German Classical Philosophy

Hegel's Philosophy: Method and System

A prominent figure in German classical philosophy was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel criticizes Kant for opposing the “thing-in-itself” to the “thing-for-us,” and for the agnosticism that arises in Kant not only from the process of knowledge, in which the subject seemingly “imposes” a priori forms of sensibility and reason upon the object, but also from the opposition between subject and object. Hegel, on the other hand, begins from the identity of the subject and the object. In his view, the real world—nature, humanity, society—represents the alienation of the absolute idea, the absolute spirit. An object, a phenomenon, possesses being and truth only insofar as it embodies the idea. We call a true friend one whose actions align with the concept of friendship. Likewise, a true state is one that embodies the idea of the state, while a poor state is one where the idea of the state has not found real manifestation. “Reality that does not correspond to the concept is merely a phenomenon, subjective, contingent, arbitrary, and not truth.” “Being has only that which embodies the idea.” However, it is important to note that when Hegel speaks of the coincidence of the essence of things with the concept of ideas, he does not refer to the subjective concept contained in our minds, but to the “absolute concept” of the absolute spirit.

Yet in this regard, Hegel is not original; he essentially repeats Plato with his world of ideas and the real world as a shadow of the world of ideas. The distinction between Hegel and Plato lies in their understanding of the world of ideas and the absolute spirit. For Plato, the world of ideas is eternal, unchanging, perfect. In Hegel's view, the absolute idea, the absolute spirit, is itself subject to change and development. In its development, the absolute idea undergoes three stages. The first stage is the development of the idea within itself, in the realm of pure, superhuman, absolute thought. The second stage involves the alienation of the absolute idea in nature, where the idea manifests “in the form of alienation.” In nature, dialectics reveals itself in a limited form, as unfolding rather than development in the proper sense of the word. “We must regard nature as a system of stages,” Hegel writes, “each of which necessarily follows from the other and is the nearest truth to that from which it has emerged, although there is no natural, physical process of generation here; there is only generation within the inner idea that constitutes the basis of nature. Only the concept as such undergoes metamorphosis, as only its changes represent development.” The third stage is the alienation of the idea of itself in society, in human history, where the idea finds itself, becomes aware of itself through humanity, and thereby returns to itself.

The concept of dialectics is most fully articulated by Hegel in his work Science of Logic. In Hegel’s system, logic plays a leading role. He understands logic not merely as the science of the forms of human thought, but as objective logic—the science of the forms and laws governing the development of the world itself, since the world is rational. The rationality of the world, in turn, is conditioned by the presence of the world spirit, the absolute spirit. Thus, in Science of Logic, Hegel reveals to us the dialectics of the absolute spirit. But how does the development of reason manifest itself, both human and absolute? Undoubtedly, in concepts when it pertains to human reason, and in categories when it pertains to absolute reason. The development of the absolute spirit is expressed in its unfolding through a system of categories, which subsequently serve as forms of thought.

Kant, as previously mentioned, distinguished four groups of categories of reason, given to us a priori as forms of our thinking. But what does a priori mean? What does it signify—given prior to experience? Innate? Produced by culture and assimilated by each individual in the process of education? Kant never explains this. They are simply given, and that is all. He does not elucidate their genesis. Hegel, however, is convinced otherwise. The categories themselves, the very forms of thought, are historical and represent the sum result of development. Therefore, in Hegel, all categories are not merely juxtaposed but arise from one another, interdependent, forming a unified system.

In Science of Logic, Hegel not only creates a system of interdependent categories but also unveils the very mechanism of development, formulating three fundamental laws of dialectics: the law of unity and struggle of opposites, the law of the transition from quantitative to qualitative change, and the law of negation of the negation. Each of these laws serves its own function within the dialectical system. The law of unity and struggle of opposites reveals to us the cause of development; the law of transition from quantity to quality illustrates the mechanism of the emergence of the new; the law of negation of the negation elucidates the interconnection of the old and the new, and the overall direction of development.

In Hegel's view, the cause, the source of the development of the absolute spirit, should be sought in the spirit itself, in the contradiction inherent in each concept, in its one-sidedness, which compels it (the concept) to transition into its opposite. Thus, in Science of Logic, Hegel begins with the most abstract, definitionally impoverished concept of pure being. However, the concept of “pure being” contains a contradiction: on one hand, it is being; on the other hand, it is, in essence, equivalent to nothing, indistinguishable from nothing, because if it were to differ from nothing, it would already be a determinate being and lose its meaning. But this inherent contradiction of pure being, where being transitions into nothing and nothing transitions into being, engenders a new category—becoming. Here, being serves as the thesis. Nothing is the antithesis, and becoming is the synthesis. This famous Hegelian triad is the mechanism through which all development occurs. In becoming, in turn, two oppositions are contained: destruction—the transition from being to nothing—and emergence—the transition from nothing to being. The struggle of these two principles in becoming leads to the existing, determinate being, which is already quality. The existing being contains within itself its oppositions: something and another, and so forth. Thus, the absolute spirit unfolds itself in a system of categories, each of which seems to be generated by the previous one and serves as the foundation for the emergence of the next.

