The Task and System of Philosophy

The Task of Philosophy

Definitions of Philosophy

The divergence regarding the problems of philosophy and their resolutions commences at the very outset of this discipline with the question: What is philosophy, in essence? This query is addressed quite differently by philosophers themselves. Plato defines philosophy as "the knowledge of being" or "the eternal and unchanging." Aristotle perceives it as the investigation of "the causes and principles of things." Leibniz characterizes it as a studium sapientiae, likening it to a tree, with metaphysics— the science of principles— as its root and various branches representing the specialized fields of knowledge. Fichte refers to philosophy as "the science of science," indicating that it is not merely a universal science but also a prerequisite for all specialized knowledge. Hegel, finally, describes philosophy simply as "the thoughtful contemplation of objects," a phrase suggesting that empirical investigation of facts should be excluded from philosophy and that it consists in the movement of pure thought. In contrast, Herbart emphasizes the necessity of preliminary work from other sciences for philosophy, considering the "processing of concepts" to be its essential task. He envisions this processing as a means to eliminate contradictions that are inevitably present in concepts commonly used both in life and in specialized scientific inquiries. To these definitions, we may also add that of Auguste Comte, who, despite his fundamentally different viewpoint from the others mentioned, playfully refers to philosophy as a discipline specializing in the study of scientific generalizations.

If the provided definitions of philosophy, despite their differences, converge in their essential aim to ensure that philosophy, in contrast to the specialized sciences, encompasses the entirety of human knowledge, the second, opposing trend manifests itself predominantly in English empirical philosophy, which seeks to limit the task of philosophy to general inquiries closely aligned with psychology regarding the emergence and conditions of knowledge, as well as the motives and goals of human actions. While proponents of the first direction strive to give philosophy the most universal character, often placing it at the forefront of all sciences, representatives of the second current, following in the footsteps of Locke and Hume, conversely see its task as the development of theories concerning knowledge and ethics, through which philosophy ought to assist science and life more as a servant than as a ruler. Closely related to the second trend is another direction that allows for the existence of philosophy as a universal science while simultaneously restricting its domain to those fields of knowledge that seek foundational explanations in the facts of human consciousness. From the perspective of representatives of this latter direction, philosophy should be defined as the universal science of the spirit, with the goal of establishing the relationship between psychology and the historical and systematic sciences of the spirit. Discussions of natural science problems should lie entirely outside its realm and be relegated to natural science itself or to the general study of nature. Proponents of this view include psychologists such as Eduard Beneke and, more recently, F. Lippe.

While the aforementioned trends, despite their differences, ultimately converge in understanding the task of philosophy as theoretical—wherein its resolution complements and expands the domains of other sciences—there exists, from ancient times, yet another approach whereby the problem of philosophy is regarded more as practical, bearing little resemblance to theoretical investigations or utilizing them merely as ancillary aids. According to the representatives of this direction, philosophy is not a theory of science but a teaching about the goods of life. Its realm is not the world of knowledge, but the world of goods. What is good, rather than what is true, is the cardinal question around which philosophy revolves. The relationship of philosophy to other sciences is inherently embedded within these two questions.

This practical understanding of philosophy is at least as ancient as the theoretical; it may even be older if we consider the semi-mythical tradition of the Greeks, wherein the history of Greek philosophy begins with the sayings of the Seven Sages. These sayings contain no theoretical teachings but rather life rules and judgments concerning those goods that imbue life with meaning and significance. Later, the practical significance of philosophy is highlighted in Socrates, contrasting with the preceding cosmological trend. Under Socratic influence, this practical direction weaves its way through the entirety of subsequent Greek philosophy, at times as a predominant trend, at others as a complement to the theoretical. Similarly, it has never completely vanished from modern thought. In the German philosophy of the eighteenth century, the term "world wisdom" was particularly favored to describe philosophy, understood as a practical contemplation of the world that emphasizes the correct critical examination of life's goods. In recent history, a similar trend has emerged, albeit in a different guise: not in world wisdom in the sense of the eighteenth century, nor in reflective teachings on virtues and derived prescriptions for action, but in the proper evaluation of the worthiness of existence itself and its individual goods. This direction often encompasses a tendency to reform prevailing views. In this context, Schopenhauer and subsequently F. Nietzsche, or from another perspective, Lotze, perceive the problem of philosophy as simultaneously theoretical and practical, evidently attributing greater significance to the latter. Ultimately, some contemporary philosophers and theologians attempt to define philosophy, drawing on the practical aspects of the teachings of Kant and Fichte, as a study of goods or values.

