The Task and System of Philosophy
The Task of Philosophy
Historical Overview of Major Attempts at Classification
The classification of sciences is a legitimate task for philosophy. Because classification involves a comparative examination of different fields of knowledge based on their content and method, establishing such a framework cannot be the work of any specialized science alone. Both the concept of philosophy itself and the nature of this specific task evolve over time. In antiquity, the classification of sciences fully coincided with the systematic division of philosophy, as philosophy and science were intimately intertwined. Two notable attempts at the systematic subdivision of philosophy survive from this period. They form the foundation of the two most influential systems of antiquity, the Platonic and the Aristotelian, and can be regarded as frameworks that guided the division of labor within their respective schools. These subdivisions were not explicitly delineated by the philosophers themselves; rather, they are partly implicit in the arrangement of material within their writings and partly conveyed to us through their followers.
Platonic and Aristotelian Foundations in Antiquity
Of these two early classifications, Plato’s is original, while Aristotle’s essentially expands upon it. Plato established a principle that has remarkably endured into modern times: the division of scientific branches according to differences in the spiritual capacities engaged by various problems. These spiritual capacities are three: cognition through concepts, achieved via dialogue or the interplay of questions and answers; sensory perception, through which the natural world is apprehended; and will and desire, which serve as the source of human action and its products. From this, three parts of science emerge: dialectic, physics, and ethics. Plato’s student Speusippus executed this division accurately, and major Platonic dialogues fit neatly within the framework: “Theaetetus,” “Parmenides,” and “Sophist” pertain to dialectic; “Timaeus” and “Phaedo” belong to physics, given Plato’s view of the soul within the natural order; and the “Republic,” “Statesman,” “Philebus,” and “Gorgias” relate to ethics. These three domains are not coordinated as equals, however, because dialectic—belonging to the highest spiritual capacity of the rational mind—prevails over the others. Dialectic therefore permeates the other two sciences, as it alone provides a complete understanding of both nature and the norms of human action.
Undoubtedly, this subdivision of science was already inadequate for the division of labor within the Platonic Academy. If astronomy was not distinguished from physics in this classification, it was likely because cosmological questions held primary importance in Plato’s physics. Ethics and politics also formed a single domain for Plato, as individual virtue acquired its true content through its relation to public life. The main inadequacy of the system appears to be that it makes no provision for mathematics, which, alongside astronomy, was a favored subject in the Platonic Academy. Yet mathematics constitutes a significant component of physics because Plato conceived the cosmos as entirely subject to mathematical laws, while the mathematical method can also be seen as an application of the dialectical method.
In comparison to Plato’s system, Aristotle’s classification is characterized by a more developed division of labor. Indeed, it is difficult to establish a classification that fully corresponds to the philosopher’s views. Although Aristotle’s writings are not lacking in observations regarding the relationships and subdivisions of specific fields of knowledge, these observations do not fully align with each other or with the system delineated within his own works. From this latter standpoint, utilizing the fundamental laws of logical distinction established by the philosopher, we can uncover two guiding principles in his classification.
The first principle entails the division of scientific fields according to the differentiation of spiritual capacities. This represents the Platonic division of sciences along three lines of human spiritual activity: according to the activities of reason, sensory perception, and will and desire—a division that Aristotle also maintains. To this principle, Aristotle adds a second: the classification of sciences based on the objectives pursued by scientific activity. By applying this objective notion of purpose to the Platonic triadic division grounded in the differentiation of subjective spiritual capacities, the latter gives rise to a binary division. Dialectic and physics serve knowledge, whereas ethics aims to unveil the fundamental laws of action. Hence, the former, as theoretical sciences, stand in contrast to the latter as practical ones.
