Three Domains of Specialized Sciences (Mathematics, Natural Sciences, and the Human Sciences) - The Task of Philosophy - The Task and System of Philosophy
Introduction to philosophy based on a historical approach - 2024 Inhalt

The Task and System of Philosophy

The Task of Philosophy

Three Domains of Specialized Sciences (Mathematics, Natural Sciences, and the Human Sciences)

Three domains of knowledge have gradually, for various reasons, become relatively autonomous parts of the scientific system: mathematics, the natural sciences, and the human sciences. However, of these, only the natural sciences have firmly established their place in this structure. Mathematics is still often considered a branch of the natural sciences, either as an abstract extension or merely as an auxiliary discipline. The human sciences, though sometimes acknowledged as independent, frequently have their very name and relationship to psychology disputed. In light of this situation, it is necessary to critically examine the relationship of these three domains of knowledge to one another.

The Position of Mathematics

Contrary to Kant, who viewed mathematics as an a priori discipline built upon the pure forms of intuition—space and time—all positivist attempts at classification, from d’Alembert to Mill and Spencer, have regarded mathematics as subordinate to the natural sciences, either as a whole or at least in part, particularly in its branches concerning geometry and abstract mechanics. In the context of our task of classifying sciences, this debate cannot be settled by a philosophical inquiry into the origins of mathematical concepts. Instead, mathematics, like any other science, must be assigned its place in the system of knowledge based on its relationships with other branches of knowledge and the specific nature of its tasks.

Mathematics, as an auxiliary science, undoubtedly shares a close connection with the natural sciences. Yet, first, its role is not confined to that of an applied science, and second, the application of mathematics to the natural sciences does not preclude its application to other disciplines. Apart from psychology, where since Herbart attempts have been made to formulate not only psychophysical but also purely psychological relationships mathematically, other examples include political economy, where the theory of value has benefited from mathematical methods, and even logic, which can be reduced to a unique mathematical algorithm. Anyone who would, simply because mathematical methods can be applied, classify these branches of knowledge as natural sciences would fall into a logical trap. Instead, we can conclude that in fields like history, where mathematical application is not possible and likely never will be, this is due partly to the complexity of historical phenomena and partly to the nature of historical problems—factors unrelated to their relationship to the natural sciences.

Empirical Data versus Formal Properties in Mathematics

Far more important than these external relations are the characteristics that stem from the unique nature of mathematical tasks, which modern mathematics has only recently clarified. The fundamental distinction between mathematics and other sciences—whether they belong to the natural sciences or any other branch, such as history, philology, or law—is that all these disciplines deal with experience, with actual empirical data or at least with possible and thus assumed or anticipated facts. Physics, like history, seeks to describe and explain reality. Both, in the pursuit of such explanations, may transcend immediate data, either by constructing hypotheses or by positing facts inaccessible to direct investigation. However, such hypotheses and assumptions are always subject to two conditions. First, they must be empirically possible. Second, they must be useful in explaining actual data. Natural laws that do not apply to the real world and historical events that never occurred are not science—they are fantasy. Mathematics, however, operates in a fundamentally different domain. It is not constrained by empirical reality, and any conceptual formation subject to its inquiry becomes a legitimate scientific problem, whether or not it corresponds to any conceivable empirical fact. Mathematics, therefore, does not limit itself to studying magnitudes that can serve to quantify real objects; it also explores magnitudes unsuitable for such applications, provided their concepts can be precisely defined and their purely ideal properties logically developed. Thus, four-dimensional or higher-dimensional spaces, or continua where the shortest distance between two points is a curve rather than a straight line, are just as valid subjects of mathematical inquiry as the three-dimensional empirical space. The mathematical treatment of concepts begins with objects of empirical reality, but it does not end there, as logical operations may extend far beyond the limits of experience.

This unique characteristic of mathematics arises from its relationship to objects of experience. The distinctiveness of mathematical work lies in its exclusive focus on certain formal properties of objects, abstracting from their broader content. Through such abstraction, mathematics, in the further formal processing of its definitions, can proceed to any conceivable forms constructed within pure concepts, without asking whether these forms correspond to real properties of actual objects. From this follows the fact that pure mathematics, by its abstract formal nature, cannot be subordinated to any other science. It constitutes an independent domain—one of formal sciences, against which all other disciplines, dealing with the real content of experience, stand as the real empirical sciences.

Natural Sciences and the Human Sciences

Natural Sciences and the Human Sciences

The separation of mathematics leads us to ask whether, and in what sense, the second domain of science—which encompasses the entirety of reality—requires further division. The natural sciences have long formed a distinct domain by virtue of the shared nature of their objects. A similar unity exists for another branch of the real sciences, although the term human sciences, now commonly used to designate them, remains contested. One objection is that psychology, which by name should be the foundation of the human sciences, actually belongs closer to the natural sciences because of its method. This leads to the conclusion in Comte’s system that psychology must be subordinated to natural science, an outcome incompatible with the independent significance of the historical sciences. Additionally, the term human sciences faces criticism because, as Comte observed, it implies a contrast with nature, whereas spiritual processes occur within natural objects and in that sense belong to nature.