However, the two directions—theoretical and practical—are not in absolute opposition to each other. This is first revealed in the fact that the most influential systems in the history of philosophy simultaneously pursue both aims: they aspire to be scientific systems while also striving to create a satisfactory worldview that accurately assesses life and its goods. Prominent among these is the philosophy that has profoundly influenced subsequent times—Plato’s. It provides a comprehensive unity to the scientific system of its era; at the same time, its ultimate goal is to cultivate a worldview that elevates humanity above needs and worldly tribulations while simultaneously satisfying religious longings. In all the great systems from Aristotle to Kant and Hegel, one can observe this dual purpose. When examining these objectives, unified within any philosophical system, one might assert that although philosophical trends significantly diverge in defining the task of philosophy, there is scarcely ever any doubt regarding its ultimate aim. This aim lies in the development of a comprehensive worldview that must satisfy the requirements of our reason and the needs of our soul. Whether philosophy is regarded as a scientific system existing in its own right or as the ultimate culmination of knowledge amassed in specialized sciences; whether its task is confined to exploring general psychological foundations of knowledge and action or defined as the "study of goods," the "science of value"—this dual aim of philosophical inquiry persists in its essential characteristics. No matter how purely theoretical one attempts to comprehend the problem of philosophy, the question of its practical significance inevitably arises during the resolution process. Conversely, regardless of how strong the inclination to reduce the significance of the philosophical problem to its practical aspect, the very evaluation of value requires justification, which in turn must rest upon universal theoretical presuppositions.

The fact that, despite the agreement among all philosophical schools regarding the purpose of philosophy, they diverge significantly in defining its task, stems from two fundamental causes: first, the historical conditioning to which philosophy, like all other sciences, is subjected, and second, the universality of its aim, which is tied to its inherent ambiguity. These two causes mutually reinforce each other, as the universality of purpose amplifies the influences that shifts in historical conditions exert on philosophical perspectives.

In each historical period, opposing aspirations arise, expressing themselves in divergent and often conflicting worldviews. Thus, the struggle of worldviews is an inevitable process accompanying the historical development of philosophy, gaining far greater significance for it than disputes concerning specific problems within individual fields of science.

The dual conditioning of philosophical issues, dependent on the historical evolution of scientific knowledge and the shifting practical perspectives on life, is evident from our formulation of philosophy’s objectives, which encompass two aims: the theoretical, purely intellectual pursuit rooted in our reason's desire for unity and coherence of knowledge, and the practical, pertaining to the sensuous aspects of our inner lives and striving towards a worldview that aligns with our subjective desires. Given that these two motives—logical and ethical—converge here, it is clear that at certain times, one may take precedence, while at others, the other may emerge, or they may even confront each other simultaneously. Under such conditions, various perspectives on the essence of philosophy and its content can emerge. Indeed, the ethical motive frequently encroaches upon the theoretical examination of matters, drawing it into the fray of competing worldviews. Although it may adopt external forms that are, in part, subject to the changing tides of time, its essential properties remain relatively unaffected by temporal influences. Conversely, the logical motive undergoes considerable transformation; frequently relegated to the background by practical tendencies, it persistently re-emerges amidst them. For if philosophy aims to be a universal system of knowledge, it must maintain continuous relations with the overarching content of the individual sciences, which evolve in tandem with both the general progress of knowledge and the fluctuating interests that stimulate curiosity towards various domains of understanding. These relationships inevitably influence the contemporary interpretation of philosophy. Thus, our conception of philosophy emerges as a product of two factors: one rooted in the overall state of sciences at a given time, expressing itself in the theoretical task of philosophy, and the other existing within the broader historical conditions that shape ethical perspectives on life at that time and the views of individual philosophers. The first factor is naturally common to all philosophical systems of a specific period, even as they may reflect its scientific nature with varying nuances; over time, it transforms, developing alongside the overall advancement of scientific knowledge. The second factor, conversely, possesses a certain timeless quality; it invariably divides philosophical perspectives into conflicting directions, which, in particular periods, depending on the state of culture, acquire their unique character. Thus, on one hand, in the continuous development of philosophical worldviews, and on the other, in their eternal struggle over universal questions concerning the meaning and value of life, the dual relationship of philosophy to the entirety of spiritual interests is expressed: its relation to science and its relation to life. Typically, one or the other relationship takes precedence, often depending on the conditions of the time. Generally, the influence of the state of scientific development on philosophical tasks is more straightforward and clear-cut, and it predominantly leaves its mark on the historical evolution of philosophy. In contrast, the influence of the overall state of culture on philosophy is most apparent in its dependency on prevailing practical worldviews and their various orientations: religious, social, and political phenomena, which exist in diverse relations to one another, impart a mutable character to the dominant philosophical perspectives.

The dual relationship of philosophy to human spiritual interests is also reflected in two very distinct designations of philosophy: the science of sciences and the doctrine of goods. As the science of sciences or universal science, philosophy plays a significant role in the development of scientific knowledge. Here, its concept is exclusively defined through the logical demarcation of its tasks from those of other sciences. As the doctrine of goods, philosophy takes a principal role in shaping perspectives on moral life; in this capacity, philosophy—as it always aspires to be a science, thus remaining in harmony with the general scientific consciousness—primarily seeks to delineate the mutual relationship between scientific and religious consciousness. For ordinary consciousness, religion precedes the valuation of life and its goods; thus, philosophy is left with an investigation post factum, which, whether it aligns with the religious worldview or not, inevitably finds itself in relation to it.

Thus, both objectives, always interlinked within the philosophical aspirations of all times, ultimately lead to two questions upon which a comprehensive definition of the philosophical problem is fundamentally based:

How does the task of philosophy relate to scientific tasks in general and especially to the tasks of positive special sciences?

How does philosophy relate to the overarching worldview, particularly to that form which, emerging directly from practical needs, invariably precedes philosophy—namely, religion?