Finally, regarding the specific objectives set by scientific activity, special subdivisions arise within the primary triadic division. As the activity of reason is directed partly at analyzing forms and methods of knowledge and partly at investigating the principles of things themselves, Plato’s dialectic is divided by Aristotle into analytics (later referred to as logic) and metaphysics. Physics, depending on whether its task is to investigate the general order of the world and natural phenomena or vital processes, is divided into physics in the strict sense and the study of the soul (psychology), with the latter, examining a part of the general order of the world, remaining subordinate to physics in the broad sense. However, such a subdivision of sciences in Aristotle intersects fortuitously with another, found in remarks on metaphysics, concerning the order of this philosopher’s writings. According to this classification, physics, as the study of sensibly perceptible things, divides into mathematics, which examines the unmoving and unchanging aspects of these bodies, and physics in the strict sense, which investigates their motions and changes. Both are contrasted with metaphysics as the study of the spiritual principles of things or of the incorporeal and unmovable. Due to its subject matter representing the ultimate foundation of all being and becoming, metaphysics may also be termed theology. In this subdivision, mathematics acts on the one hand as a part of physics, and on the other as a mediating link between it and metaphysics, for in fact, Aristotle discusses mathematical principles also within his metaphysics.
Finally, the division of practical philosophy into special sections according to their objectives holds significant importance in Aristotle’s system. Practical activity, directed outward, divides into action (πραξις), whose goal is the activity of the acting subject itself, and production (ποίησις), which aims at an object to be created. Therefore, practical sciences divide into practical in the strict sense and poetic or artistic sciences. The former, depending on whether the individual or the entire state is the object of study, divide into ethics and politics. Among the poetic sciences, Aristotle’s writings include poetics and rhetoric, the latter of which, however, due to its relation to thought activity, is closely connected with logic, and, in its application to public life, with politics.
Aristotle’s system of sciences shaped the course of scientific development for many centuries, and the division of sciences it contained sustained the dominance of Aristotelian philosophy for an extended period. Logic and metaphysics, physics and psychology, ethics and politics, rhetoric and poetics remained standard disciplines until the 18th century, their study in university education preceding the exploration of specialized sciences. Regarding the division of philosophy in the strictest sense into separate areas, Aristotle’s system has retained its guiding significance in many respects to this day. While physics is now more commonly referred to by the broader term of natural philosophy, the study of philosophy and literary engagement with it continue to be confined to the realms designated for it by the great Greek philosophers.
The Modern Shift Beyond Aristotelian Categories
In contrast, from the dawn of the modern era, a conviction has emerged regarding the inadequacy of this system to meet the demands of specialized fields of knowledge, particularly the rapidly evolving natural sciences. It became entirely impossible to unify the various problems that arose in the 16th and 17th centuries in mechanics, optics, astronomy, geography, and soon also in chemistry, physiology, and the sciences of flora and fauna under a single concept of physics. Furthermore, in other domains of knowledge, Aristotle’s system proved utterly insufficient: it left no room for history, linguistics, and other disciplines. Thus, a new and grand classification arose as an expression of the need felt by the specialized sciences for a more expansive and complete dissection of concepts. This classification was established by Francis Bacon initially in 1605 and later in a more developed form in his work “De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum,” published in 1623. This classification acquired the same canonical significance for the science of the modern age as the Aristotelian framework held for medieval science.
Francis Bacon and the Empirical Classification of Knowledge
Bacon’s division of all major fields of knowledge—though often under different names—and his definition of them by their tasks provided an essential foundation for the modern system of sciences. Moreover, the logical basis of his classification remained intact until the early 19th century. This foundation largely consists of a modified application of the Platonic-Aristotelian principle of segmenting fields of knowledge according to differences in spiritual capacities. However, while this principle held an objective significance in ancient classifications—where areas of knowledge were differentiated by the distinct spiritual activities whose products formed the content of separate sciences—Bacon’s approach renders it entirely subjective. He distinguishes sciences based on the differences in the mental activities we employ to address specific types of problems. Because every scientific endeavor is an intellectual activity, will, desire, and action are by no means functions of knowledge and therefore should not relate to scientific inquiry. Consequently, for Bacon, the criterion for dividing the sciences—which was necessary to distinguish Plato’s ethics from Aristotle’s practical and poetic sciences—loses its significance. In his view, all sciences collectively constitute a “globus intellectualis,” or intellectual world, and each science has its own theoretical task. Only upon resolving this task can one proceed to the practical applications of scientific knowledge.