The law of the transition from quantitative changes to qualitative ones elucidates the passage from one quality to another. According to Hegel, every phenomenon is characterized by its qualitative and quantitative attributes, which, in their unity, constitute the measure of that phenomenon. The process of development manifests as a synthesis of quantitative and qualitative changes, embodying a unity of gradualness, continuity, and discontinuity—a leap. While changes occur within the bounds of measure, they unfold gradually and continuously. For instance, heating water from 0 °C to 100 °C occurs without interruption, progressively, without altering the water's quality as a liquid; it merely makes it warmer or colder. However, should the temperature exceed these limits, water undergoes a leap, transforming into ice or steam, disrupting the continuity. "Any birth and any death," Hegel asserts, "is not a prolonged gradualness; rather, it signifies an interruption of such gradualness and a leap from quantitative change to qualitative."

The law of the negation of the negation reveals the interconnection between the old and the new while illustrating the overarching direction of development. In the process of transition from one quality to another, there inevitably occurs a negation of the preceding quality. Thus, from Hegel's perspective, any development contains an element of negation. Yet, he argues, this negation is not a mere, negative rejection; it is not simply the annihilation of the old quality. To characterize dialectical negation, Hegel employs the term "aufheben," which in German encompasses both the moment of removal and cancellation as well as that of preservation. Consequently, in the act of negation, a concept, object, or phenomenon is not simply dismissed but rather transformed into a new quality, elevated to a higher level, inheriting all positive aspects from its predecessor. Development, therefore, does not follow a straight line nor a closed circle but rather spirals, wherein the second negation appears to return to the original state, albeit on a qualitatively new foundation.

The development of spirit in itself represents merely the initial stage of evolution, when "it is only spirit in itself." From the outset, it strives to become spirit for itself, to comprehend itself. To achieve this, it must become other, to separate itself, embodying itself in nature. In this separation, the true freedom of spirit reveals itself, as it liberates itself as nature, objectifying itself within it. However, nature, although comprising "a system of strata, each of which necessarily follows from the other," does not imply that the higher is physically generated by the lower. Dialectics pertains solely to the idea, not to physical nature, which merely unfolds. Nature embodies dialectics only insofar as it contains the idea, within which spirit detaches itself on the path to self-knowledge. Thus, the layers of nature are but stages in the development of spirit, not stages in the evolution of physical nature itself. These are stages of spirit's development in the form of the other, in the form of otherness. Here, spirit manifests in the guise of objective spirit, opposing the subjective spirit of the absolute idea.

Nature serves as a necessary step towards human spirit and human consciousness, through which the absolute idea returns to itself, recognizes itself. In this moment, spirit stands before us "as that which is in itself and for itself," as a unity of objectivity and ideality, as absolute spirit. Here, human spirit essentially retraces the path of spirit's development in itself, in the realm of pure spirit. The history of human knowledge is an applied logic, as it replicates the journey of spirit in itself. The history of philosophy, within which, according to Hegel, spirit emerges in its adequate form, attests that human reason evolves according to the same laws as "pure" reason, and throughout the history of philosophy, the same system of categories emerges as presented in the "Science of Logic." Hence, truth appears before us not as finished, but as developing and changing. In science and philosophy, there are no absolute truths or absolute errors; each truth contains both a kernel of the absolute and a seed of the relative, which must be discarded in the course of development. One of the main reasons for Kant's agnosticism, according to Hegel, lies in his non-dialectical approach to the process of cognition, truth, and the system of categories wherein human thought is realized. Indeed, Hegel himself enters into contradiction when he proclaims his philosophical system as the pinnacle of philosophical thought, an assertion that the spirit has come to know itself, thus concluding the process of self-realization.

To summarize Hegel's doctrine of dialectics, his own words serve best: "Dialectics is... the driving soul of any scientific unfolding of thought and embodies the principle that infuses into the content of science an immanent connection and necessity, just as it contains the true and not the external elevation above the finite." Dialectics "is, in general, the principle of any movement, any life, and any activity in reality."

Among the most significant ideas of Kant and Hegel regarding social life is the concept of the rule of law and the idea of the historicity of society. The views of Kant and Hegel on society were profoundly influenced by the French Revolution on one hand and the realities of the Prussian monarchy in which they lived and acted on the other.

Kant's idea of the rule of law emerges, as previously indicated, from his teaching on morality, from his assertion that a person must always be regarded as an end, not merely as a means. Freedom, for Kant, is an inherent and inalienable right of humanity. Equally inalienable is the right to equality. Although Kant's understanding of both freedom and equality is somewhat limited, denying the impoverished a say in collective matters, his notion of human rights and the rule of law was progressive for its time.

Hegel, too, views the state as "the reality of moral idea." However, unlike Kant, he approaches society and the state historically. History, in Hegel's view, "is the progress of the consciousness of freedom," and the state itself is a product of the historical development of society. The ideal state is a constitutional monarchy. The state represents the overcoming of the extremes of individualism and collectivism. Within the state, these oppositions are dialectically transcended on a moral foundation.