The Task and System of Philosophy

The Task of Philosophy

Philosophy and Science

The answer to the first of the two questions posed above can be found in examining the historical changes in the relationship between philosophy and the entirety of scientific knowledge. This path reveals that the status of philosophy in relation to other sciences has never remained static but has evolved in accordance with changing needs. Consequently, the notion of philosophy is not an immutable entity; it is different for us now than it was in earlier times—a point often overlooked by both philosophers and representatives of other sciences. This inattentiveness gives rise to a false understanding of the role of philosophy among other sciences.

In antiquity, the concepts of philosophy and science—particularly theoretical science, emerging from a pure desire for knowledge—were entirely congruent. In this sense, Plato refers to the acquisition of knowledge as κτήσις της επιστήμης, including not only philosophy but also geometry. Among the works of Aristotle, there are indeed specialized studies that he himself would scarcely classify as pure philosophy, such as those concerning the parts of animals; however, he likely regarded them as preliminary work and a collection of materials for specific philosophical disciplines. In contrast, disciplines such as physics and politics—essentially those encompassing broader scientific domains—were undoubtedly included in the realm of philosophy by Aristotle’s school. This relationship underwent slight modification during the subsequent Alexandrian period, where scientific inquiry became more specialized, leading to greater division of labor. Nevertheless, mathematicians and philologists of the Alexandrian era continually aligned themselves with specific philosophical schools, and their orientation in specialized fields was determined by their affiliation with Stoic, Peripatetic, or Academic traditions.

The position that philosophy held in antiquity became precarious when Christianity appropriated its conclusions for its own purposes. While Christianity also could not dispense with science, knowledge was subordinated to faith. However, the form of this subordination varied with the conditions of the times. In the early centuries, pagan philosophy contributed both positively and negatively to the formation of Christian worldview, aiding in the gradual systematization developed through scientific method—positively through its actual influence on the formulation of church dogmas and negatively through the apologetic and polemical writings it directly inspired. Later, during the flourishing of scholasticism, this relationship of absolute subordination gave way to a division between the realms of religion and philosophy. Religion and dogma were assigned a higher knowledge, pertaining to the comprehension of the supersensible world and divine order, establishing the connection between the sensory and the supersensory realms. Conversely, science was relegated to the sensory world, encompassing all that could be understood without revelation, through the natural faculties of reason. Aside from this, the Christian Middle Ages preserved the unity of philosophy and science inherited from antiquity. This unity was rigorously maintained in the form it assumed under the philosopher who dominated the Middle Ages, Aristotle. At that time, scholars were expected to possess comprehensive knowledge of the entirety of science, although a certain degree of specialization in scientific labor was permitted. In the scholastic system, theology towered over secular science just as, in the teaching of its foremost representative, Thomas Aquinas, heavenly virtues—faith, love, and hope—overshadowed the four worldly virtues of ancient philosophy. Theology was not only to supplement the work of secular science but also to direct it. This unity of philosophy and science was reflected in the medieval universities, which aspired to a pure form of science. They were indeed universitates litterarum in the sense that the study of general science, philosophy, preceded both the study of theology and the exploration of individual branches of secular knowledge, to which the clergy initially devoted themselves exclusively.

This state of affairs began to change with the advent of the modern era. Two conditions contributed to this transformation. The first involved the revival of independent thought, liberating philosophy from the dominion of theology; the second was the autonomy achieved by specialized sciences in relation to philosophy, along with the division evolving from this scientific labor. Under the influence of the first condition, philosophy endeavored to reclaim a guiding role in life and science. Conversely, the second condition fostered a progressive separation from the specialized sciences. In tandem, philosophy acquired the significance of scientia universalis, as Leibniz termed it. However, in the manner that philosophy sought to resolve this task, its prior relationship with theology still lingered: the new philosophy, like its medieval predecessor, either submitted to theology or contested its dominion. Moreover, the separation of specialized scientific labor from philosophy resulted in the latter becoming fully dependent on specific branches of secular science; at times, it was predominantly influenced by mathematics and the natural sciences, as during the 17th and 18th centuries, or by the historical sciences of the spirit, which characterized the 19th century.

Later, in more recent times, doubts even arose regarding the very right of philosophy to exist. A glance at the gradual growth of specialization in scientific labor inevitably gives rise to suspicion that, once this process of specialization is completed, there will be no role left for the general science, the mother of all sciences, as all the tasks once belonging to it will now fall under the purview of specialized disciplines. If psychology is no longer regarded, as is more or less universally acknowledged, as a philosophical science in its own right, but rather as a specialized science akin to physics, chemistry, or history, why should we not also allow for ethics, aesthetics, or the philosophy of law and religion to join their respective specialized sciences—ethics to cultural and moral history, the philosophy of law to jurisprudence, and the philosophy of religion to theology? And when the process of specialization reaches such proportions, then logic or the theory of knowledge—the sole remnant of former philosophy—will become a specialized science of its own, scarcely comparable to the philosophy of yore. This perspective on the present and future of philosophy has recently gained considerable traction, partly overtly and partly subtly, as a very understandable result of the prevailing estrangement of specialized sciences from philosophy. What is unknown can be disregarded. A specialist, immersed in particular studies for which he requires no auxiliary means beyond those within his specific field, is naturally inclined to regard a general science like philosophy as superfluous. It is indeed more astonishing that such views find a foothold even within philosophy itself. Yet this phenomenon can again be explained by the humility induced by the evolution of philosophical systems.