Valuing such applications highly and recognizing the benefits science provides to life through them, Bacon narrowed Aristotle’s concept of practical sciences by proposing a theoretical foundation for each practical or technical discipline. Conversely, he expanded their scope by allowing for a corresponding practical science for each theoretical discipline, particularly those he termed “philosophical.” Thus, theoretical physics corresponds to technical physics; theoretical chemistry corresponds to technical chemistry; anatomy and physiology correspond to practical medicine; and the theoretical study of human society corresponds to practical politics.
The idea of an all-pervasive relationship between theoretical science and its subordinate, life-applying discipline stands as one of the most fruitful thoughts in Bacon’s system. With brilliant foresight, Bacon infused the opposition between the theoretical and the practical established by Aristotle with a new meaning that assumed fundamental significance for the relationship between science and life in modern scientific knowledge. As a result, the classification of the sciences becomes, for Bacon, a purely theoretical task. Practical areas are linked directly to their corresponding theoretical counterparts, while the foundations for division constitute theoretical problems. Bacon selected as these foundations the mental capacities we employ in addressing scientific questions; naturally, these could only be theoretical capacities, namely intellectual activities of various kinds. Thus, the question of classifying the sciences transitions into psychology.
Psychology recognizes three principal forms of intellectual activity: memory, imagination, and reason. Although these forms are always inseparable, they can nonetheless operate to varying degrees, which leads directly to Bacon’s tripartite division of the sciences. History corresponds to memory, poetry corresponds to imagination—wherein Bacon views poetry exclusively as a depiction of the known in contemplative and symbolic forms—and reason corresponds to the collective of explanatory sciences, which he simply labels “philosophy.” The use of this term still reflects the enduring identity of philosophy and science that persisted from antiquity until the beginning of the modern era. For further grouping of the sciences within these domains, Bacon employs distinctions among the objects themselves, thereby largely replacing outdated terms with ones closer to current usage.
One cannot deny that this classification rested on a remarkably precise understanding of the major scientific fields contemporary to Bacon and that it delineated these areas correctly in significant parts. For instance, the distinctions of political history from literary history, the description of nature from its understanding, physics from chemistry, and physiology from psychology still hold vital importance for the separation of the sciences today. The alignment of Bacon’s system with the actual state of contemporary science—which greatly surpassed its time—is evidenced by the fact that the French mathematician and philosopher d’Alembert, when undertaking the first new classification of the sciences since Bacon in his renowned 1756 introduction to the great French encyclopedia, broadly retained the Baconian system. He improved and supplemented it in various aspects. He initially maintained the primary division of the sciences into three domains corresponding to the three human spiritual capacities: memory, imagination, and reason.
D’Alembert’s Modification for the Arts and Sciences
With the aim of establishing not merely a classification of the sciences but also a classification of the arts, d’Alembert modified the order of Bacon’s system to suit this expanded task. He placed memory and reason first as the two distinctly scientific activities, followed by imagination as the organ of art, wherein he grouped poetry with other arts and liberated them from subservience to science. Setting aside the classification of the arts, which does not concern us here, we find in d’Alembert’s system the subdivision of the entire corpus of sciences into two parts: history and philosophy. The further dissection of these two domains remains identical to that of Bacon, with the sole difference that d’Alembert endeavored to allocate an appropriate place for mathematics, which his predecessor had almost entirely overlooked. He categorized mathematics among the natural sciences and closely associated it with mechanics, astronomy, and physics, regarding pure mathematics (arithmetic and geometry) as abstract natural sciences on the grounds that number, magnitude, and space are general properties of things.
Thus, Bacon’s classification, in a slightly modified form, persisted until the early nineteenth century. However, the inherent dual shortcomings of its fundamental principle could not remain hidden for long. The first shortcoming lay in the subjective interpretation Bacon assigned to the ancient philosophical division of sciences according to spiritual capacities, which entails a one-sided assessment of various scientific endeavors. This inevitably leads to a further error—the separation of interconnected disciplines and the grouping of heterogeneous fields into a single domain. For instance, history cannot be sufficiently defined merely as the science of memory. Natural history is closely related to other natural sciences, and political, ecclesiastical, and literary histories are linked with other humanities, such as theology, ethics, and politics.