Given these difficulties, the alternative term historical sciences has been proposed to better reflect the prevailing views among historians, linguists, and others. The distinctive character of the facts studied by philology, law, economics, and above all history lies not in the operation of psychic forces—which interact with physical forces in every cultural phenomenon—but in historical development itself. Yet objections have also been raised against this designation, since the concept of historical development is too broad. It would even encompass parts of nature outside humanity, such as the animal kingdom, if one presumes the operation of psychic forces. Consequently, the production of cultural values serves as the proper basis for separating the disciplines concerned with human activity from the natural sciences and psychology, which are directed purely toward the theoretical explanation of facts and must be subordinated to the latter. The division of the real sciences rests not on a contrast between nature and spirit, but between nature and culture.

Regarding the term historical sciences, we must first observe that development—that is, history—is present in all that exists: the solar system, the Earth, plants, animals, and humanity alike. Although this term is frequently restricted to human history for the sake of brevity, it cannot serve as a systematic criterion for distinguishing fields of knowledge. Such a criterion, understood precisely, applies to every domain under consideration. Furthermore, the expression is at once too broad and too narrow. While no spiritual occurrence is conceivable without a presupposed historical development, it does not follow that every method of examining such occurrences must be historical.

The defining feature of certain sciences of the spirit is rather that they limit themselves to analyzing the systematic interconnections of particular facts without inquiring into their origin. For example, economic theory, as a branch of political economy, investigates the general phenomena of the consumption and production of goods without reference to the specific conditions of their genesis. Similarly, a given legal order can form the subject of a logical-systematic investigation that is fundamentally distinct from historical-legal inquiry. Thus, legal history does not exhaust the entirety of legal science, but constitutes merely one of its branches. The same relationship obtains between political economy and economic history, or between grammar and the history of language.

Nomothetic Science and Unique Historical Events

Attempts are frequently made to ground the distinction between branches of science on principles already familiar from common-sense views of different fields of knowledge. According to this view, what happens in nature repeats itself countlessly, enabling the natural scientist to subsume facts under abstract laws. History, by contrast, investigates events that happen only once. This leads to the conclusion that natural science is nomothetic and concerned solely with the general, whereas history values the singular and seeks to grasp it through deep immersion.

However, such a purely formal criterion is wholly inadequate for distinguishing concepts that interest us primarily for their content, rather than for the greater or lesser number of facts they subsume. This criterion becomes particularly unsuitable when it proves to be incorrect. It is cited even by those who wish to apply it, often with exceptions.

As for the formal distinction between historical and natural sciences mentioned earlier, it is false in two respects. First, it is incorrect to think that singular occurrences play no role in natural science. For instance, almost all geology consists of singular facts. It would be difficult to argue that the investigation of the glacial period, simply because it likely occurred only once, does not belong to natural science but instead falls under the historian’s purview. Second, it is also incorrect to assert that lawful regularity, as such, cannot be the object of history. Since the time of Polybius, historians, insofar as they were not mere chronologists, have rarely missed the opportunity to point out simultaneous events and analogous connections between occurrences at different times. They often draw certain conclusions from such parallels.

One may assign varying degrees of importance to the comparative-historical method, but the historian’s right to employ it cannot be denied. Just as the natural scientist’s occasional investigation of singular events cannot be contested when circumstances demand it, so too does this right hold. Nevertheless, even if there is a grain of truth in this erroneous view—as with most false assertions, namely, that historical facts tend to possess a more singular character than natural phenomena—this criterion remains insufficient where it proves valid because it is merely a formal one. As such, it raises the question of the inherent qualities of the material content of phenomena, upon which this higher criterion is based.

Posing the question in this manner leads to the conclusion that the motives of the agents involved are largely dependent on individual circumstances. The interaction of countless such motives with external conditions renders historical events necessarily more singular than natural phenomena, due in part to the general nature of psychic phenomena and in part to their complex character. Thus, if we replace this formal criterion with a corresponding real one, we once again arrive at the term “sciences of the spirit.”

However, should one refuse to acknowledge this term on the grounds that it implies psychology as the foundational science for the entire domain—an implication incompatible with psychology’s current status—such reluctance would be unjustified. The reason for this hesitation lies in the fact that psychology, in its present state, does not yet meet the legitimate demands placed upon it. This fact does not necessitate the adoption of a demonstrably false principle for the division of sciences. Nor does it justify the permanent denial of psychology’s capacity to fulfill the role it is called to play according to its overarching purpose. One could even argue that the claims of some philosophers stem from ignorance of what scientific psychology can already accomplish, and that such scholars’ interests lie far removed from the pursuit of scientific psychology. These philosophers assert that scholars dealing with concrete manifestations of spiritual life, such as linguists, mythologists, and historians, are content with a vulgar psychology acquired through practical experience.