If we regard the creation of these latter, following the example of Albert Lange, as “poetry in concepts,” it is easy to conclude that the systems that have emerged thus far have already exhausted all possible forms of such creativity. Therefore, if what belonged to philosophy, upon completion of the process of specialization, transitions to the domain of specialized sciences, it will have no other task but to recount its own history. Such opinions are more or less frequently defended by historians of philosophy from the Hegelian school. Since Hegel asserted that the development of philosophy concluded with his system, it is not far-fetched to consider placing the history of philosophy in lieu of what was once philosophy itself in earlier times.

However, at present, only a few voices advocate for the understanding of philosophy as a purely historical science. This view has proven inadequate for two reasons. On one hand, within philosophy itself, numerous attempts have arisen once more to find new perspectives in specialized scientific fields, such as epistemology or ethics, and there is no shortage of efforts to form new systems that correspond to the altered scientific conditions; stagnation is as impossible for philosophy as it is for any other domain. On the other hand, and this phenomenon is more characteristic of contemporary philosophy than of its recent past, a vibrant philosophical need is awakening within the special sciences. In mathematics, natural science, as well as in history, legal studies, sociology, art, and literature, philosophical inquiry is now as prevalent as it is in disciplines universally recognized as belonging to philosophy. Indeed, engaging with fundamental questions that pertain to various branches of knowledge and that partly relate to general epistemological issues must be considered as philosophical activity. In these increasingly common pursuits, especially among specialists, there is a clear desire—not to diminish the significance of philosophy—to position it in a fundamentally different relationship with the other sciences compared to its earlier status in antiquity and the Middle Ages. While the value of philosophy for the ancients lay in its encompassing the entirety of theoretical knowledge, satisfying purely cognitive needs, it can be said that its value for our time is rather derived from its evolving into a universal science, responding to the emerging tendency to address problems that, due to their universality, cannot find a place within any specific science. The existence of such problems is necessary because the division of scientific labor and the resulting specialization of sciences always remain somewhat arbitrary; issues from one specific field of science are connected to those of another, and there exist certain general problems that can only be resolved with the aid of results independently obtained through various methods. Furthermore, each science ultimately pertains to the unity and interconnectedness of knowledge. No result will be reliable unless it aligns not only with the facts of its own domain but also with results obtained through different means. This requirement for a consistent relationship between the results of scientific inquiry naturally transcends the boundaries of specific fields of scientific labor; the results from different areas and the general perspectives that dominate them must ultimately not contradict one another. The same universal natural laws hold significance in physics, chemistry, and physiology, even though the conditions under which these laws apply may differ, leading to varied specializations of the laws themselves. The same motivations for human actions considered in history, albeit from a different angle, are presupposed in political economy, legal studies, and finally psychology. Thus, our intellect's desire for unity initially extends to neighboring scientific fields and subsequently, due to the continuous interconnection of all scientific endeavors, to more distant domains. No specialized discipline can completely detach itself from the overarching system of human knowledge, and the fundamental questions surrounding the latter ultimately extend to all branches of scientific inquiry, either relying on the results obtained within these fields or exerting an influence akin to that of general principles on the specialized ones.

If we attempt to reduce these relationships, initially existing among related fields and later, directly or indirectly, between more distant sciences, to their foundational elements, we ultimately arrive at two such foundations corresponding to two different directions of our intellect's striving for unity. The first consists in the universality of fundamental scientific concepts, and the second—in the general significance of the laws of human cognition. Concepts such as movement, matter, force, or energy are common to various natural sciences. Physics, chemistry, and physiology each engage with these concepts from their respective viewpoints and under somewhat altered conditions. The scope of the concepts of cause, substance, and purpose is even broader; they permeate all domains of empirical knowledge, for wherever an attempt is made to establish any internal connection between the facts of reality, these concepts must be invoked. The same holds true for universal laws of cognition and the inquiries into the scope, limits, and validity of knowledge. The demand for the exploration of these questions is all the more pressing as the specialized sciences operate under the assumption that these issues have been resolved; they utilize specific preliminary assumptions arising from our practical life experience without subjecting them to scientific scrutiny. This arises from the fact that such questions lie outside the realm of specialized sciences and should fall under the purview of a more general science dedicated to the laws of human cognition and the universal epistemological problems associated with them.

From this relationship between philosophy and the aggregate of other sciences arises a definition of philosophy that characterizes its position within the modern scientific system and its tasks: philosophy is a universal science aimed at unifying the knowledge obtained by the special sciences into a coherent, non-contradictory system, and at reducing the general methods and assumptions employed in scientific inquiry to their principles.

However, while this dual task fully delineates the relationship between philosophy and the entirety of other sciences, its relation to a second realm of life, with which it initially stood in close interaction—namely, religion—remains decidedly undefined.