The two parts of what Bacon termed history hardly share any relation beyond the general concept encapsulated in the phrase historical process, which refers to the sequence of known events. Moreover, the error that crept into Bacon’s primary division of sciences resulted in further inaccuracies. As one moves to more specific subdivisions of the system, the division principle shifts, relying partly on a classification based on objects and partly on the aims of scientific inquiry.
Nineteenth-Century Shifts Toward Object-Based Classification
Prompted by such considerations, two major new attempts at classification arose in the early nineteenth century. These approaches independently and resolutely rejected the traditional classification principle established since Plato and sought to systematize sciences exclusively by their objects. One of these classifications, attributed to the jurist and moralist-philosopher Jeremy Bentham, emerged in 1829. The other, proposed by the physicist André-Marie Ampère, renowned for his research on the relationship between magnetism and electricity, appeared in 1834. Both were evidently influenced by the great eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century natural science systematizers such as Linnaeus, Jussieu, and de Candolle. Specifically, it appears that these two new classification systems were significantly shaped not only by the objective division of sciences strictly delineated by Linnaeus and de Candolle in their botanical classifications, but also by the principle of dichotomous division. Yet these classifiers followed the aforementioned naturalists in another respect as well: they regarded themselves as tasked with inventing an entirely new nomenclature for the sciences. Bentham, in particular, pushed this endeavor too far. While Linnaeus’s botanical system—striving for precise terminology based on a single principle for objects that previously lacked exact and defined names—was a necessity, in the classifications proposed by Bentham and Ampère this became a fatal flaw that ruined their reception. It was hardly desirable for disciplines such as mathematics, physics, and chemistry to abandon their well-established names in favor of proposed terms like nosology, physiurgy, or stechiodynamics. This unfortunate terminology deprived these classification systems, despite the authority of their creators, of nearly any influence in the scientific community. The arbitrariness of many distinctions they proposed, which failed to reflect the actual division of labor in science, compounded this failure. Undertaken often merely for the sake of logical schematism, the introduction of purely mechanical arts into the classification of sciences—such as orthography, alphabetics, and pantomimics—further revealed the artificiality of these systems. A telling indication of this artificiality is that Ampère, through successive dichotomous divisions of his two main scientific domains, cosmology and noology (the science of spirit), arrived at eighty-four subordinate areas.
Nonetheless, their central idea—the strict establishment of the division of sciences based on objects—marked a significant advancement compared to earlier attempts. The resulting new classification principle, which divides all knowledge into two broad branches of natural sciences and the humanities, holds tremendous significance. The natural sciences had long secured their independent status, whereas the humanities had not yet achieved such a position. The new overarching concept for the latter, which emerged independently in both classification systems, served as a sign that a consciousness of their close interconnection was beginning to take root within the scientific community. The fact that the activities of historians, philologists, theologians, jurists, and political economists often intersect and are more closely linked to one another than, for example, to the work of astronomers, physicists, or chemists should have become evident from the moment specialized branches of knowledge emerged as genuine sciences.
The reason for the relatively late emergence of this awareness under the common name of the humanities lies primarily in the practical tendencies of certain disciplines, such as theology, jurisprudence, and political economy, which still pursued distinctly different objectives. Furthermore, there was no universally recognized main discipline among the humanities that could serve as a common foundation for the others, analogous to how physics served the natural sciences. Yet despite this, there was a palpable need to highlight the humanities as a distinct branch of knowledge. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that even before Bentham in England and Ampère in France established a common concept for these fields, Hegel in Germany had already, in his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences first published in 1817, divided the general content of knowledge into logic, natural philosophy, and philosophy of spirit. He regarded logic as the abstract foundation of both other branches, which together study the entirety of human existence. Hegel’s system, with its established relation to empirical sciences, simultaneously took on the character of a classification of all sciences, with the primary divisions of natural philosophy and philosophy of spirit substantially corresponding to the existing natural sciences and humanities.