Critique of the Term Sciences of Culture

If, finally, the term “sciences of culture” has been proposed for the sciences of the spirit, based on similar reasoning and with the recognition that the concept of “history” is too narrow to encompass all the sciences of the spirit, this term is hardly a suitable choice. All culture, whether it pertains to the economy of a country, the products of industry and technology, or, in its metaphorical sense, “spiritual culture,” is undoubtedly a product of the human intellect. However, not every one of these products belongs to the field of science to which this name is being applied.

The productive forces of a nation’s economy, machines, and the chemical auxiliaries of technology and industry, which fall under the concept of “culture” in its original sense, rightly belong to the objects of natural science and its applied disciplines. Therefore, just as a layperson would hardly assume that the “science of culture” refers to the sciences of the spirit, they would likewise not identify a philologist or historian as a “cultural worker.” Thus, the expression “science of culture” suffers from the flaw of using the specialized and relatively modern sense of the word “culture,” meaning spiritual culture, in a way that contradicts proper usage.

Even if we accept this arbitrary narrowing of the word “culture,” the term “science of culture” is still too restrictive. It emphasizes the concept of cultural value in a way that neither practically nor theoretically corresponds to its actual significance. Historical development is, of course, often directed toward the production or consumption of cultural values, but not everything produced through historical development possesses cultural value. Moreover, to consider things solely in terms of their cultural value is far from being the sole task of science. Science is much more concerned with understanding facts and their connections. Only after such understanding, when appropriate, can their evaluation follow. Similarly, the scope of a science cannot be defined based on the products that result from the phenomena it studies, but rather by the nature of the phenomena themselves.

The Rationale for the Sciences of the Spirit

The considerations outlined above contributed to the emergence of the term “sciences of the spirit.” This term was intended to designate the collection of branches of scientific knowledge that deal with the spiritual development and products of humanity. Thus, it presupposes a distinction between spiritual and natural phenomena. However, it by no means implies an absolute opposition between “bodies” and “spirits,” as is often incorrectly assumed by those who argue against it. They point to the fact that spiritual phenomena occur within natural bodies. This distinction in no way excludes the fact that phenomena of both kinds occur in the same sensory substrate. It merely allows that, regardless of how they influence one another, they nonetheless possess sufficiently distinct characteristics to warrant the division of these domains of knowledge.

Naturally, this division still acknowledges the various relationships between the distinct areas of knowledge, since it simultaneously upholds the unity of the sensory substrate underlying all our experience.

When other terms are preferred over “sciences of the spirit,” this is not due to a denial of the common bond that unites the fields grouped under that name. Rather, it happens because the term implicitly suggests a relation to psychology. Since the foundation of the connection between the sciences of the spirit is their shared dependence on spiritual processes and phenomena, it follows naturally that the branch of knowledge which studies the properties of these processes—directly evident in consciousness—cannot be excluded from these sciences. This branch is psychology.

The Methodological Role of Psychology

Psychology, it is claimed, by its methods and aims, belongs to the natural sciences, and therefore has contributed nothing to the so-called “sciences of culture.” However, this reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, it conflates psychology’s current, evolving state with its ultimate task. Second, it assumes, based on insufficient acquaintance with the true state of psychology, that the interpretation defended by certain metaphysical psychologists is universally valid.

It is hardly surprising that psychology, having only relatively recently achieved independent status, is still preoccupied with elementary tasks, often located at the boundary between psychological and physiological investigation. Yet it is evident that the current state of psychology cannot be used to judge its ultimate purpose. Even less permissible is the understanding of psychology and its aims as viewed by certain psychologists and physiologists, who have attempted to resolve psychological problems by deriving mental processes from physical ones, considering the latter as more fundamental and causally determining. This view is a metaphysical hypothesis, akin to others, and it has already been sufficiently refuted within philosophical epistemology, even before its recent revival in attempts to reduce psychology to physiology.

The task of psychology as an empirical science is not determined by metaphysical hypotheses about the relationship between soul and body, but is drawn from the facts upon which it is based. These facts are the facts of human consciousness, or more specifically, the processes of sensation, feeling, imagination, emotions, will, and the actions that arise from these processes.





Über den Autor

Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.

Quellen und Methodik

Der Inhalt basiert auf akademischen Quellen in mehreren Sprachen — darunter ukrainische, russische und englische Universitätslehrbücher sowie wissenschaftliche Ausgaben zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Texte wurden aus den Originalquellen ins Deutsche übertragen und redaktionell bearbeitet. Alle Artikel werden vor der Veröffentlichung inhaltlich und didaktisch geprüft.

Zuletzt geändert: 15/11/2026