Main Philosophical Directions

Ethical Directions

Heteronomous Moral Systems

Although, as previously noted, scientific ethics primarily began with the development of autonomous systems, heteronomous morality has not completely vanished from the realm of science. Wherever profound shifts occur in worldviews, where prevailing perspectives have outlived their usefulness and the foundations of new understandings have yet to be established, heteronomous morality often emerges as a critical symptom, akin to skepticism in epistemology. This skepticism is related to heteronomous morality in that it frequently highlights the necessity of supplementing knowledge with faith. Another significant aspect that lends particular weight to the emergence of heteronomous views in the history of ethics is the recognition that acknowledgment of the autonomous origin of moral norms, in its extreme forms, inherently leads to the acceptance of their heteronomy. Thus, we find a peculiar, nature-grounded "coincidentia oppositorum." If moral autonomy is understood as the subjective volition of an individual or a specific cultural society acting in common interests, then such autonomy becomes heteronomy for any other individual or for another society outside of the one that has established an autonomous law. If a person were indeed the creator of the norms they follow in their actions, the law that is autonomous for them would be heteronomous for any other person; even ultimately, this law would be heteronomous for themselves, as they could replace it at any moment with another. Absolute volition leads to the dominance of chance, whims that hang over the individual as an external force capable of imposing a new and unexpected law at any moment. Thus, in reality, sophistry provided a decisive impetus for ethical reflection by substituting subjective autonomy of will—unconstrained by any norms—for the original heteronomy of objective customs. This autonomy essentially represents the heteronomy of whim. Therefore, a truly autonomous morality must ground its norms in the true nature of humanity, rather than in the arbitrary will of an individual subject. This shift from subjective volition to the demand for universal significance is exemplified by Socrates, who thereby becomes the founder of autonomous ethics.

In the subsequent development of ethics, the emergence of heteronomous morality generally characterizes a critical transitional state—a condition in which the previously existing foundations of autonomous morality and their associated worldviews cease to satisfy people, while new ones have yet to be established. In this context, later heteronomous systems typically differ from heteronomous ethics in its original pre-scientific form in that they do not rely, as the latter did, on various sources such as religion, law, customs, and traditions, but rather recognize a single, specific type of external norm as primary. The derivation of all norms from a singular source, characteristic of theory rather than reality, renders later heteronomous systems products of ethical reflection. Among all obligatory norms imposed on individuals from outside, only two types particularly attract attention: religious prescriptions and state laws; thus, they are primarily considered as sources of morality. In this regard, such origins may either affirm its significance or serve as a pretext for its dismissal. Therefore, heteronomous moral systems can be categorized into two types: those where morality derives its significance from religious prescriptions, and those that rely on state laws; both can embody conservative or revolutionary ethical tendencies, depending on the circumstances. Exclusively religious ethics, in and of themselves, are heteronomous. One might reasonably question whether religion can be sufficiently defined if it is understood, along with Kant, as "the understanding of moral laws as divine commandments"; yet it cannot be doubted that any religion comprehends moral laws as divine commandments. Consequently, moral systems with a sharply defined religious tendency invariably exhibit a heteronomous character and emerge in such times and directions that concurrently give rise to a mystical skepticism rooted in similar foundations. Thus, at the inception of Christian philosophy, heteronomous religious morality predominantly prevails. Later, it either recedes to the background or, following the acceptance of Aristotle's doctrine of virtue, intertwines with elements of autonomous morality within scholasticism; however, at the decline of the latter, in scholastic nominalism, it again unilaterally opposes teachings permeated by secular interests. Ultimately, once more, the orthodox theological direction of the eighteenth century, in its struggle against free thought, decisively advanced the heteronomous perspective: the so-called theological English utilitarianism asserts that moral norms are contingent in their content; their value and significance rely solely on the fact that they are divine commandments.

Political heteronomous morality has appeared less frequently in history than religious morality. Nevertheless, it has twice played a crucial role as a companion to political revolutions: once as a reaction to the English revolution of the seventeenth century in the ethics of Thomas Hobbes, linked to a politically conservative direction; and again in the philosophy that preceded the French revolution of the eighteenth century, connected to revolutionary tendencies and, consequently, to the demand for a substantial "re-evaluation" of prevailing notions of moral value. A related current is represented by the period of "Sturm und Drang" in German literature, as well as the first phase of Romanticism. Elements of this phenomenon are partly echoed in our contemporary literature. All these instances of the emergence of heteronomous ethics have elicited a decisive reaction from the self-consciousness of the "I" against all externally imposed norms. This reaction may manifest either a cynical-egoistic character, as in the case of Max Stirner, or it may aim at creating the ideal of an infinitely free individual, as in Friedrich Nietzsche's "morality of masters." However, this ideal rests on the presupposition that moral laws are not immanent—contrary to the laws of intellect and the nature of humanity—but are arbitrarily established by the individual and therefore can be arbitrarily changed at any moment. This direction, partly arising from the striving for new ideals and values highly characteristic of recent developments in art and science, and partly stemming from the intrinsic human inclination to foreground the autonomy of one’s will, evidently encompasses elements of both religious and political heteronomy: it aspires to a "re-evaluation of all values." As such, in these systems, the sources of norms prevalent during a particular period primarily derive from either religious motivations or political and social ones, thus shifting the center of gravity between religious and political heteronomy.

The isolation of morality from the totality of all spiritual products inherent to humanity presents a shortcoming in every heteronomous morality. It adopts a quasi-naïve perspective on moral problems similar to the emerging reflection with which sophistry, adhering to its strictly established subjectivism, systematically considered all universal products of human spirit, including society and language, morality, and religion. The sophists regarded as natural and original only that which an individual possesses solely by themselves, independent of their relations to others. They perceived society and its products as something artificial, constructed. In essence, they viewed all universal products of human communal life in the same manner as the most primitive among them: language. However, it would be absurd to acknowledge that language arose through agreement, as the latter already presupposes the existence of language; thus, it is impossible to concede that society, family, customs, and morality arose arbitrarily and could be arbitrarily eliminated or altered at any moment. Rather, they are products of development or gradual transformation that, in their most general outlines, are free from encroachment by individual human will, much like the norms of our logical thinking or the laws of sensations, feelings, and affects. In all these domains, will operates freely within its designated boundaries, just as it does within the realm of inherited language. Yet, none of these aspects of communal life can be created out of nothing or arbitrarily transformed into nothing with the intent of reconstructing them in a new form. Such perspectives, based on a false recognition of the absolute autonomy of the individual in relation to society, stem from a lack of understanding of the truth articulated by Aristotle—the first founder of both autonomous and immanent morality—namely, that humanity is "zoon politikon," and that social life, in its development, adheres to certain laws on par with individual life. Naturally, these truths have been subjected to misinterpretation during periods of intense political, religious, or social upheaval. In times when traditional forms of social life are severely disrupted, individuals may easily adopt the belief that they are entirely left to their own devices. They perceive inherited cultural forms as alien external norms against which they can oppose their own; in doing so, they overlook the new forms into which social life unfolds without their participation. Thus, all these views rest on a misconception that arises from the close relationship between morality and will, as if science relates to the laws of activity in a fundamentally different manner than it does to the laws of knowledge. Consequently, ethics cannot develop and explain the laws of moral behavior as logic does concerning the laws of thought; instead, it must create them anew.