Auguste Comte and the Hierarchical System of Positive Science
Almost simultaneously with the dualistic classification systems of Bentham and Ampère, a new attempt at classification emerged from a completely different perspective. It was initiated by Auguste Comte in 1830 as part of his encyclopedic overview of science in his Course in Positive Philosophy (1830–1842). Comte wholly agreed with the two aforementioned systems in rejecting the classification of sciences according to human spiritual capacities. Such a division seemed to him tenuous simply because all significant human spiritual capacities generally operate together in every scientific endeavor. On the other hand, from his perspective, he could not base the classification of sciences on their objects of study either. Ultimately, all objects of scientific investigation are natural bodies that, although differentiated by specific properties, share essential qualities.
From these two conditions—the unity of scientific activity and the unity of the nature of all objects of scientific inquiry—arose Comte’s monistic system and linear order of sciences, in contrast to the dualistic classifications. In this system, the disciplines studying the most general properties inherent to all bodies must precede and serve as the foundation for all others. This is mathematics, which in turn is divided into abstract and concrete parts: analysis, or general arithmetic, which examines abstract relationships of magnitudes; and geometry, which has spatial quantities as its subject. Because space is an immediate quality of bodies themselves, geometry belongs, according to Comte, to the natural sciences. Following geometry is the science of the motion of bodies, mechanics, and subsequently astronomy, the study of celestial bodies and systems in their interrelations. Opposed to astronomy as the investigation of the movements of surrounding earthly bodies and their particles is physics, which is followed by chemistry, the discipline that examines changes defined by the qualitative properties of substances. Above chemistry stands biology, the study of individual life phenomena arising from the physical and chemical properties of known bodies. Finally, above biology as the concluding member of the whole is sociology, the study of the connection of many living individuals in society and its changes.
This linear order of the sciences, according to Comte, bears a dual significance. When viewed from the bottom upwards, it characterizes a subjective sequential increase in abstractness; conversely, when viewed from the top downwards, it indicates an objective gradual increase in the complexity of the properties of entities. Comte believes that the human spirit tends to grasp the abstract before the concrete, for the former is more straightforward, and studying complex properties presupposes knowledge of simpler, more abstract concepts. From this it follows that the linear system of sciences must also function as a system of their study, thereby possessing significant pedagogical value alongside its philosophical implications. It is indeed possible to study a single science without familiarizing oneself with the subsequent disciplines in the system. Conversely, it is impossible to study any science without understanding those that precede it in the hierarchy. For instance, a mathematician may well refrain from studying astronomy or physics. A chemist, according to Comte, must possess knowledge of physics, astronomy, mechanics, and mathematics. A sociologist, moreover, must thoroughly understand not only all these sciences but also biology and chemistry.
Although Comte’s classification of the sciences diverges sharply from the empirical reality of the disciplines, particularly the moral sciences, it exerted far greater influence on subsequent thought than the earlier dualistic systems of Bentham and Ampère. While the later development of science and scientific education rarely conformed to Comte’s doctrine of the hierarchy of sciences, his ideas left a lasting mark on the positivist tradition in philosophy. Within this movement emerged an ambitious effort to refine and improve the Comtean system, an effort chiefly associated with Herbert Spencer.
Herbert Spencer’s Critique and Revision of Comte
Spencer directs two principal criticisms at Comte. First, he argues that Comte conflated the universal with the abstract. Second, he contends that Comte failed to secure psychology’s rightful claim to autonomy. The consequence of conflating the universal and the abstract is that the sciences occupying the upper echelons of Comte’s system are characterized by greater universality rather than greater abstractness. The phenomena they examine are more widespread, but not necessarily more abstract. For example, astronomy, which deals with individual objects, is more concrete than physics, just as physics is no more abstract than chemistry. According to Spencer, psychology must be distinguished from biology due to the specificity of its tasks. Sociology is positioned directly thereafter, because social facts depend far more on the psychological than on the biological properties of individuals. In this respect, Spencer departs most sharply from Comte. Comte denied the possibility of direct self-observation, demanded objective observation for psychology, and consequently considered scientific psychology feasible only as an analysis of physical properties—a process he believed was realized in phrenology.
