. Thus, the previous question, "What is virtue?" gives way to another: "What is morality itself, and what purposes does it serve?" The possibility of various answers to this question generates a multitude of diverse ethical teachings, sometimes markedly divergent in their tendencies. Hence, the philosophy of the Renaissance occupies a similar position in the history of modern ethics as sophistry did in ancient ethics. If sophistry, with its subjectivism, imparted to ancient ethics a predominantly subjective character regarding the doctrine of virtue, the philosophy of the Renaissance, with its more universal interests directed primarily toward the objective world, from the outset ascribes to the new ethics, mainly, the character of an objective doctrine of goods, in which the formerly prevailing notion of virtue assumes a secondary and dependent role, bearing greater significance for practical morality than for ethical theory itself.