Seeking to remedy the deficiencies of Comte’s system while retaining his core premise that the order of the sciences is determined by their degree of abstraction, Spencer replaced the linear model with a division of the sciences into distinct groups. He distinguishes three such groups: the abstract, the abstract-concrete, and the concrete.
- The first encompasses mathematics and abstract mechanics;
- the second includes concrete mechanics, physics, and chemistry;
- and the third comprises astronomy alongside associated geographical disciplines, biology—which incorporates botany and zoology alongside physiology—psychology, and finally sociology.
The arrangement of these three groups represents a gradual transition from abstract to concrete branches of knowledge. Within each group, the more general sciences with a broader scope precede those with a narrower scope.
Though this system, thanks to the repositioning of astronomy and the recognition of psychology's independence, has eliminated some undeniable shortcomings of Comte's classification, it still retains two principal errors akin to those found in Comte's work: 1) the presumption of a hierarchy of sciences wherein subsequent fields always presuppose their predecessors as foundations—this assumption, albeit slightly mitigated by the grouping of sciences; and 2) the introduction of sociology as a new science in place of the numerous existing disciplines, such as history, philology, and legal studies. Within the realm of natural sciences, it remains permissible to a certain extent that subsequent disciplines require preceding ones as auxiliaries; however, the inclusion of psychology in such a series and the associated overarching concept of a hierarchy of sciences can only be entertained under the assumption that psychology, in both content and methodology, belongs to the natural sciences. Nevertheless, under such conditions, this classification ceases to represent an actual categorization of existing sciences; it can only hold value as a program for a future system of sciences, constructed upon specific philosophical presuppositions and demands. This is evidenced, both in Spencer's and Comte's frameworks, by the manner in which they integrate sociology into their classification systems. For sociology ought not merely to be appended as a new science to existing ones—as Bacon once sought to do with scientific fields yet unformed in his time—but it must simultaneously replace a multitude of actually existing sciences, thereby denying them the right to exist in their current forms.
John Stuart Mill and Later Objections to the Scientific Hierarchy
This arbitrary manipulation of existing sciences by Comte and Spencer, grounded in the concept of a scientific hierarchy, has prompted numerous objections. Even philosophers who otherwise align with Comte’s positive philosophy have disagreed with this one-sided principle of classification borrowed from the natural sciences. Chief among them is John Stuart Mill, who contested this principle in his expansive System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, first published in 1843. Despite its noted superficiality—or perhaps even because of it—this work became one of the most influential texts on logic in the latter half of the 19th century.
Mill himself did not propose a distinct classification of the sciences, but he scrutinized two aspects of Comte’s system: the position of mathematics and the placement of sociology. Regarding mathematics, he agrees with Comte and even refines his perspective. While Comte included only geometry within the natural sciences and relegated analysis to an abstract logical preparation, Mill contends that all mathematical disciplines address the most universal properties of natural phenomena. Mathematics remains entirely abstract yet fundamentally empirical for him, as measurability, magnitude, and extension are empirically ascertainable properties of objects, much like light, color, and sound. Mill adopts a different stance on sociology. Although he acknowledges the need for a science of society and sees it reflected in disciplines such as political economy and statistics, he robustly defends the autonomy of other fields—notably the historical sciences—that rest on human volition and motivation. Here, as across much of his philosophy, he follows Bentham by grouping the historical disciplines under the overarching category of the moral sciences. This designation gained currency in contemporary literature primarily through Mill’s influence. If the term remains familiar in German discourse today, even if less pervasive than natural sciences, it owes more to Mill than to Hegel. These two points—where Mill simultaneously expands Comte’s system on mathematics and restricts it on sociology to accommodate existing disciplines—proved contentious. They concern the status of mathematics within the system of knowledge and the unification of the moral sciences as a distinct domain separate from the natural sciences, and both hold fundamental significance for the development of scientific classification.
Über den Autor
Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.
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